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INTRODUCTION 
Officers and directors have special access to information that 
they can use to profit in the purchase and sale of their company's 
securities. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act)1 is the only provision of the federal securities laws 
explicitly designed to deter such transactions.2 To accomplish its 
purpose, section 16(b) requires insiders to disgorge to the company 
any profit they realize from "any purchase and sale, or any sale and 
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), ch. 404, § 16(b), 48 Stat. 881, 896 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988)). 
2. Section lO(b) of the Exchange Act, while authorizing the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to define fraudulent or deceptive acts of securities manipulation, does 
not explicitly forbid insider trading or any other particular practice. See Exchange Act 
§ lO(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988). Pursuant to its delegated authority, the SEC adopted rule 
lOb-5, which prohibits fraud in securities transactions but does not specifically mention in-
sider trading: See 19 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1993). In 1961, the SEC held that rule lOb-5 forbids 
insider trading in both face-to-face transactions and anonymous stock exchanges. In re Cady, 
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Thus, while§ lO(b) may be applied to insider trading 
via rule lOb-5, neither the section nor the rule is specifically designed to reach this practice. 
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purchase, of any equity security" of the company within· a six-
month period.3 
Does section 16(b) in fact deter officers and directors from trad-
ing on the basis of nonpublic information?4 If so, to which pairs of 
transactions should section 16(b) be applied among all that the stat-
ute's language can be stretched to cover? Proper answers to these 
fundamental questions require a coherent theory of section 16(b )'s 
application. This theory should determine whether and how a pen-
alty on short-swing transactions deters insider trading, and it should 
account for the costs of imposing this penalty. Despite section 
16(b )'s sixty years of existence, the courts and legal scholars have 
yet to develop such a theory.5 This article intends to fill this void, 
3. The full text of§§ 16(a) and 16(b) of the Exchange Act, as amended, reads as follows: 
Sec. 16. (a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more 
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) 
which is registered pursuant to section 12 of this title, or who is a director or an officer of 
the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such security on a 
national securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration statement filed 
pursuant to section 12(g) of this title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial 
owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and, if such security is 
registered on a national securities exchange, also with the exchange) of the amount of all 
equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days 
after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been a change in such 
ownership during such month, shall file with the Commission (and if such security is 
registered on a national securities exchange, shall also file with the exchange), a state-
ment indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such changes in his 
ownership as have occurred during such calendar month. 
(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been 
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the 
issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of 
any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of 
less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a 
debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of 
any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into 
such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security 
sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at 
law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of 
any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or 
refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prose-
cute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the 
date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any trans-
action where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and 
sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions 
which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended 
within the purpose of this subsection. 
Exchange Act § 16, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 896, as amended by Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. 
No. 88-467, § 8(a), 78 Stat. 565, 579 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988)) (emphases added). 
4. Section 16(b) also includes in its list of statutorily defined insiders the beneficial own-
ers of more than 10% of the shares of any class of the issuer's equity securities. See supra 
note 3. Its application to these persons involves issues of policy and statutory interpretation 
somewhat different from its application to officers and directors and thus will not be the 
focus of this article. 
5. 1\vo legal scholars, Steve Tuel and Karl Okamoto, have each recently developed gen-
eral theories of § 16, but they are not theories of how § 16 combats insider trading. Karl S. 
Okamoto, Rereading Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 27 GA. L. REv.183 (1992); 
Steve Tuel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held Compa-
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using the techniques of modem financial economics, the theory of 
the firm, and analogies to basic concepts of statistical inference. 
The theory developed here shows that a penalty on short-swing 
trading deters insider trading and suggests a simple framework for 
deciding on which pairs of transactions to impose the penalty.6 
Section 16(b) is one of the most important provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws. Section 16 has been the subject of more inter-
pretations by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) than any other provision.7 If the talk of inside corporate 
counsels is to be believed, section 16(b) gives rise to a substantial 
portion of the securities work of their offices as well. It was the 
basis of a claimed cause of action in twenty-four reported cases be-
tween 1987 and 1992, ranking it eighth among all provisions of the 
federal securities law,8 and it has spawned a small industry of plain-
tiffs' lawyers.9 It probably plays a larger day-to-day role in con-
straining the behavior of America's corporate executives than rule 
nies, 42 HASTINGS LJ. 391 (1991). Each theory instead rests on the unlikely proposition that 
despite the language of § 16(b )'s preamble - "For the purpose of preventing the unfair use 
of information that may have been obtained . . . ." - combatting insider trading is not 
§ 16(b)'s primary purpose. See infra note 87 for a further discussion of their works. 
6. The desirability or undesirability of insider trading is a controversial question that has 
been addressed extensively in legal and economic literature. For a critical survey of that 
debate, see Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate 
What?, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Autumn 1992, at 263, 266-90. Rather than attempting to 
add further to this debate, this article starts with the assumption that society has decided it 
wants to deter insider trading. 
7. Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Stockholders, Ex-
change Act Release No. 26,333, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 
84,343, at 89,600 (Dec. 2, 1988) [hereinafter Initial Release]. 
8. This figure is based on a Westlaw search, conducted by the author, of reported cases 
for the period 1987 through 1992. Search of Westlaw, Securities and Blue Sky Law Database, 
FSEC-CS File (October 1993) (search of federal securities cases, using the section numbers 
relating to all of the securities laws likely to be the basis of a cause of action). The number of 
reported cases in fact probably understates the impact of § 16(b) on the behavior of insiders 
because, over a wide range of possible situations, its applicability can be determined mechan-
ically. Insiders know with relative certainty much of the behavior that must be avoided in 
order to stay clear of § 16(b )'s sanctions, unlike, for example, rule lOb-5, the Exchange Act's 
catchall antifraud provision, which generated the most reported cases. With a smaller gray 
area of uncertain application, a given amount of behavior alteration resulting from the stat-
ute can be expected, ceteris paribus, to be accompanied by less behavior that gives rise to 
legal disputes. Moreover, those disputes that do arise are more likely to be settled and will 
thus give rise to fewer litigated cases. See George L. Priest, Measuring Legal Change, 3 J.L. 
EcoN. & 0RG. 193, 199-200 (1987) (concluding that less uncertainty concerning a legal stan-
dard will result in fewer litigated cases). 
9. Committee on Fed. Reg. of Sec., Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider 
Trading - Part II: Reform of Section 16, 42 Bus. LAW. 1087, 1134 (1987) (noting that "[a]n 
active plaintiffs' bar has been extremely effective in seeking disgorgement of short-swing 
profits under section 16(b)"). 
2092 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:2088 
10b-5's headline-grabbing, judge-made strictures against insider 
trading.10 
Section 16(b) is unusual in that it seeks to accomplish its stated 
purpose by indirect means rather than by direct prohibition.11 The 
statute's operation does not depend on whether there is any direct 
evidence of the use of inside information. Instead, it identifies cer-
tain pairs of transactions in terms of their nature and timing and in 
effect conclusively presumes that inside information was in some 
way used in connection with one or both of the transactions in the 
pair. Section 16(b ), therefore, is the paradigm of a crude legal rule 
of thumb. Because it applies automatically and without respect to 
the actual use of inside information, section 16(b) imposes sanctions 
in some circumstances on insiders who have not relied on inside 
information in deciding whether to trade. The sanctions imposed 
on persons who have not used inside information are justified be-
cause they facilitate the imposition of sanctions on persons who 
have traded on the basis of inside information. 
Section 16(b)'s indirectness makes the questions of efficacy and 
rational application particularly critical. If the statute is not effec-
tive at deterring insider trading, the costs it imposes on persons who 
are not trading on inside information are unjustifiable. If the stat-
ute is effective, the costs imposed on innocent traders need to be 
considered in constructing a rational approach to its application. 
10. Rule lOb-5 requires corporate insiders to disclose or abstain from trading only when 
they possess material inside information. The seminal case defining materiality for rule lOb-5 
cases states that possessing such information is "essentially extraordinary in nature." SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (quoting Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Se-
curities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf 
Sulfur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1289 (1965)), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In 
contrast, insiders must consider§ 16(b) in deciding the timing of every purchase and sale. As 
will be seen, the statute also has major effects on the design of share-price-based executive 
compensation. Moreover, § 16(a), which is intended to provide outsiders with the informa-
tion necessary to enforce § 16(b ), requires each officer and director to make monthly filings 
of any purchases or sales of his or her issuer's equity securities. Exchange Act § 16(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988). 
11. In some sense, even statutes that purport to prohibit directly a disapproved activity 
accomplish their purpose indirectly. Consider the application of a directly prohibitory stat-
ute. The finder of fact cannot directly observe whether or not a violation has occurred, and 
the application of the statute depends on the operation of evidentiary rules and presump· 
tions. Thus a directly prohibitory statute can be said to work indirectly too in the sense that 
the behavior that the statute deters is only that behavior that can be expected to give rise to a 
record that will lead to a finding of a violation by a finder of fact employing set presumptions 
and rules of evidence. All that differentiates § 16(b) from directly prohibitory rules like rule 
lOb-5 is the openness with which the section lays out the process for its application and the 
strength and simplicity of its presumptions. To the extent that there is commonality between 
§ 16(b) and directly prohibitory statutes, this article can be taken to address how as a general 
matter we should approach questions of statutory efficacy and coherent application. 
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There is an obvious reason to doubt section 16(b )'s efficacy. To 
avoid the statute's sanctions, all that an insider trader needs to do is 
to wait six months. This observation causes some prominent com-
mentators to believe that section 16(b) is simply a trap for the un-
wary that should be repealed.12 This criticism, however, rests on an 
assumption that the six-month wait in and of itself does not deter 
insider trading. The theory developed here shows this assumption 
to be incorrect. 
Rational application of section 16(b) might not seem so difficult 
at first blush because the statutory language is quite straightfor-
ward. A moment's reflection, however, suggests a wide variety of 
situations beyond the simple cash purchase or sale of a security that 
would permit an individual to alter her financial position so that her 
wealth will be either increased if share price subsequently goes up 
or protected from decrease if share price subsequently goes down. 
Every such situation presents an insider possessing nonpublic infor-
mation with an opportunity to benefit in ways the public cannot. 
Thus, to be consistent with the statute's underlying purpose of 
preventing unfair use of information, we might want to apply the 
words purchase and sale to a variety of insider transactions. Such 
12. Richard Jennings, Harold Marsh, and John Coffee express a very skeptical view con-
cerning the usefulness of § 16(b ): 
Judging solely from the facts stated in the opinions in the decided cases, the function of 
Section 16(b) would appear to be to impose unjust liability upon entirely innocent per-
sons. However, the justification of the section lies supposedly in its in terrorem effect 
upon potential inside manipulators. It has never been demonstrated whether this princi-
ple of "Punish the innocent, in order to terrorize the guilty" works to any extent, and no 
one has even made an attempt to produce such evidence. It would seem clear, however, 
that any moderately bright manipulator should be able in many cases to string out his 
activities over a period of more than six months and thus escape any penalty under the 
section. 
RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION! CASES AND MATERIALS 1363-64 
(7th ed. 1992) (footnote omitted}. For similar reasons, a number of commentators have 
called for the outright repeal of§ 16(b ). See Marleen A. O'Connor, Toward a More Efficient 
Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 309 (1989); 
S.S. Samuelson, The Prevention of Insider Trading: A Proposal for Revising Section 16 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 511, 522-28 (1988); Michael R. Klein, 
Outsider Proposes Changes in Insider Trading Bil~ LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 12, 1983, at 8; William 
H. Painter, Time for an Overhau~ A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1987, at 38. 
Supporters of§ 16(b), rather than attempting to rebut these criticisms, tend to be dog-
matic about the need for its retention. Jennings, Marsh, and Coffee recount, for example, 
that "[t]he Advisers to the American Law Institute's Securities Code Project were told by the 
Reporter [Louis Loss] that no discussion would be permitted of the policy of Section 16(b ); it 
had to be accepted as sacred." JENNINGS ET AL., supra, at 1364. In a similar vein, Marc 
Steinberg and Daryl Landsdale, Jr., without any acknowledgment of the criticisms leveled at 
§ 16(b }, chastise the SEC for recent restrictions in the reach of § 16(b) as "giving away a 
crown jewel" in its announced" 'war' on insider trading." Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L. 
Landsdale, Jr., The Judicial and Regulatory Constriction of Section 16(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 33, 69 (1992). 
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stretching of statutory terms has a long tradition in the securities 
laws. 
It is not obvious, however, which transactions the statute should 
be stretched to cover. A variety of issues has arisen. For example, 
for section 16(b) to apply, need the trader be an insider at the time 
of both the first and the second transactions in the matched pair? Is 
the acquisition of a call option the "purchase" of an "equity secur-
ity," and should it make a difference whether the option is acquired 
in the market or pursuant to a management stock option plan? 
Should the acquisition of a put option be considered a "sale?" How 
should the exercise of an option and the subsequent sale of the re-
sulting shares be handled? Should the exercise of stock apprecia-
tion rights be treated as involving the simultaneous "purchase" and 
"sale" of a security even though as a formal matter no securities are 
involved at all? As this article will show, the record of the SEC and 
the courts in dealing with these issues has been one of inconsistent 
treatment of essentially like transactions, frequent conflict among 
courts and between the courts and the SEC, and numerous rever-
sals of position by both institutions.13 The courts and the SEC seem 
lost without the compass of a theory of the costs and deterrent im-
pact of section 16(b )'s short-swing penalty against insider trading. 
Part I of this article assesses the social costs of a crude rule of 
thumb. Because section 16(b) applies to a given class of paired 
transactions, it deters both transactions based on inside information 
and transactions not so based. Each time section 16(b) is stretched 
to include a class of paired transactions, it deters some additional 
innocent transactions. This side effect will take the form of officers' 
and directors' purchasing fewer shares in their own companies and 
refusing to accept as large a portion of their compensation in a form 
based on share price. There are strong theoretical and empirical 
reasons to believe that managerial share ownership and share-price-
based compensation are important to the proper functioning of our 
economy because of the significant incentives they provide for 
aligning the otherwise divergent interests of management and 
'shareholders. The weakening of these incentives is a social cost of 
including a given class of paired transactions within the reach of 
section 16(b ). 
13. See infra Part m. Decisions concerning the reach of the statute fall to the SEC and to 
the courts. The SEC makes rules that help define the terms of the statute and that exempt 
certain transactions as not comprehended within its purposes. In their adjudication o( indi-
vidual cases, the courts interpret the terms of the statute and review the validity of the SEC's 
rules. 
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Part II develops a theory of how a penalty on short-swing trades 
works in the case of transactions clearly covered by the statute -
ordinary cash purchases and sales of securities. It utilizes portfolio 
theory - the mainstay of modem financial economics - to predict 
the effect of a short-swing penalty on the respective behaviors of 
insiders who are and who are not trading on inside information. 
The fact that transactions occur within six months of each other 
increases the likelihood that one of them is based on inside infor-
mation - an increase that is significant over a wide range of plausi-
ble values for the relevant parameters. Imposing a penalty on 
short-swing transactions discourages trades based on inside infor-
mation by forcing those who would engage in them to remain 
"dediversified" for six months and hence to be at greater financial 
risk than they would be without the statute. This theory of section 
16(b )'s operation, it will be shown, suggests that purchase and sale 
should be defined in terms of when the increase in portfolio risk is 
assumed and when it ends. This theory suggests that the statute 
should only be concerned with the possibility of abuse at the time of 
the first transaction. 
Part III employs the lessons of Parts I and II to solve the actual 
problems faced by the SEC and the courts in applying section 16(b) 
to cases other than pairs of ordinary cash-for-security transactions 
clearly covered by the statute. It begins by proposing an overall 
principle of statutory reach derived from the statute's internal logfo, 
from other evidence of congressional intent, ~md from a concern for 
economic efficiency: a given class of paired transactions should be 
included within the coverage of section 16(b) only if the potential 
officer-and-director transactions belonging to the class, because 
they are separated by less than six months, contain a larger portion 
of transactions motivated by inside information than do potential 
officer-and-director transactions generally. Guided by the theory 
developed in Part II, this overall principle of statutory reach is then 
applied to a number of hypothetical examples. This approach is 
compared with the approaches used by the courts and the SEC 
dealing with the same issues. As will be seen, the approach based 
on the theory developed in Part II suggests simple, clear, supporta-
ble solutions to a number of problems with which the courts and the 
SEC have struggled for decades. 
Particular attention is paid to the wholesale reform of the sec-
tion 16 rules adopted by the SEC in 1991. Judged by the approach 
advocated here, these reforms, though not perfect, are a large step 
forward. The new rules are, however, highly controversial, and 
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they are in many cases vulnerable to judicial invalidation because 
they represent reversals of policy by the SEC or take positions con-
trary to prior judicial interpretations of the statute. The approach 
advocated here provides significantly stronger rationales with which 
to defend these reforms than the ones so far provided by the SEC. 
I. IDENTIFYING THE COSTS OF A ROUGH RULE OF THUMB: THE 
IMPACT OF SECTION 16(B) ON MANAGERIAL 
INCENTIVES 
Section 16(b ), because it uses a crude rule of thumb, will inevita-
bly burden officers and directors in some situations in which these 
individuals would not in any event have engaged in insider trading. 
The social cost of this burden is important in determining both 
whether the statute is worthwhile at all and, if it is, which classes of 
paired transactions the statute should reach. To understand the na-
ture and extent of these social costs, one needs to see the effects of 
the burden in context. How do the decisions of corporate manage-
ment affect our economic welfare? What is the structure of incen-
tives in which corporate managers make these decisions? How 
does the burden imposed by section 16(b) on officers and directors 
not engaging in insider trading impinge on that structure of 
incentives? 
A. The Importance of the Managerial Incentive Structure 
The managers of large, publicly held corporations are delegated 
a large portion of the fundamental "line" decisions in our economy: 
they determine how existing productive capacity should be em-
ployed and what new projects should be implemented.14 If the 
choices made are the ones that maximize shareholder wealth, they 
are generally presumed also to be the ones that constitute the most 
efficient allocation of society's scarce resources.15 There is no as-
surance, however, that the managers of these corporations will 
14. The impact of these managerial decisions on the economy cannot be overstated. His-
torical data suggests that about 75% of the nation's industrial assets are controlled by the 
largest five hundred industrial corporations and that these firms are responsible for a roughly 
comparable proportion of new investment. MERRrIT B. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL 
PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC EcoNOMY 117 (1987) (surveying a number of data sources 
leading to this picture). 
15. Conventional economic theory holds that in a competitive economy in which antiso-
cial behavior, such as pollution, is properly regulated, management decisions that are best for 
existing shareholders are also the ones that allocate the economy's scarce resources most 
efficiently. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 395-400 
(4th ed. 1977); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); PAUL A. 
SAMUELSON & WILLIAM 0. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 678 (12th ed. 1985). 
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make their decisions in this fashion. A corporate manager, like 
anyone else, can be expected to value cpmpensation, perquisites, 
respect, power, affection, a sense of rectitude, and job security. Al-
most every decision the manager makes for the firm will affect the 
level of at least some of these rewards. The question is how. The 
extent to which a manager's decisions maximize shareholder wealth 
depends on the structure of incentives. Correctly structuring incen-
tives for delegated decisionmakers is the focus of agency theory -
an increasingly prominent field of economics16 - and it has be-
come the central concern of the modem study of corporate law as 
well.17 
Greater success at structuring corporate managers' incentives 
may be crucial to our national economic welfare. With the decline 
in the growth rates of U.S. productivity and per capita income over 
the last two decades has come increasing criticism of the quality of 
management decisions made in U.S. corporations. Many observers 
assert that these decisions are characterized by lack of imagination, 
toleration of too much slack, a costly overemphasis on the short 
run, and overly generous perquisites given to high-level execu-
16. Seminal agency-theory articles include Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Pro-
duction, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. EcoN. REv. 777 (1972); 
Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem, 63 AM. EcoN. 
REv. (PAPERS & PRoc.) 134 (1973); and Steven Shaven, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the 
Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. EcoN. 55 (1979). Michael Jensen and William 
Meckling, in what has become perhaps the most-cited economics article in corporate law, 
first applied agency-theory concepts in a systematic way to the relationship between share-
holders and management. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. F1N. EcoN. 305 
(1976). Jensen and Meckling's article has spawned a large literature within financial econom-
ics as well. See, e.g., Symposium on the Distribution of Power Among Managers, Sharehold-
ers, and Directors, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 3 (1988). 
17. Berle and Means brought to the center of scholarly attention the dispersion of share 
ownership and, in their view, the resulting impotence of shareholders in constraining manag-
ers from making decisions contrary to the best interests of shareholders. .ADOLF A. BERLE, 
JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933). 
Jensen and Meckling formalized the effects of the separation of share ownership from 
control and developed the concept of "agency costs" - the sum of the costs of measures to 
reduce the deviations from shareholder best interests and the residual deviations - that has 
become the paradigm for much of corporate law scholarship. See Jensen & Meckling, supra 
note 16. A leading corporate law casebook, which includes in its introductory material a 
discussion of the agency-cost model, starts with the observation that "[a ]I though many econo-
mists dispute the Berle-Means thesis that shareholders Jack the capacity to control manage-
ment, all recognize that potential conflicts exist between managers and shareholders." JESSE 
H. CHoPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 25 (3d ed. 1989). Choper, 
Coffee, and Morris conclude their introductory materials with the following observation: 
[C]ontemporary debate ... is between ... those who advocate corporate law reforms in 
the belief that increased regulatory or institutional reforms .•. will reduce agency costs, 
and those ... who reject such reforms on the grounds that agency costs have already 
been minimized as a result of voluntarily adopted monitoring controls and the incentive 
effects created by existing management compensation systems. 
Id. at 28. 
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tives.1s Others complain that managers of many firms unjustifiably 
retain cash flow just to maintain or enlarge their domain; they use 
the retained cash flow for investment in inferior projects or inap-
propriate acquisitions within the firm, rather than pay it out to 
shareholders who could reinvest it through the capital market in 
other firms that are engaged in more promising projects.19 
Although the specifics of these criticisms are the subject of debate, 
there is one proposition on which the debaters are likely to agree: a 
firm's management is more likely to be making good decisions if it 
is operating within a structure of incentives that promotes such 
decisions. 
Managers face a number of pressures of varying intensity that 
help align their interests with those of shareholders: the threat of 
legal action for violation of fiduciary duties, the threat of hostile 
takeover, the managerial labor market, the evolutionary growth or 
decline of the firm as the result of succeeding or failing in product 
competition, peer review, the discipline of the outside directors, and 
the threat of removal by dissatisfied shareholders. 
The impact of corporate and securities law on these pressures 
has been the subject of much study over the years. Traditionally 
most corporate and securities scholars concerned with pressures on 
18. See GRAEF s. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMER· 
ICAN EXEClITIVES 96-109 {1992) (arguing that executive pay is excessive and not tied closely 
enough to company performance); Robert H. Hayes & William J. Abernathy, Managing Our 
Way to Economic Decline, HARv. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1980, at 67 (arguing that the decline 
in productivity of U.S. corporations compared to Germany and Japan is attributable to a 
focus on short-term profitability that excludes investment in technological innovations whose 
payoff is longer term); Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital 
Investment System, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 65 (arguing that U.S. corporations 
invest too little in research and development and "nontraditional" forms of investment such 
as human resource development); Alfred Rappaport, Execlllive Incentives vs. Corporate 
Growth, HARv. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1978, at 81 (attributing low capital investment, poor 
improvements in labor productivity, and low spending on research and development - the 
causes as he sees them of the slowdown in U.S. growth - to short-term managerial 
incentives). 
19. See Fox, supra note 14, at 122-40, 178-201, 233-37 (analyzing the problem and collect-
ing studies); DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT & F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND Eco-
NOMIC EFFICIENCY 75-122 {1987) {showing profit declines after conglomerate acquisitions); 
Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 
UCLA L. REv. 895, 898-917 {1992) (collecting studies suggesting suboptimality with respect 
to a variety of decisions by significant portions of the corporate population); Michael C. 
Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 
48 J. FIN. 831, 854-62 (1993) [hereinafter Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revollllion] 
{presenting data that suggest the massive misuse of internally generated cash flows by a sig-
nificant portion of major U.S. corporations); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash 
Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. EcoN. REV. (PAPERS & PRoc.) 323 (1986) 
(suggesting hostile takeovers and leverage as cures); Porter, supra note 18, at 67, 73 (arguing 
that even when U.S. capital funds go to investment outside the firm, such investment tends to 
be in short-term, readily valued acquisitions that slight needed investment in long-term 
"intangibles"). 
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management focused on the impact of fiduciary duties on manage-
rial incentives, but in the 1980s many shifted their attention to the 
effect of hostile takeovers on these incentives. Hostile takeovers, 
however, are themselves at best a blunt instrument for disciplining 
management;20 this is of particular concern because two of the 
other pressures that constrain managerial behavior - the manage-
rial labor market and peer review - depend in important ways on 
the effectiveness of the takeover threat.21 With the decline in take-
over activity in the 1990s following the collapse of the junk bond 
market and the widespread adoption of state antitakeover statutes 
that appear to pass constitutional muster, attention of corporate 
and securities lawyers has shifted again, this time to the last two 
20. Information asymmetries between potential acquirers and incumbent management 
make a hostile tender offer inherently risky. For a bid to occur, the expected return from the 
acquisition must be sufficiently positive to compensate acquirers, who are risk averse, for this 
risk. This gives incumbent management room to behave suboptimally. See Fox, supra note 
14, at 62-68, 84-91; Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Ruining Rivals: Managerial Rent 
Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies (May 1992) (unpublished paper presented at Center for 
Economic Policy Research, on file with author). Gathering information to find suboptimally 
run firms is costly. If a potential acquirer conducts such a search, identifies a target, and 
announces an offer, others can join in the bidding. The possibility of such free riding on the 
first potential acquirer's search reduces the incentives for it to gather the information in the 
first place, and so the suboptimally run firm may never be a target. See id. (describing effects 
of information asymmetries on alternative management bids); see also Frank H. Easterbrook 
& Daniel R. FISchel, The Proper Role of Target Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 
94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981) (arguing, for this reason, against permitting target managers to 
implement defenses even to the extent necessary to create an auction). Empirical data sug-
gests that the premiums that acquirers must pay average around 50%. See Michael Bradley 
et al., Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their Division Between the Stock-
holders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FIN. EcoN. 3 (1988). One explanation of this 
premium is that this is the average extent to which incumbent managers must underperform 
before triggering a takeover. 
Reflecting on these kinds of considerations, Eugene Fama concludes, "[Henry] Manne's 
approach, in which the control of management relies primarily on the expensive mechanism 
of an outside takeover, offers little comfort [to those concerned with the incentive problems 
caused by the separation of share ownership and control]." Eugene F. Fama, Agency 
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. PoL. EcoN. 288, 295 (1980). Fama places reliance 
instead on the managerial labor market and peer review as the most effective pressures. Id.; 
see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. 
& EcoN. 301 (1983). 
21. The dependence of these pressures on the effectiveness of the takeover threat is not 
sufficiently recognized. Eugene Fama, who sees the managerial labor market and peer re-
view as substitutes for the takeover mechanism, Fama, supra note 20, fails to consider that 
these factors alone are unlikely to counteract the managerial deviation - retention of inter-
nally generated cash flow for suboptimal new investments and acquisitions - that both theo-
retical and empirical studies suggest is the most clearly significant. See supra note 19 and 
accompanying text. Absent a takeover threat effective enough to force the management 
teams running all of the economy's established corporations to have share-value maximiza-
tion as their goal, these teams are likely to have goals that would lead to overretention any 
time that their firms have an insufficient number of quality investment possibilities relative to 
their internal cash flow. Thus, the entities that constitute the buyer's side of the market for 
managerial labor (these managerial teams) will not penalize the sellers (the individual man-
agers) for engaging in overretention. The same comments apply to peer review. See Fox, 
supra note 14, at 143-48. 
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sources of pressure on management incentives - shareholders and 
outside directors. The new interest is in what kinds of legal changes 
could give shareholders and outside directors the knowledge, 
power, and independence to be more effective monitors - better 
able to participate in setting agendas and to review managerial deci-
sions in a meaningful way.22 Although improved monitoring can 
narrow the boundaries of managerial discretion in important ways, 
the inherent problems in steering large organizations means that 
the discretion that remains will inevitably be wide. Thus we need to 
be concerned as well with how shareholders and directors can use 
any increase in their power to establish incentives that are internal 
to the firm and that better motivate managers. Such incentives may 
also be useful to make outside directors themselves more effective 
monitors.23 Although such internal incentives have long been of 
interest to economists, scholars of corporate and securities law have 
to date given them scant attention.24 
There are strong theoretical reasons to believe that it is good 
social policy to encourage practices that increase managerial wealth 
when share price increases. A manager faced with a choice be-
tween an action that would increase shareholder wealth and one 
that would not is more likely to choose the one that does if that 
choice would increase her personal wealth as well. This flows from 
the most fundamental proposition in economics - that people are 
rational maximizers of their own wealth.25 The efficient market hy-
22. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520 
(1990); Black, supra note 19; Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institu-
tional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1997 (1994); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1277 (1991); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capital-
ism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117 (1988); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing 
the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863 (1991); 
Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 CoLUM. L. REV. 10 
(1991). 
23. See Jensen, The Modem Industrial Revolution, supra note 19, at 862-65; Myron 
Scholes, Executive Compensation 4 (May 1, 1992) (materials presented at the Center for 
Economic Policy Research, on file with author). 
24. One exception is the portion of the debate over insider trading prohibitions concern-
ing the effect of insider trading on managerial incentives. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER 
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 78 (1966). Other exceptions include Fox, supra note 6, at 
277-90 (examining the effect of insider trading rules on share price accuracy); Merritt B. Fox, 
Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic 
Analysis, 70 VA. L. REv. 1005, 1012-14, 1018-22 (1984) (hereinafter Fox, Shelf Registration] 
(describing how mandatory disclosure rules, through their influence on share price accuracy, 
affect the agency-cost-reducing effectiveness of the takeover threat and share-price-based 
compensation); Geoffrey S. Rehnert, Note, The Executive Compensation Contract: Creating 
Incentives to Reduce Agency Costs, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1147 (1985) (proposing an executive 
compensation package designed to reduce agency costs). 
25. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 1.1, at 3-4 (4th ed.1992). 
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pothesis in its broadly accepted "semistrong" form holds that share 
price is ordinarily the best available proxy for share value26 and 
hence for shareholder wealth. Thus forms of compensation whose 
return to the manager is favorably influenced by increases in share 
price, most prominently employee stock options (ES Os) and stock 
appreciation rights (SARs),27 are more likely to lead to decisions 
that maximize shareholder wealth. These forms of compensation, 
ceteris paribus, should be favored over others, and managerial share 
ownership should be encouraged.28 
26. The efficient market hypothesis (EMH}, most broadly stated, is that the market price 
of a security "fully reflects" all information publicly available at the time in question. Much 
has been written about the efficient market hypothesis. The seminal article reviewing the 
work that formed the basis for the hypothesis is Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: 
A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). An early statement of the 
theory in relatively nontechnical language is JAMES H. LoruE ET AL., THE STOCK MARKET: 
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 55-79 (2d ed. 1985). See also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. 
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 10 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984). The "actual 
value" of a share is the future stream of income - dividends and other distributions -
accruing to its holder discounted to present value. The EMH suggests that market price is 
the best estimate of actual value that can be made based on publicly available information. 
For an elaboration of .these concepts of fairness and actual value and their relationship to 
market price, see Fox, Shelf Registration, supra note 24, at 1010-14. 
Share price's quality as a proxy for share value is not free from controversy. Even if the 
market is relatively efficient with respect to publicly available information in the sense that 
the ordinary investor cannot make money by trading on such information, the market may 
only be "speculatively efficient" (that is, prices are, conditional on such information, unbi-
ased predictors of future financial returns) and not "allocatively efficient," (that is, they are 
not unbiased predictors of the discounted value of the future cash flows produced by the 
issuers' underlying real assets, the subject of "fundamental" information). Jeffrey N. Gordon 
& Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 825-30 (1985). Furthermore, some commentators dispute whether the 
market is efficient at all. They point to the existence of a large body of investors ("noise 
traders") influenced by "beliefs or sentiments .•• not fully justified by fundamental news" 
and to limitations on the ability of better informed, more rational investors to arbitrage away 
their influence on price. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Ap-
proach to Finance, J. EcoN. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19, 19-20 (offering a nontechnical over-
view of the "noise" theory approach); see also Fox, supra note 14, at 36-59, 81app.1.4. Even 
if share price is not as good a proxy for share value as the most loyal adherents of the EMH 
suggest, however, it may well not be possible to construct an institutional alternative that 
would be better than share-price-based compensation in relating compensation to true 
changes in share value. 
27. Stock options and SARs have the feature that, for a given expected cost to the firm at 
the time of their award, the amount of reward ultimately received by the executive is particu-
larly sensitive to differences in share performance. An employee stock option typically gives 
the manager the right, becoming effective at some point in the future, to purchase shares 
from the firm at the market price prevailing at the time the option is granted. If the firm 
performs well and its share price increases, the manager can exercise the option and immedi-
ately sell the shares for a profit. Stock appreciation rights work more simply: the manager is 
given the right, becoming effective at some point in the future, to receive from the firm the 
difference between the price of a share at the time the right is exercised and the price at the 
time the right is granted. In each case the timing of the exercise of the right once it has 
become effective is determined by the manager. 
28. The importance of share-price-based compensation becomes clear in light of other 
methods. A straight contractual salary will have no effect on management decisions, because 
it is set in advance and does not vary with performance. The promise of year-end bonuses 
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Share-price-influenced compensation and share ownership al-
ready play a very large role in the economic lives of top executives. 
A Conference Board survey on executive compensation showed 
that in 1992, 82 % of responding manufacturing firms had a stock 
plan for top executives, and that in 1991 their five highest-paid 
executives' median gains from exercising previously granted ESOs 
constituted 83% of their salary.29 The extent to which the structure 
of compensation for U.S. firms provides incentives to maximize 
share price is also indicated by the fact that there is a high positive 
correlation between changes in compensation and in share price.30 
and future salary increases based on merit are devices by which top management as a group 
can reward those members who have made decisions contributing to the group's goals. In· 
centives awarded by a management group, however, will protect shareholders only if there is 
in tum a way to align the interests of the· group with those of the shareholders. A profit· 
sharing arrangement may work to align management and shareholder interests to some ex· 
tent, but a defect in those plans is that "profit" is an accounting figure that at best captures 
only imprecisely many of the gains and losses experienced by a firm. Profit-sharing arrange· 
ments often create incentives to make decisions that emphasize a firm's short-run perform· 
ance over its long-run performance. In contrast, when a manager, in choosing among 
alternative courses of action, chooses the one that most benefits the firm, that choice will on 
average have the most positive immediate effect on share price, even if the benefit will not be 
realized until some point in the future. 
The importance for economic efficiency of managerial share ownership and share-price· 
based compensation was first formalized by Jensen & Meckling, supra note 16. See also 
Miron Stano, Executive Ownership Interests and Corporate Performance, 42 S. EcoN. J, 272 
(1975). Constructing an optimal incentive structure is complicated, however. The typical top 
manager arrives at that position with little wealth relative to the value of her corporation, so 
it is not practical for her to start owning outright a significant percentage of its shares. As 
noted above, stock options and SARs exercisable at the market price at time of issue are 
partial solutions, see supra text accompanying notes 26-27, but their asymmetric payoffs can 
lead managers to be indifferent to downside risk. This problem can be mitigated, but at a 
price, by compensation in the form of "in the money" options or by a levered equity purchase 
plan. The share price of a corporation is influenced by many factors outside the control of 
management - these factors significantly add to the risk of share ownership and share-price· 
based compensation. A partial solution here would be to grant managers rights or compen· 
sation based on share price as adjusted by such things as the performance of other firms in 
the corporation's industry and the stock market as a whole. For an examination of such 
problems, see Scholes, supra note 23. See also G. Bennett Stewart III, Remaking the Public 
Corporation from Within, HARV. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1990, at 126; Rehnert, supra note 24. 
Share price still has an important influence on the managerial wealth effect of all these 
schemes, however, and thus all present the potential to profit from inside information. 
29. THE CoNFERENCE BOARD REPORT No. 1016, ToP EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: 1992 
EomoN 17 tbl. 13, 18 tbl. 20; see also David F. Larcker, The Association Between Perform· 
ance Plan Adoption and Corporate Capital Investment, 5 J. Accr. & EcoN. 3, 8 tbl. 2 (1983) 
(showing that in 1979, 84 out of the top 100 corporations used stock options to reward execu· 
tives and 65 used SARs). 
30. See Robert T. Masson, Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Per· 
formance, 79 J. PoL. EcoN. 1278, 1289 (1971) (finding that firms that tied executive compen· 
sation to stock returns perform better than those that do not); Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate 
Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. Accr. & EcoN. 7, 
25-37 (1985) (showing a similar correlation for salary and bonus even before adding in ESOs 
and SARs). The fact that compensation is structured in a way that creates incentives for 
increasing shareholder wealth does not necessarily mean that it is the incentives that made 
the better-performing managers perform the way they did. Correlation does not establish 
causation. It is possible that the typical manager in the study was unaffected by the incentive 
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Kevin Murphy, in a study covering 1964-1981, found that the aver-
age value of the share holdings of top executives among the sam-
pled firms was about $4.7 million in 1983 dollars, which represents 
approximately thirteen times their average annual salary and bonus 
during the period.31 Murphy grouped the yearly experiences of the 
sampled executives according to how well their firms performed in 
terms of shareholder returns. Executives whose firms for a given 
year were in the worst performing group - about 10% of the sam-
ple - saw the value of their personal share holdings fall an average 
of about $2.9 million.32 Executives whose firms were in the best 
performing group - about 20% of the sample - saw the value of 
their personal share holdings increase by $2.3 million.33 The annual 
change in the value of the shareholdings of executives in these two 
groups of firms was several times their annual salary and bonus.34 
Wilbur Lewellen found that in a sample of top executives of top 
corporations, for eighteen of the twenty-four sampled years, 
changes in executive wealth from the dividends and capital gains 
from shareholdings in their own firms on average exceeded their 
salary and bonus, sometimes by as much as six- to eightfold.35 
Available empirical evidence suggests that share-price-sensitive 
compensation does in fact motivate managers to increase share-
holder wealth. Firms that structure their compensation plans in 
ways that put emphasis on share returns outperform firms that do 
not structure their compensation plans that way.36 Event studies 
structure under which he worked but that the board, which at the beginning of his tenure was 
not sure of the manager's abilities, observed firm performance over time and then began 
paying him what he was worth. For an example of this kind of "learning" theory of compen-
sation, see Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, A Theory of Wage Dynamics, 49 REv. EcoN. 
STUD. 315 (1982). 
31. Murphy, supra note 30, at 26-27 & tbL 3. 
32. Id. at 27 tbL 3. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 28 (three to five times); see also George J. Benston, The Self-Serving Manage-
ment Hypothesis: Some Evidence, 7 J. Acer. & EcoN. 67, 75 tbL 1 (1985) (noting that for the 
executives working at the firms that performed particularly well or particularly poorly -
45% of the total sample - annual changes in their shareholdings averaged approximately 
five times the total of their salary bonus, fringe benefits, and profitsharing). 
35. WILBUR G. LEWELLEN, THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT 87-92 (1971). 
36. Elizabeth Jenkins and Robert Seiler, who studied a sample of 40 public firms, found 
that over a five-year period ending in 1983, the shareholder wealth of firms with "long-term 
compensation schemes" - those with little or no bonus and with significant proportions of 
executive income derived from the exercise of SARs or ESOs - grew an average of 80%, 
while the shareholder wealth of firms with "short-term compensation schemes" - those 
based primarily on current accounting measures and derived primarily from bonuses and 
with little income from exercising SARs or ESOs - grew an average of only 27%. Elizabeth 
Jenkins & Robert E. Seiler, The Impact of Executive Compensation Schemes upon the Level 
of Discretionary Expenditures and Growth in Stockholder Wealth, 17 J. Bus. FIN. & Acer. 
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show a positive stock market reaction to the announcement of long-
term incentive plans - plans in which share price plays a large 
role37 - which is consistent with a market belief that these plans 
increase shareholder wealth.38 Studies also show that there is a 
higher correlation between compensation and firm performance, as 
measured by multiple indices including shareholder returns, in 
firms in which a substantial number of nonmanagement shares are 
held by a single outside bloc.39 This fact also suggests that share-
holders believe that share-price-related compensation motivates 
managers to increase shareholder wealth, because when sharehold-
ers have direct control over executive compensation, they more 
o;ften choose a form of compensation related to share price 
performance.40 
The available empirical evidence suggests as well that managers 
are in fact more motivated to maximize shareholder wealth when 
they own more of their firm's shares, at least up to the point at 
which the holdings are so large that they permit managerial en-
trenchment.41 An event study that examined the stock market re-
585, 589 (1990); see also Masson, supra note 30 (finding that stock of firms from three indus-
tries did better if executive compensation was closely tied to stock performance). 
37. James A. Brickley et al., The Impact of Long-Range Managerial Compensation on 
Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. Acer. & EcoN. 115, 123-27 (1985) (reporting a positive reaction to 
an undifferentiated group of performance plans, some of which involved share-price-based 
units and some of which did not); Larcker, supra note 29, at 27-28 (same). 
38. This reaction could be explained two other ways. One explanation is that executives 
tend to propose such plans when their private knowledge leads them to foresee a bright 
corporate future and that an announcement of such a plan is seen by the market as a signal of 
the existence of such positive information. The other explanation is that the plans reduce the 
total amount of taxes paid by the executives and the corporation, the corporation - directly, 
or indirectly through a compensation package with less of an expected payout to managers -
gets some of this benefit, and the market recognizes this. It would be extremely difficult to 
disentangle available data in a way that would separately test the incentive and signaling 
explanations, but there is at least some evidence that reduced taxes alone cannot fully explain 
the observed stock market reaction. See ELLEN L. PAVLIK & AHMED BELKAOUJ, DETERMI· 
NANTS OF EXECUTIVE CoMPENSATION 22 (1991). 
39. WILLIAM A. McEACHERN, MANAGEMENT CoNTROL AND PERFORMANCE 77-84 
{1975) {claiming that the existence of an outside bloc increases the correlation between com· 
pensation and accounting profits); Luis R. Gomez-Mejia et al., Managerial Control, Perform· 
ance, and Executive Compensation, 30 ACAD. MGMT. J. 51 (1987). 
40. But see Gomez-Mejia et al., supra note 39, at 62 (testing the hypothesis that share· 
holder-controlled firms compensate management with long-term rewards like stock options 
more than other firms and failing to find statistically significant support). 
41. See, e.g., John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Owner· 
ship and Corporate Value, 27 J. FtN. EcoN. 595, 601 (1990) (finding that shareholder returns 
increase as insider stock ownership increases until such insider share reaches 40% to 50% ). 
Most large public firms fall well short of the ideal range suggested by these results. Of the 
1000 largest firms measured by market value, the median CEO owns only 0.2% of his firm's 
shares, and 75% own less than 1.2%. Jensen, The Modem Industrial Revolution, supra note 
19, at 864 (citing KEVIN MURPHY, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN CORPORATE AMERICA, 
1992 (1992)). Of the top 250 firms, only one CEO in 10 owned at least 1 % and fewer than 
June 1994] A Unified Theory of Section 16(b) 2105 
action to an issuer's announcement that it intended to acquire 
another firm showed that the market reaction was more favorable 
the greater the percentage of management share ownership in the 
acquiring firm.42 This study suggests the market believes that when 
managers make important decisions, such as a decision to acquire 
another firm, they are more likely to make the choice that enhances 
shareholder wealth if they have substantial share holdings 
themselves. 
A number of pressures are currently at work to increase both 
the portion of managerial and directorial compensation based on 
share price and the extent of managerial and directorial share own-
ership. Dramatic increases in both have been called for by promi-
nent critics of U.S. managerial performance such as Michael Jensen 
and Kevin Murphy, who see insufficient incentives as a major cause 
of problems with U.S. corporate management.43 As manifested by 
the recent dismissals of the CEOs of a number of our largest firms, 
the influence of institutional investors and the independence of 
outside board members appear to be increasing.44 Some institu-
tional investors are likely to use their growing influence to try these 
proposals. Institutional investors, politicians, and members of the 
press also complain that the level of managerial compensation is 
too high.45 Managers' most defensible response, as some of their 
advisers have suggested, is to increase the proportion of compensa-
tion based on share price.46 Finally, the 1993 tax changes create 
one in 20 owned more than 5%. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives -
It's Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 1990, at 138, 141. 
42. Wtlbur Lewellen et al., Merger Decisions and Executive Stock Ownership in Acquiring 
Finns, 7 J. Accr. & EcoN. 209 (1985). 
43. Jensen & Murphy, supra note 41, at 141-42 (arguing for more compensation based on 
share performance, though seeing a complementary role for cash compensation to protect 
executives from stock fluctuations outsider their control); see also Jenkins & Seiler, supra 
note 36, at 588-89 (finding that firms with "long-run compensation schemes" exhibited higher 
ratios of capital spending to sales and R&D spending to sales than firms with "short-run 
compensation schemes"). Concerning calls for share-price-based directorial compensation, 
see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
44. See, e.g., Brett D. Fromson, American Express: Anatomy of a Coup, WASH. PoST, 
Feb. 11, 1993, at Al; Doron P. Levin, Stempel Quits Job As Top G.M. Officer in Rift with 
Board, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1992, at Al; Steve Lohr, Big Business in Turmoil: Upheavals at 
I.B.M., Sears and Elsewhere Underline Fundamental Shifts in Economy,, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
1993, at Al; Steve Lohr, I.B.M. to Replace Its Top Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at Al. 
45. See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, Shareholder Advocate's New Target, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 
1993, at Dl; 138 CoNo. REc. S2907-01 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1992) (statement of Sen. Levin); 
Graef S. Crystal, Cracking the Tax Whip on C.E.O.'s, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1990, § 6, pt. 2 
(Business World Magazine), at 48. 
46. See, e.g., Memorandum from M. Lipton, Attorney, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, 
to clients (May 17, 1991) (on file with author) (calling for "a much greater proportion of 
executive compensation" to be based on long-term appreciation in the price of the corpora-
tion's stock). 
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new inducements. The new law eliminates the corporate income 
tax deduction for top executive salaries in excess of $1 million but 
creates an exception to that cap for certain share-price-based com-
pensation.47 It also creates a significant difference between the 
marginal tax rate on the ordinary income of the highest-income in-
dividuals and the rate on capital gains - the same situation that 
prevailed before 1986 - again making qualified stock options a 
more attractive form of compensation for managers.48 
B. The Impact of Section 16(b) on Managerial Incentives 
Section 16(b) requires the return of profits from certain pairs of 
transactions involving equity securities. Pairs of transactions argua-
bly regulable in this fashion include ordinary cash purchases and 
sales as well as transactions involving ESOs, SARs, and other 
share-price-based forms of compensation. The scope of section 
16(b )'s coverage of these transactions is a question of statutory in-
terpretation. Directors and officers have at least a sense of the cur-
rent interpretation when they consider whether to purchase shares 
in the market and whether to accept a given portion of their total 
compensation in share-price-based form. The more potential trans-
actions that a given interpretation would pair with a market 
purchase, the less attractive the purchase becomes. The more po-
tential transactions involving ESOs, SARs, and other share-price-
based compensation devices a given interpretation would pair, the 
less attractive share-price-based compensation becomes. Thus, 
broader interpretations of section 16(b) are likely to result in man-
agers owning a smaller percentage of their firms' shares and in a 
smaller portion of their compensation being in share-price-based 
form. To the extent that the transactions deterred by a broader in-
terpretation would in fact have been based on inside information, 
the interpretation furthers the statutory purpose. To the extent that 
the deterred transactions would not have been so based, the 
47. The cap exempts stock options with an exercise price equal to the fair market value of 
the shares at the time the option is granted if the options are granted pursuant to a plan 
approved by shareholders and a compensation committee of outside directors. Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13211(a), 107 Stat. 312, 470 (codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 162(m) {West Supp. 1994)). 
48. The marginal rate on ordinary income for the highest income individual has been 
increased to 39.6%. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 
§ 13202(a)(l), 107 Stat. 312, 461 (codified at I.R.C. § 1 (West Supp. 1994)). The capital gains 
rate remains at 28%. l.R.C. §§ l(h), 1222 (West Supp. 1994). Executives pay no tax when 
granted a "qualified" incentive stock option. See I.R.C. §§ 421(a), 422 (Supp. III 1990). 
When the option is exercised, the gain realized between the exercise price and the then-fair-
market value is taxed at the capital gains rate, not at the ordinary income rate. See I.R.C. 
§ 1221 (1988). 
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broader interpretation will instead simply weaken the agency-cost-
reducing structure of management incentives. 
The mere fact that a trade has been undertaken by an insider 
rather than an outsider significantly adds to the probability that the 
trade is based on inside information. Thus, the most thorough way 
for Congress to have stopped trades based on inside information 
would have been to prohibit officers and directors from engaging in 
any transactions involving their firm's shares or to impose a penalty 
that is the effective equivalent, requiring the return of all profits 
gained by insiders through the acqll;isition and sale of their firm's 
shares however long separated in time. Implicit in the decision not 
to take the route of total prohibition is a recognition by Congress 
that at some point the additional reduction in trades based on in-
side information would not be worth the cost in terms of reduced 
incentives. This decision also suggests an overall principle, to be 
developed further after the presentation of the model in Part II and 
an exploration of congressional intent in Part III, for deciding the 
appropriate reach of section 16(b ). For some classes of paired 
transactions that are not clearly covered by the statute, adding the 
fact that one is followed by the other within six months to the fact 
that an insider was involved in no way increases the probability that 
one of them was based on inside information. To include these 
classes of transactions within the reach of the statute would be in-
consistent with the intent of Congress, as reflected in its decision 
not to ban all insider transactions. For other classes of paired trans-
actions that are not clearly within the reach of the statute, adding 
the fact that one is followed by the other within six months does 
increase the likelihood that one of them was based on inside infor-
mation, an increase as great as adding that fact when the transac-
tions involved are clearly covered ordinary cash for security 
purchases and sales. To fail to include these classes within the stat-
ute's reach would be inconsistent with the congressional purpose of 
fighting insider trading by penalizing short-swing transactions. 
IL A GENERAL THEORY 
The two fundamental questions addressed by this article -
whether the general approach of section 16(b) is worthwhile and, if 
so, what classes of paired transactions the section should cover -
both require an approach for comparing the magnitude of the de-
sired effect of section 16(b ), which is the deterrence of transactions 
motivated by inside information, with the magnitude of its unde-
sired effect, which is the deterrence of transactions motivated by 
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any other cause. This comparison can be developed through a se-
ries of three models. Tue first model assumes a world in which all 
inside information is positive: negative information is immediately 
disclosed to the general public. Tue second model assumes a world 
in which all inside information is negative: positive information is 
immediately disclosed. The third, more complex model has both 
positive and negative inside information. Throughout, it will be as-
sumed that no other constraints on insider trading exist. 
All these models involve ordinary transactions clearly covered 
by the statute. Shares are purchased and sold for cash in an open 
market by a person who is an insider at the time of both transac-
tions. There are no options available, but investors may sell short 
and may borrow in unlimited amounts. Thus transactions are possi-
ble that are sufficiently analogous to put and call options to permit 
the development of principles to deal with those transactions. 
A. A World With Only Positive Inside Information 
Assume a world in which all inside information is positive. In 
this world, some purchases by insiders would be based on inside 
information and some would not, but no sales by insiders would be 
based on inside information. Tue model of this world developed 
here will be used to consider three questions. First, if section 16{b) 
did not apply, how would we expect purchases based on inside in-
formation and purchases not so based to transpire, and, subse-
quently, what kind of sale behavior would we expect to be 
associated with each kind of purchase? Second, still assuming that 
section 16{b) did not apply, how accurate would it be to infer that 
inside information had been used in the purchase of an issuer share 
if that purchase were followed by a sale within a period of six 
months, and how accurate would it be to infer that inside informa-
tion had not been used if such a purchase were not followed by a 
sale within six months? Third, how would the application of section 
16{b) affect the purchase and sale behavior of an officer49 who, but 
for section 16{b ), would surely have made a purchase not based on 
inside information (an "innocent" transaction), and how would it 
affect the behavior of the officer who, but for section 16{b), would 
surely have made a purchase based on inside information? 
49. For convenience, the discussion will be in terms of transactions undertaken by of-
ficers, but it is equally applicable for ones undertaken by directors as well. 
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1. Purchase and Sale Behavior in the Absence of Section 16(b) 
a. Purchase behavior. How does a share purchase not based on 
inside information transpire compared to one based on such infor-
mation? To answer this question, we will examine a scenario that 
starts with an officer who has had no information concerning the 
future prospects of the firm that has not been equally available to 
the investing public. The officer then receives inside information 
concerning an event that will increase the issuer's earnings. For 
simplicity, assume that the officer knows for certain that the event 
will occur and can determine its ultimate effect on the issuer's earn-
ings and the value of the issuer's shares. Investment behavior in 
modem finance theory is discussed in terms of portfolio choice, and 
so our focus will be on the officer's portfolio before and after re-
ceipt of the inside information. The issuer shares in the officer's 
portfolio at the start of the scenario can be regarded as innocent 
purchases. The officer did not act on inside information in purchas-
ing those shares. The increase in issuer shares contained in the of-
ficer's portfolio after receipt of the information represents shares 
purchased on the basis of inside information. 
i. Portfolio choice theory as a predictor of behavior. The compo-
sition of the officer's portfolio at any given point in the scenario can 
be predicted through the application of portfolio choice theory.50 
Portfolio choice theory in its standard exposition focuses on invest-
ment behavior in a single period. Whatever the investor does not 
plan to consume in this period, he invests. In the next period he 
consumes the results of these investments. The theory tells the in-
vestor how to compose a portfolio at the beginning of the invest-
ment period that will maximize the expected utility he will derive 
from the end-of-period value of his invested wealth - the means 
for his consumption the next period. The factors that determine 
whether an investor will purchase a security are his taste for risk, 
the current price of each available security, his beliefs concerning 
the expected end-of-period price of each security, and his beliefs 
concerning the variance and covariances of that expected end-of-
period price with the end-of-period prices of other available securi-
ties. Portfolio choice theory can be used to predict the behavior of 
the officer in our scenario because we assume he is a rational maxi-
mizer of his expected utility and so will follow its dictates. We also 
assume that for the officer, as for most investors, wealth has declin-
50. This model was originally developed by William F. Sharpe. William F. Sharpe, A 
Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis, 9 MGMT. Sci. 277 (1963). For a nontechnical exposi-
tion of this model, see LoRIE ET AL., supra note 26, at 108-31. 
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ing marginal utility, and so he is risk averse.51 Therefore, if two 
portfolios differ in their level of risk, he will find the riskier one 
equally desirable only if it has a sufficiently higher expected return 
to compensate him for the disutility he associates with the greater 
risk. The standard exposition also assumes the availability of an 
asset with a certain rate of return equal to r* (the safe asset) and 
the unlimited availability of borrowed money at a cost also equal 
tor*. 
To construct his optimal portfolio, the officer's first step is to 
determine the proportions in which he should hold the available, 
risky securities. This determination is based on his beliefs concern-
ing the expected returns, variances, and covariances of these securi-
ties. The object is to find the combination with the highest "extra 
return/risk ratio," that is, x, the amount by which, whatever number 
of dollars is invested in risky securities, the expected return of the 
resulting portfolio exceeds what it would have been if it had been 
invested entirely in the safe asset, divided by y, the standard devia-
tion (the positive square root of the variance) of that portfolio.52 
The critical lesson of portfolio choice theory is that holding a diversi-
fied set of risky securities yields benefits. A portfolio·consisting en-
tirely of the security that itself has the highest extra return/risk ratio 
will not have as high a ratio as one that also includes other securi-
ties that have lower ratios. In fact, in the absence of transaction 
51. Investors are typically assumed to be "risk averse," that is, they like expected return 
and dislike risk. Thus, for any given level of expected return, the lower a portfolio's risk is, 
the better. The assumption of risk aversion is in turn derived from an assumption that the 
investor will derive declining marginal utility from consuming his end·of-period wealth; that 
is, compared to the utility an officer gains from any given level of wealth, one dollar more 
adds less to his total utility than one dollar less subtracts from his total utility. This leads to 
risk aversion because compared to the expected utility from a given level of end-of-period 
wealth known with certainty, the chance of one dollar over that level does not compensate 
for an equal chance of one dollar under that level. Thus, in a choice between two portfolios 
with differing risks, the investor will choose the riskier one only if it has a sufficiently higher 
expected return to compensate him for the disutility he associates with the greater risk. 
52. As a rational utility maximizer, the officer follows the prescriptions of portfolio 
choice theory depicted in figure 1: {l) he considers each possible combination of risky securi-
ties that can be purchased with W0 , his initial wealth, and calculates. the expected return and 
variance from holding that combination; (2) he constructs a graph on which each of these 
combinations is represented by a point relating its expected return, w, and standard devia-
tion, cr.., and from this determines the subset of these points constituting his Markowitz effi-
ciency frontier {MEF); (3) he constructs a capital market line {CML) by drawing the line that 
passes through (0, 1 + r*) and is tangent to the MEF, designating the point of tangency as RP. 
Each point on his capital market line to the left of RP represents a portfolio in which some 
part of W0 is invested in the risk-free asset, and the rest of W0 is invested in risky assets in the 
same proportions to each other as they are in RP. Each point to the right of RP represents a 
portfolio in which all of W0 and some amount of borrowed monies are invested in risky 
assets, again in the same proportions to each other as they are in RP. The slope of the CML 
is the "extra return/risk ratio," because the CML shows the rate at which the officer can trade 
off risk for return. 
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costs, it is desirable to hold within the portfolio at least some of 
each available risky security because, unless a given security's re-
turns are perfectly correlated with the returns of another security, 
its inclusion i1! the portfolio can help diversify or hedge against the 
risks associated with other securities. 
The officer's second step is to decide, based on his tastes con-
cerning expected return and risk, the total number of dollars he 
actually wishes to invest in risky securities. One investor might in-
vest only a portion of his wealth in risky securities and the rest in 
the safe asset, while another, less risk-averse investor might invest 
all of his wealth plus a certain amount of borrowed money in risky 
securities. Whatever the total amount an investor's tastes lead him 
to invest in risky securities, however, they will be in the same pro-
portions to each other, the ones that he calculated in the first step 
to result in a portfolio with the highest possible extra return/risk 
ratio.53 
ii. The initial portfolio prior to receipt of inside information. 
What can be said about the officer's initial portfolio, which contains 
the issuer shares purchased not on the basis of inside information? 
Because we do not know the officer's specific beliefs, we cannot 






53. The officer chooses as his optimal portfolio the one point on the CML to which an 
indifference curve is just tangent. One possibility is depicted in figure 2, in which the position 
of the officer's indifference curves is such that he chooses portfolio OP'. If the officer is 
relatively less risk averse, his indifference curves would be differently shaped and he would 
choose a riskier, higher return portfolio such as OP~ as depicted in figure 3. 
2112 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 92:2088 
ever, that he has no information concerning the issuer not available 
to the general investing public. We might assume, then, that he has 
the same beliefs as every other investor. This corresponds to the 
assumption of homogeneous expectations used in many finance the-
ory models. In the absence of transaction costs, the officer in this 
scenario should hold each available risky security in the same pro-
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tions as they are outstanding in the market (the "market 
portfolio"). 
While the stylized version may not describe reality, it suggests 
that the officer is likely to hold the shares of the issuer long if he 
holds them at all because the information he possesses concerning 
the issuer is shared in common with all other investors. Such "firm-
specific" information should play a large role in forming the beliefs 
of both the officer and the other investors concerning the expected 
value, variance, and covariances associated with the issuer shares. 
Holding shares in the same proportions as the market portfolio 
is also consistent, absent transaction costs, with investment advice 
based on the semistrong statement of the efficient market hypothe-
sis. The hypothesis is that securities prices adjust almost instantane-
ously to reflect any piece of information that becomes publicly 
available.s4 This hypothesis suggests that an investor who does not 
possess inside information, like our officer at this point, cannot gain 
anything from choosing a portfolio in accordance with his beliefs. 
He will not be able to gather economically all the publicly available 
information relating to securities, so his beliefs will be based on par-
tial information. Market prices will, on the other hand, reflect all 
such information. Instead of choosing a portfolio based on his be-
liefs, an officer that lacks undisclosed inside information about his 
firm should simply hold as diversified a portfolio as possible, which, 
absent transaction costs, is a portfolio with risky securities in the 
same proportions as the market portfolio. In the real world, unless 
the officer simply invests in an "index fund," transaction costs and 
the number of available securities are such that holding every secur-
ity is impractical, but again, if the officer does hold shares of the 
issuer, he will hold them long.ss 
54. See supra note 26. 
55. The figures on the dollar value of the typical top executive's shareholdings of her firm 
show not only that these holdings are long term but also that they constitute a disproportion-
ate share of her total portfolio. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text. Although the 
model assumes that in the absence of inside information she would hold her own firm's 
shares in the same proportion as the market portfolio, the fact that she typically holds much 
more in no way undercuts the model's conclusions. Whatever factors make the shares of her 
firm particularly desirable to hold - subsidized purchase programs, employer pressure, psy-
chological identification with the firm, irrational optimism concerning the firm she knows 
best - portfolio choice theory will work in the same way as if she permanently viewed the 
expected return on these shares to be higher than others in the market. She will want to hold 
a larger proportion of her portfolio in her firm's shares than will others, but the extent to 
which she will wish to do so will still be limited by the portfolio-risk-reducing characteristics 
of holding other securities. Thus, at the margin she will be in the same position as if these 
factors were not present. 
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m. The portfolio after receipt of inside information. Now conM 
sider the next stage in the scenario: the officer comes into possesM 
sion of inside information about an event that will increase the 
issuer's earnings. How will the officer adjust his portfolio in reM 
sponse to this information? This question cannot be answered by a 
direct application of the standard portfolio choice model because 
the model makes no provision for portfolio adjustments during the 
period of investment due to changes in the prices of securities or in 
the information possessed by the investor. To the extent that 
changed information is generally available to the public, this simpliM 
fication in the portfolio choice model can be justified as consistent 
with the semistrong statement of the efficient market hypothesis. 
The almost instantaneous change in market price in response to 
changed information eliminates the possibility of gain that the inM 
vestor would otherwise be able to enjoy by adjusting his portfolio in 
response to the information. In our scenario, however, the officer 
receives a change in information that is not generally available to 
the public, so the possibility of such a gain is not eliminated by an 
instantaneous corresponding change in the market price. The way 
to deal with the problem of maintaining the simplicity of the stanM 
dard portfolio choice model while accounting for intraperiod trades 
motivated by nonpublic information is to assume that the portfolio 
as adjusted in response to the receipt of ·the inside information, 
whenever in the period it is actually received, is the same as the 
portfolio would have been if the information were received at the 
beginning of the period. In other words, the changes will correM 
spond to the difference between the portfolio the investor actually 
constructed at the beginning of the period, when he did not have 
the information, and the one he would have constructed if he had 
possessed that information at the outset. 
Receipt of inside information concerning an event that will inM 
crease the issuer's earnings will cause the officer to increase his 
evaluation of the expected endMof-period price of issuer shares. 
This change would prompt an investor to recalculate the optimal 
portfolio of risky securities, arid it would call for an increase both in 
his proportional holdings of issuer shares56 relative to other availM 
able risky securities and in the absolute number57 of those shares 
56. For a demonstration of this point in a world with two risky securities, see Appendix 
A. 
57. The increase in the proportion of issuer shares in the officer's portfolio of risky securi-
ties does not lead automatically to the conclusion that there will be an absolute increase in 
the number of such shares. This is because the increase in expected wealth that arises from 
the acquisition of the positive information might in theory lead the officer to readjust to a 
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that he holds. Thus, the officer's possession of the inside informa-
tion will lead him to purchase more issuer shares for his portfolio 
than he would purchase in the absence of that information. These 
additional purchases can be said to be based on inside information. 
The conclusion that receipt of positive inside information will 
lead an officer to purchase issuer shares seems obvious, but deriv-
ing that conclusion through portfolio choice theory reveals a point 
that is crucial for predicting how long the shares will be held: the 
purchase "dediversifies" the officer's portfolio of risky securities. 
The increase in the risky security portfolio's expected return is ac-
companied by an increase, though not as great, in its riskiness. This 
can be seen at an intuitive level by dividing the potential return that 
can be earned from an investment in a share of the issuer into two 
parts and, for a moment, thinking of the right to receive each part 
as a separate security. One security represents the right to receive 
the portion of the potential return that reflects the prospects of the 
firm without taking into account the inside information. The of-
ficer's evaluation of the risk and return characteristics of this first 
security are the same as his evaluation of the risk and return charac-
teristics of the issuer shares prior to receipt of the inside informa-
less risky total portfolio by having a smaller portion of his initial wealth invested in risky 
securities. That is, he might invest more in the safe asset or, if he is leveraged, borrow less. If 
he did so, he would purchase greater security with his increase in expected wealth: the in-
come effect of the change in value of issuer shares compared to price would dominate the 
substitution effect. Whether the officer would do so depends on the characteristics of his 
utility function relating his level of utility to his level of wealth, because a person's utility of 
wealth function determines how a maximizer of expected utility trades off expected wealth 
and risk. 
Common, empirically supported assumptions concerning investor utility functions, how-
ever, suggest that this theoretical possibility is not real and that in fact the investor is likely to 
increase the riskiness of his portfolio. Finance economists commonly assume that investors 
have utility functions that, for relatively small changes in wealth, display constant absolute 
risk aversion; in other words, the ratio of the second derivative to the first is constant. The 
effect of this is that the investor's indifference curves relating expected end-of-period wealth 
to risk will have the same slope for any given amount of portfolio risk, whatever the level of 
his expected wealth. An increase in expected wealth will not lead him to want to "buy" more 
safety by trading more expected wealth for a given reduction in risk than before. For a 
portfolio theory proof of the assertion in the text that an increase in the expected extra 
return of an issuer's security, as would result from receipt of material nonpublic positive 
information, would lead an investor with a utility function displaying constant absolute risk 
aversion to increase the absolute number of the issuer's shares in his portfolio, see Merritt B. 
Fox, The Role of Finance in Industrial Organization: A General Theory and the Case of the 
Semiconductor Industry 445-47 (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University). 
The assumption that an officer has a constant absolute degree of risk aversion is in fact a 
conservative assumption. Finance economists commonly assume that for large changes in 
wealth, investors have utility functions that display declining absolute risk aversion. As 
wealth increases, investors are more willing to take chances and therefore are not willing to 
pay as much in reduced expected return in order to obtain a given reduction in risk. Thus, 
the increase in expected wealth from receipt of nonpublic material information may lead an 
officer to increase the total amount he invests in risky securities as well as the proportion 
devoted to the issuer's security. 
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tion. The second security represents the increase in the potential 
return caused by the event that the inside information concerns. 
Because we have assumed for simplicity that the increase is certain, 
the second security has no risk. The price of the issuer's shares 
does not yet reflect the inside information, so possession of the in-
side information creates an opportunity to acquire the second se-
curity as a free bonus that accompanies the purchase of the first 
security. The number of issuer shares that the officer holds imme-
diately prior to receipt of the inside information is the amount of 
the first security that he would optimally wish to hold given his 
evaluation of its risk and return characteristics. Receipt of the in-
formation causes the officer to acquire additional issuer shares in 
order to take advantage of the bonus. The result is that he holds 
more of the first security than he would wish to hold but for the fact 
that he must acquire more of the f~rst security in order to acquire 
more of the second. 
b. Sale of shares purchased on the basis of inside information. 
The last step in the scenario is that the information received by the 
officer ultimately becomes public, but before the end of the invest-
ment period.58 The efficient market hypothesis suggests that the 
price of issuer shares would increase at this point to reflect the in-
formation. What would we expect the officer to do with his portfo-
lio? Again, we cannot answer this question by a direct application 
of the standard portfolio choice model. This time we maintain its 
simplicity and account for intraperiod adjustments by assuming that 
the portfolio the officer chooses to hold after the price change, 
whenever in the investment period the price change occurs, will be 
the same as the portfolio that the officer would have chosen at the 
beginning of the period if he and the public were both in possession 
of the information at that time and the issuer shares traded at the 
new price. Thus, we are dealing with the intraperiod portfolio ad-
justment resulting from the price change in an equivalent fashion to 
the way we dealt with intraperiod adjustment for new information, 
because the new price represents a higher opportunity cost for con-
tinuing to hold issuer shares. 
The change in market price of issuer shares as a result of full 
dissemination of the information should equal the change, at the 
time the officer received the information, in his evaluation of the 
58. We are only concerned with insider trading if public dissemination occurs before the 
end of the officer's investment period. Otherwise the officer will have gained nothing and 
the public lost nothing from the purchases based on the information, because the information 
will not be reflected in the end-of-period price. 
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expected value of the end-of-period price of issuer shares, dis-
counted to present value at r* from the time of the price change to 
the end of the officer's investment period. This means that after the 
price change, the officer's evaluation of the extra return from con-
tinuing to hold an issuer share instead of selling it and investing the 
proceeds in the safe asset will be· the same as his evaluation at the 
beginning of the period - prior both to his receiving the informa-
tion and to the price change - of the extra return from purchasing 
an issuer share instead of investing an amount equal to the 
purchase price in the safe asset. The market price has caught up 
with the change in information that prompted the officer's purchase 
of extra shares and returned the officer to his original position. 
Thus at this third step in the scenario - the time at which the infor-
mation becomes public - the officer will want to sell the same 
number of shares as he purchased at the second step - the time at 
which he received the information. 
In essence, once the information becomes public, there is no 
reason for the officer to continue to hold the dediversified, riskier 
portfolio that he acquired when he received the inside information. 
The gain that he intended to reap from that adjustment can now be 
realized. If we again think of an investment in an issuer share as 
two securities, the return on the second security - the increase in 
the value of the shares because of the event the inside information 
concerns - has matured, so there is no longer any reason to con-
tinue to hold more of the first security than the officer would have 
wanted to all along but for the opportunity to acquire that increase 
. for free.59 
2. The Six-Month Rule of Inference 
What would be the efficacy of a rule of inference that all 
purchases followed by sales within a given time span, let us say the 
statutory six months, are purchases based on inside information, 
and all purchases followed by sales more separated in time are 
purchases not based on inside information? The answer to this 
question will depend on the length of time that inside information 
59. To be technically correct, this description of the officer's sale behavior must be 
slightly modified. After the information becomes public, the officer will want to hold his 
issuer's shares in the same proportion to all other risky securities as he did before he received 
the information. The increase in his wealth, however, will mean that he will probably wish to 
own a larger absolute amount of risky securities than prior to receiving the information and 
so he would want to hold more of every security, including the issuer's, than he did at the 
beginning of the investment period. See supra note 57. Thus he will probably not sell quite 
as many issuer shares as he bought at the time that he acquired the inside information. 
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stays nonpublic and on the distribution of the lengths of the invest-
ment periods chosen by officers purchasing issuer shares without 
the benefit of inside information. The criteria by which to judge the 
rule of inference are its potential for Type I error - the likelihood 
of finding that an innocent purchase was based on inside informa-
tion - and Type II error - the likelihood of finding a purchase 
based on inside information to be an innocent purchase. The rule 
of inference will be evaluated through an example based on a more 
general formula set out in the margin. The reader should remem-
ber that at this point in the analysis we continue to assume that 
there are no legal restraints on insider trading (including section 
16(b)) and no sales based on inside information. 
An officer who purchases issuer shares without relying on inside 
information presumably does so as part of an investment strategy to 
place his savings where they will grow so that he may enjoy greater 
consumption at the end of his investment period. Although this of-
ficer could continuously adjust his portfolio as new, publicly avail-
able information reaches him, the semistrong statement of the 
efficient market hypothesis, as noted earlier,60 suggests that such 
adjustments are not worthwhile. Thus, it is plausible to assume that 
an officer will hold his shares until he is ready to consume. The rate 
at which an officer will want to consume some or all of his invest-
ments will of course vary from one officer to another. Further-
more, as future consumption needs and desires are not completely 
predictable, any given officer may not in fact know at the time he 
purchases the issuer shares how long it will be before he wilI wish to 
sell them and consume the proceeds. It would be reasonable to as-
sume that if we pooled all the shares purchased on a given day by 
officers of all public companies not acting on the basis of inside 
information, the pattern of sales of these shares over time would 
resemble a decay function: in each successive six-month time pe-
riod a given percentage of the shares still held would be sold. For 
our example, assume that 500,000 shares are purchased on a given 
day and 20% sold in each succeeding six-month period. Thus 
100,000 shares would be sold in the first six-month period leaving 
400,000 still in officer portfolios; 80,000 would be sold in the next 
period leaving 320,000 still in officer portfolios; 64,000 would be 
sold in the period following that, and so on. 
An officer that engages in a purchase of issuer shares based on 
inside information does so to profit from the reaction of the share 
60. See supra text accompanying note 54. 
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price when the information becomes public and, as demonstrated 
above, will wish to sell the shares at that point even if he is not 
ready tq consume the proceeds. Casual empiricism suggests that 
little inside information of a material nature stays secret for more 
than six months. The market imposes strong pressures on issuers to 
disclose internal information to the public. Timely disclosure is also 
prompted by securities law disclosure rules. And managers them-
selves have powerful incentives to breach confidentiality and to dis-
close valuable private information once they themselves have 
utilized it to purchase issuer shares because it is of value to others 
and because the sooner it is reflected in price, the sooner they can 
realize their profits. Certainly, few if any rule lOb-5 insider trading 
cases involve situations in which material inside information was 
kept secret for more than six months. Therefore, it would be rea-
sonable to assume that if we pooled all the shares purchased on the 
basis of inside information on a given day by officers of all public 
companies, essentially all of them would, in the absence of legal 
restraints, be sold within six months. So, to continue the example, if 
500,000 shares were purchased on the basis of inside information on 
the same day, all 500,000 would be sold within six months. 
Now take these numbers and assume that they recur daily for a 
period of years so that a "steady state" pattern of purchases and 
sales occurs. Each day officers of public companies would engage 
in purchases of 1,000,000 shares - 500,000 shares based on inside 
information and 500,000 shares not so based. Each day also in the 
steady state 1,000,000 shares would be sold by officers of public 
companies. Of these, 500,000 would come from purchases made on 
the basis of inside information, all within the prior six months. The 
other 500,000 shares would come from purchases not made on the 
basis of inside information, 100,000 from purchases made within the 
prior six months, 80,000 from purchases made within the six-month 
period immediately preceding that, 64,000 from the six-month pe-
riod before that, and so on.61 Thus 600,000 of the 1,000,000 shares 
61. Calculating the origins by period of the sales on a given day of shares purchased not 
on the basis of inside information is the mirror image of calculating the sales by period of 
shares purchased on a given day not on the basis of inside information. Let V = the number 
of shares purchased each day not based on inside information, b =the decay rate, and c = (l-
b). If purchases began k six-month periods preceding the day in question, sales on such day 
of shares so purchased will equal 
k 
V :E (d-1-d) = V(l-ck). 
i=l 
Because 0 < c < 1, as k ~ co (the steady state), sales on such day of shares that were 
purchased not on the basis of inside information approach V. 
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sold on any given day would have been purchased within the prior 
six months, 500,000 on the basis of inside information and 100,000 
not on such basis. Consequently, a rule of inference requiring that 
any share purchased within six months prior to its date of sale be 
considered a purchase on the basis of inside information will have a 
20% 'fype I error - that is, finding an innocent trade guilty - and 
a 0% Type II error - that is, finding a guilty trade innocent. Alter-
natively, thinking about the problem from a Bayesian perspective, 
adding the fact that a purchase was followed within six months by a 
sale to the fact that the purchase was by an insider increases the 
probability that it was based on inside information from 50% to 
83%.62 
We can generalize from this example by considering a number 
of variations. If the decay rate for holdings of purchases not based 
on inside information were lower than 20% for each six-month pe-
riod, the Type I error would be lower. If the decay rate were 
higher, the Type I error would be higher. If the respective propor-
tions of innocent and guilty purchases were changed, the percent-
ages of 'fype I and Type II error would be unaffected but the 
magnitude of whatever problems those errors create would be pro-
portionally altered. 63 In sum, over a wide range of plausible values 
for the parameters involved, 'fype I error will be relatively small, 
Type II error will be zero, and the fact that a purchase was followed 
62. The Bayesian approach to probability involves looking at conditional probabilities 
and asking the question how much does a given fact add to the probability that an event has 
occurred. See ROBERT v. HOGG & ALLEN T. CRAIG, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL 
STATISTICS § 5.4 {2d ed. 1965). The approach in essence consists of making probability as-
sessments and reevaluating them in light of further information. See 1 BRUNO DE FJNETTI, 
THEORY OF PROBABILITY § 4.6 (Antonio Mach£ & Adrian Smith trans., 1974) (1970); Rich-
ard D. Friedman, A Diagrammatic Approach to Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 571, 586-88 
{1986); David Kaye, The Law of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 34, 
49-50 & n.54 (1979). In this case, the probability that a purchase was based on inside infor-
mation given both that the purchaser was an officer of the issuer and that the purchaser sold 
within six months is 500,000/(500,000 + 500,000), or 50%, because we know that there are one 
million purchases by officers per day, of which 500,000 are motivated by inside information. 
The probability that a purchase was based on inside information given both that the pur-
chaser was an officer and that the purchaser sold within six months is 500,000/(500,000 + 
100,000), or 83%, because we know that among all purchases of issuer shares by officers, 
600,000 are sold within six months and 500,000 of those are based on inside information. 
63. These points are evident from the following generalized formula. In a steady state, let 
U = daily purchase of shares based on inside information; V = daily purchase of shares not so 
based; b = decay rate per six-month period of shares purchased not on the basis of inside 
information; c = (1 - b); Pl1 =number of shares sold on a given day and purchased on the 
basis of inside information in the ith six-month period preceding such day; and PC1 =number 
of shares sold on a given day purchased not on the basis of inside information in the ith six-
month period preceding such day. Assume the shares purchased on the basis of inside infor-
mation are sold within six months, so 
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within six months by a sale will significantly increase the likelihood 
that it was based on inside information. 64 
3. Purchase and Sale Behavior If Section 16(b) Is Applied 
What would happen to the scenario discussed above if section 
16(b) applies to the officer and is fully enforced? How will this 
alter the officer's behavior in terms of transactions in issuer shares 
based on inside information and transactions not so based? 
a. Shares not purchased on the basis of inside information. At 
the first stage of the scenario, the officer composes his initial portfo-
lio prior to receiving any inside information. Therefore, the issuer 
shares in this initial portfolio are, as before, the result of purchases 
not based on inside information. The officer knows, however, when 
he constructs this portfolio that if he sells any issuer shares within 
six months, he will be forced under the statute to disgorge any 
profit from the sale. This rule forces him to consider whether, as 
seems likely, there is at least some possibility that he would wish to 
sell all or part of his portfolio within six months in order to con-
sume. The officer may at the time of purchase plan for certain to 






PC1 = V(l-c) = Vb 
~ PC1=V ~ (c 1-1-c1)=V. 
i=l i=l 
For a rule of inference that all shares sold on a given day purchased within the preceding six 
months are based on inside information, 'fype I error equals 
PCi/.~ PC1=Vb!V=b. 
1=1 
'fype II error equals zero. 
64. We are examining the power of a rule of inference based on the statutory six-month 
period. It is interesting to note, however, that if the length of the period involved in the 
presumption were made longer than six months, the Type I error would increase without a 
corresponding decrease in 'fype II error, which is already zero. The most extreme lengthen-
ing of the period - to infinity - would be equivalent to assuming that all purchases by 
officers are based on inside information, in which case Type I error would rise from 20% to 
100%. If we shortened the period involved in the presumption to less than six months, we 
would reduce 'fype I error below 20%. Whether it would increase 'fype II error and, if so, by 
how much, depends on the distribution of the time periods for which inside information 
remains nonpublic. This analysis thus suggests the natilre of the trade-offs involved in, and 
the empirical information needed to evaluate, the recommendation to amend § 16(b) to re-
duce the statutory period to three months made by the American Bar Association Commit-
tee on Federal Regulation of Securities. See Committee on Fed. Reg. of Sec., supra note 9, at 
1130-31. 
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he may simply foresee that some emergency or special consumption 
opportunity might arise during that period. 
The officer is likely to foresee at least a small possibility that his 
consumption needs will be great enough within six months that he 
would need to sell more of his investing than are represented by all 
of his holdings other than his issuer shares. If he does, the existence 
of the statute will lower the expected return he associates with is-
suer shares. Under those circumstances, he will have to sell his is-
suer shares and face the statute's direct effects. The best he can do 
- a zero return - is less than he would earn on an investment in 
the safe asset. There is, as well, the usual risk that the price of is-
suer shares at the time of sale will be less than the initial price. 
The officer is likely to foresee a more significant possibility that 
he will want to sell some smaller portion of his portfolio in the next 
six months. Unless the officer's consumption needs exceed the 
value of his savings that are represented by all his holdings other 
than issuer shares, the officer could meet his consumption needs 
without selling any issuer shares. Under those circumstances, he 
would be able to avoid the direct effect of section 16(b) on his is-
suer shares, but he would be doing so at the cost of dediversifying 
his portfolio. Optimally, if he sells part of his portfolio to consume, 
he should continue to hold risky securities in the same proportions 
in his new, smaller portfolio as they were in his initial portfolio. 
But he cannot follow that optimal course of action if he needs to 
retain issuer shares to avoid the direct effect of section 16(b ). 
The conclusion is that the statute reduces the number of issuer 
shares that the officer will want in his initial portfolio even though he 
possesses no inside information at that time. The officer will know 
when he considers how many issuer shares to purchase that there is 
a possibility that he will have to give up any profits he makes and 
that, even if he can avoid giving up his profits, the issuer shares may 
turn out to be a dediversifying burden on his portfolio. Both pros-
pects make issuer shares less attractive relative to other available 
risky securities than they would be if section 16(b) did not apply. 
b. Purchases based on inside information. In the next stage of 
the scenario, the officer comes into possession of inside information 
that concerns an event that will increase the issuer's earnings. We 
saw above that the officer, in the absence of section 16(b ), would 
adjust his portfolio in response to this information in a way that 
would increase his holdings of issuer securities, and that these 
purchases can be said to be based on inside information. The ques-
tion here is the effect of section 16(b) on these adjustments: Will it 
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deter insider trading? To answer this question, we have to examine 
how section 16(b) alters an officer's expectation about the circum-
stances under which he can sell the shares he i~ considering 
purchasing on the basis of inside information. If the officer did not 
have to worry about section 16(b ), he would want to sell the shares 
he purchased on the basis of inside information as soon as the infor-
mation became public, because if the officer continues to hold on to 
these shares after that point, he would leave his portfolio needlessly 
dediversified. Almost all material inside information, it was sug-
gested, 65 becomes public in less than six months. The statute will 
force the officer to remain with a riskier, dediversified portfolio for 
the period between public dissemination of the inside information 
and a date six months after the purchase date.66 The statute thus 
makes the purchase of is~uer securities on the basis of inside infor-
mation less attractive because the more shares that are purchased, the 
more dediversified the investor will be during this period. 67 As a 
consequence the officer will purchase fewer shares in response to 
the receipt of the information. 
c. Comparison of effects. This analysis shows that section 16(b) 
discourages both purchases of issuer shares based on inside infor-
mation and purchases not based on inside information. The first 
effect is good: it is what the statute is supposed to accomplish. The 
second effect is bad: it discourages agency-cost-reducing manage-
rial share ownership. A comparison of the statute's two effects runs 
along the same lines as the discussion above concerning the timing 
of purchase and sale as a rule of inference.68 
65. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61. 
66. The sting of this forced dediversification is softened somewhat by the fact that the 
statute imposes its penalty only if the sale price is above the initial purchase price. Thus, if 
notwithstanding the positive price effect of the public announcement of the inside informa-
tion and the ordinary prospects of capital appreciation, enough negative events transpire 
after purchase to result in a price equal to or below the initial purchase price, the officer is 
free to rediversify his portfolio without penalty. 
On the other hand, the officer may also foresee the possibility that his consumption needs 
would be great enough within six months of the guilty purchase that he would need to sell 
more of his invested savings than are represented by all of his holdings other than his issuer 
shares. If this is the case, the officer faces the possibility that he would not be able to escape 
the direct effect of the statute, and the expected return he associates with the purchase would 
be lower. 
67. The assumption here is that events fui:ther in the future are more difficult to predict 
with accuracy than events nearer in the future, so that both individual share prices and the 
price of the market portfolio vary more over longer periods of time than shorter ones. Be-
cause diversification is the way that investors cope with risk, longer periods of dediversifica-
tion are less desirable. 
68. See supra section 11.A.2. 
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Consider all the shares officers would purchase in their respec-
tive firms in the absence of section 16{b) on a given day. Officers 
would wish to sell within six months all the shares purchased on 
inside information but only some portion, in the example above, 
20%,69 of the innocently purchased shares. Thus the costs of evad-
ing section 16{b) are on average more likely, in our example five 
times more likely, to burden a potential share purchase based on 
inside information than a potential share purchase not so based. 
4. Conclusion 
The model developed here for analyzing how section 16{b) af-
fects insider trading has important implications for determining 
whether section 16(b )'s general approach is worthwhile. On the 
one hand, the model shows that, contrary to the hopes expressed in 
legislative history and in many judicial opinions, section 16{b) will 
not eliminate much insider trading by "taking the profit out of it"7o 
because the direct effect of the statute can easily be avoided most of 
the time. Historically, prior to the enactment of the statute, most 
officer and director purchases based on positive inside information 
probably were followed by sales within six months, as Congress be-
lieved and the model predicts. But the statute's very enactment 
made a continuation of this pattern unlikely. 
On the other hand, the commentators who note the ease with 
which the direct effects of the statute can be evaded and conclude 
that the general approach of the statute is not worthwhile71 are also 
wrong. The maneuvers necessary to avoid the direct effect of sec-
tion 16(b) bring their own costs. Officers who engage in insider 
trading must remain dediversified for longer than they would other-
wise wish; thus section 16(b) will reduce, though not eliminate, in-
sider trading. Furthermore, the reduction may be more substantial 
than it first appears. The most tempting situation in the absence of 
16(b) is where the insider knows a "sure thing" that will be an-
nounced very soon. The officer will have a strong incentive to 
purchase a large number of issuer shares, relative to his existing 
69. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
70. Judge Clark, in the seminal case interpreting § 16(b ), Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 
F.2d 231 {2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 {1943), expressed such hopes: 
We must suppose that the statute was intended to be thoroughgoing, to squeeze all pos-
sible profits out of stock transactions, and thus to establish a standard so high as to 
prevent any conflict between the selfish interest of a fiduciary officer, director, or stock-
holder and the faithful performance of his duty. 
136 F.2d at 239. 
71. See supra note 12. 
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holdings of securities, financed either by a sale of much of these 
holdings or by extensive borrowing. While such extensive 
purchases will make his portfolio much more risky until the public 
announcement and rediversifying sale of the purchased securities, 
the period of heightened risk is short and the expected reward is 
great. With the imposition of section 16(b ), however, purchases of 
this magnitude would leave the officer in this highly risky position 
for a full six months. As a result, the officer will scale down consid-
erably, though not eliminate, his insider trading. 
B. A World With Only Negative Inside Information 
In contrast to the first scenario, now assume a world in which all 
inside information is negative rather than positive. In this world, 
some sales by insiders would be based on inside information and 
some would not, but no purchases by insiders would be based on 
inside information. We can ask the same questions about this world 
as we did about the world in which all inside information was 
positive. 
1. Purchase and Sale Behavior If Section 16(b) Is Not Applied 
How does a share sale not based on inside information transpire 
compared to one that is based on inside information? Consider a 
scenario that again. starts with the officer not having any undis-
closed, inside information concerning the prospects of the firm. His 
portfolio at this stage is therefore the same as in the first stage of 
the scenario relating to positive information.72 
The scenario can then develop in-two ways. One way is for the 
officer to come to the end of his investment period never having 
acquired any inside information and to sell his issuer shares in order 
to consume. Such a sale is one not based on inside information. 
The other possibility is for the officer to acquire negative inside 
information prior to the end of his investment period. How will the 
officer adjust ltj.s portfolio in response to this information? Again, 
to maintain the simplicity of the standard portfolio choice model 
while accounting for intraperiod adjustments, we will assume that 
regardless of when in the period the information is received, the 
adjusted portfolio will be the same as the portfolio would have been 
if the officer had known the information at the beginning of the 
period. The analysis exactly parallels that relating to the receipt of 
positive information. Receipt of the negative information will 
72. See supra section II.A.La.ii. 
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cause the officer to decrease his evaluation of the expected end-of-
period price of issuer shares. He will therefore recalculate the opti-
mal portfolio of risky securities, and this recalculation will cause 
him to decrease both the proportional holdings of issuer shares and 
the absolute number of issuer shares he holds. Thus receipt of the 
information will lead the officer to sell shares of the issuer, and such 
sales can be said to be based on inside information. 
At the last stage in the scenario, the inside information received 
by the officer becomes public.73 Again the analysis parallels that 
for positive information. The change in the market price of issuer 
shares should equal the change in the officer's evaluation of the 
end-of-period price of issuer shares at the time he receives the in-
formation, discounting at r* to reflect the time value of money. 
Thus he will want to buy the same number of issuer shares as he 
sold when he received the information. In essence, the officer sold 
issuer shares solely in order to avoid the fall in market price that 
would accompany disclosure of the inside information. After the 
fall has occurred, he no longer has any reason to maintain reduced 
or negative holdings of issuer shares. 
2. The Six-Month Rule of Inference 
For a world in which only sales can be based on inside informa-
tion, the statute suggests two possible rules of inference related to 
the timing of purchases and sales. The first possible rule of infer-
ence would be that all sales following purchases by less than six 
months are sales based on inside information, and all other sales are 
innocent. The second rule of inference would consider all sales fol-
lowed by purchases within six months to be sales based on inside 
information and all other sales to be innocent.74 Again, the criteria 
by which to judge each of these rules of inference is its potential for 
Type I and Type II error. The rules will be evaluated in terms of an 
example that is based on a more general formula set out in the 
margin. 
73. Again, we are not concerned with the situation in which the investor's investment 
period ends before the information becomes public. In that situation, even if he accelerates 
his sale of issuer shares to the time he receives the information, he gains nothing from having 
received and acted on it. 
74. This second rule of inference could have been considered as well in the preceding 
discussion of the world with only positive inside information, but that would have added 
unnecessary complication at that stage in the analysis. Consideration of the rule at that stage 
would parallel the consideration here of the first rule of inference in a world with only nega-
tive inside information. 
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a. Sale preceded by purchase. To evaluate the first rule of infer-
ence, which relates to a sale preceded within six months by a 
purchase, suppose that officers of all public companies purchase in 
aggregate 500,000 shares of their respective issuers' shares on a 
given day, not including any rediversifying repurchases to replace 
shares sold on the basis of inside information. According to our 
assumptions in this section, none of these 500,000 purchases are 
based on inside information. If there were no sales based on inside 
information, the pattern of sales might be as in our earlier example, 
a decay function in which officers would sell 20% of their issuer 
shares in each successive six-month time period. But in fact sales 
are made on the basis of inside information and the number of such 
sales will be a function of the proportion of officers that receive 
inside information, the significance of that information, and the 
number of issuer shares held by officers of public companies. Sup-
pose that the proportion of officers and the significance of the aver-
age bit of inside information is such that, in the aggregate, officers 
receiving inside information in each successive six-month period 
sell 10% of the total number of issuer shares currently held by of-
ficers of public companies.75 There is no reason why an officer who 
purchased his shares in a recent period woulq be more likely to 
receive inside information than an officer who purchased his shares 
in a much earlier period. For expositional purposes, assume that 
sales, whether they are based on inside information or not, occur 
only on six-month anniversaries of the purchase date. Thus, at the 
end of the first six-month period - at the first six-month anniver-
sary of the date of purchase of the 500,000 shares - 100,000 shares 
will be sold not on the basis of inside information (20% of the 
500,000) and 40,000 shares will be sold on the basis of inside infor-
mation (10% of the remaining 400,000, which would otherwise not 
have been sold at that time). Officers selling the 40,000 will repur-
chase them within six months when the information becomes pub-
lic. At the end of the second period, 80,000 shares will be sold not 
on the basis of inside information (20% of the remaining 400,000 
75. Not included in the calculation of sales based on inside information are shares sold 
when an officer comes into possession of inside information but which would in any case 
have been sold to generate funds for consumption prior to the information becoming public. 
In such a situation, the officer has gained nothing from the early sale because the price had 
not declined by the point at which he would have sold if he had not received the information. 
At the time of the sale, the officer may not know for certain either when he would sell for 
consumption purposes or when the information would become public, but as long as he has 
rational expectations concerning these matters, the foregoing calculation of sales based on 
inside information should be an accurate representation of the aggregate impact of the use of 
the information on the market. 
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remaining original shares and repurchase replacements) and 32,000 
will be sold based on inside information (at this point there are 
320,000 remaining original shares and repurchase replacements that 
otherwise would not have been sold at the time). At the end of the 
third six-month period, there would be sales of 64,000 not based on 
inside information and sales of 25,600 based on inside information, 
and so on.76 
Now, as in the earlier example, take these numbers and assume 
that they recur daily for many years so that a "steady state" pattern 
of purchases and sales occur. Each day 500,000 shares are 
purchased, not counting replacement repurchases. As just de-
scribed, they or their replacements are gradually sold not on the 
basis of inside information. Also, there will be selling on the basis 
of inside information from the accumulated stock of officer-held 
shares. As the sales pattern approaches a steady state, the origins 
of these sales on any given day are simply the decay functions de-
tailed just above but in reverse: from original purchases made six 
months before, 40,000 based on inside information and 100,000 not 
so based; from original purchases twelve months before, 32,000 and 
80,000 respectively; from original purchases in the period before 
that, 25,600 and 64,000 respectively, and so on.77 Because this is an 
infinite algebraic series, we can calculate for the steady state the 
total number of shares sold every day on the basis of inside infor-
76. The general formula for the progression of sales in successive six-month periods from 
shares purchased on a given day is as follows. Let Z = the number of shares purchased by 
officers of public companies on a given day (in the example in the text, 500,000); a = the 
proportion of such shares or repurchase replacements thereof held during any successive six-
month period that are sold on the last day of such period not on the basis of inside informa-
tion (a= .20 in the example); b =the proportion of such shares or repurchase replacements 
thereof held during any given successive six-month period and sold on the last day of such 
period on the basis of inside information (b = .10 in the example); f = 1 - a (f = .8 in the 
example); SC1 =the number of shares sold in period i not on the basis of inside information; 
SI, = the number of shares sold in period i on the basis of inside information; and S1 = Sl1 + 
SC;. Thus, 
SC1=Z([i·1-f1) =Z(l-f)f,_1 =Zaf,.1; 
Sl1=Zbf1=Zbff1-1; 
S, = (Za+Zbf)f,_1 
77. The general formula for the original purchase dates, in terms of prior six-month peri-
ods, for sales of shares sold on a given day is as follows. Let PSC1 = the number of shares 
sold on a given day not on the basis of inside information and purchased in the ith six-month 
period preceding the sale date; PSI1 = the number of shares sold on such day on the basis of 
inside information and purchased in the ith six-month period preceding the sale date; and PS1 
= PSl1 + PSC;. Because the origins of sales are just the mirror image of the sales of a 
purchase on given day, PSC1 = Zat·1, PSl1 = Zbf1, and PS1 = (Za+ Zbf)f1-1• See supra note 76. 
June 1994] A Unified Theory of Section 16(b) 2129 
mation, which in the steady state is 200,000, and the number that 
are not, which is 500,000.78 
The critical date ill a portfolio theory explanation of behavior is 
a share's "original" date of purchase, and the discussion so far has 
been cast in terms of that date. We have assumed that if any share 
represents a rediversifying replacement for a share previously sold 
on the basis of negative inside information, that share is deemed to 
have the purchase date of the original share that it replaces. 
Although it could not be implemented as a practical matter, it is a 
useful first step to ask how good would be the rule of inference that 
considers the sale of a share originally purchased less than six 
months earlier to be based on inside information and the sale of a 
share originally purchased further in the past to be "innocent." The 
answer is not very good at all: such a rule would have a 20% 
(100,000/500,000) Type I error (finding an innocent sale guilty) and 
78. Assume Z shares are purchased each day and are sold, as described above, on the six-
month anniversaries of the original purchase date. If purchases began k six-month periods 
prior to the sale date in question, the aggregate sales on such day not based on inside infor-
mation will equal 
k 
Z( k (f·1-f')) = Z(l-Jk). 
i=l 
Because 0 < f < 1, ask~ oo (the steady state), sales on such day approach Z. Approaching 
the problem of describing the steady state another way, 









(2) ~;i-i=l+~fl-1=1+ ~l/(l~)l=l+f_ 









(the total number of shares sold not on the basis of inside information on a given day). 
C=aZ .f f'-1 =aZ(l+f/a) =Z(a+f) =Z; 
1=1 
l=bZf ~ =bZf(l+fla). 
i=l 
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an 80% (160,000/200,000) '!Ype II error (finding a guilty sale 
innocent).79 
The apparent lack of probity of this rule of inference is not an 
artifact of the particular parameters chosen here; it can be demon-
strated as well by the fact that if we selected at random without 
reference to their original purchase date 140,000 of the sales on a 
given day - the same number as were purchased in the immedi-
ately preceding six months - and simply assumed that these sales 
were based on inside information and that all the others were not, 
we would get the same Type I and Type II errors. This is because if 
we look at innocent and guilty sales on a given day in terms of their 
original purchase dates, each six-month period contributes to the 
two categories of sales in the same ratio. 80 To know whether a 
share sold today was originally purchased in the most recent six-
month period or one long ago tells one nothing about the chances 
that the sale was based on inside information. Adding the fact that a 
share sold today was purchased in the most recent six-month period 
to the fact that it was sold by an insider does not increase one iota 
the likelihood that the sale was based on inside information. 
This picture is not materially changed if we substitute the ob-
servable, actual purchase date in the rule of inference, that is, if we 
count all purchases within the last six months as original purchases 
even though we know that some of them represent replacement 
purchases. We know that any sale based on inside information will 
be replaced within the next six months. To see what effect this has, 
let us return to our steady state example,81 where we looked at sales 
on a given day, say January 14, 1994, that were the result of original 
purchases made on dates at six-month intervals going way back in 
79. Applying the formula PSC1 = Za/'"1, the number of shares sold innocently that were 
originally purchased at the beginning of the six-month period just ending equals Za. Thus, 
Type I error=Za/C=Za/Z=a 
Similarly, the number of shares sold on the basis of inside information and originally 
purchased at the beginning of the six-month period equals 
Zbjf1•1 = Zbf. 
Hence, the number so purchased more than six months before equals 
Zbf .f p-I_zbf=Zbf(l- .f Jl-l)=Zbf (f/a) 
l=l l=l 
Zbf(f/a) Zbf(fla) (f/a) 
Type II error=--!-= Zbf(l+f/a) = l+(f/a) 
80. From supra note 77, for any given period of origin i, PS/1 = Zbf1 and PSC1 = Zaf,.1, 
and so PSI/PSC1 = bf/a. 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79. 
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time. Consider the total purchases made on January 14, 1993: 
500,000 shares. Of these, 100,000 were sold before January 14, 
1994, not on the basis of inside information. On January 14, 1994, 
the sale date on which we are focusing, an additional 80,000 shares 
with an original purchase date of January 14, 1993, will be sold not 
on the basis of inside information, as well as an additional 32,000 
shares whose sales are based on inside information. Between July 
14, 1993, and January 14, 1994, the 40,000 shares sold based on in-
side information on July 14, 1993, will be repurchased. Thus, imme-
diately prior to January 14, 1994, insiders would hold 400,000 shares 
with original purchase dates of January 14, 1993; 360,000 would be 
original shares, and 40,000 replacement shares. The 40,000 replace-
ments ought to be spread proportionately among the 80,000 to be 
sold that day not based on inside information, the 32,000 to be sold 
based on inside information, and the 328,000 that are retained. 
Thus of the 80,000 innocent sales with an original purchase date of 
January 14, 1993, 8000 will have repurchase dates within the last six 
months; similarly, 3200 of the inside information sales will have 
such repurchase dates. For shares with an original purchase date of 
July 14, 1992, and sold on January 14, 1994, the comparable figures 
would be 6400 and 2540, and so on. In aggregate, stretching back to 
infinity, 40,000 innocent January 14, 1994, sales will have repur-
chase dates within the preceding six months and 16,000 guilty trades 
will. Thus the rule of inference that a sale preceded by a purchase, 
whether original or repurchase, within six months is based on inside 
information and all others are not will have a Type I error of 27% 
(140,000/500,000) and a Type II error of 72% (144,000/200,000). 
b. Sale followed by purchase. The second possible rule of infer-
ence suggested by the statute is that only sales followed by 
purchases within six months should be considered sales based on 
inside information. Consider again a steady state in which officers 
of public companies in the aggregate purchase daily 500,000 shares 
of their respective issuers' shares, not including replacement repur-
chases, and sell daily in aggregate 500,000 shares not based on in-
side information and 200,000 shares based on inside information. 
The officers ),'esponsible for the 500,000 innocent sales on any given 
day are not likely on average to start saving again immediately in 
amounts that are large in relation to their recent sale of securities 
for consumption. Therefore, we will assume that, in the aggregate, 
such officers will within six months only acquire 10% of the amount 
they sold of their respective issuers' shares, or 50,000 shares. Ac-
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cording to the analysis above,82 each of the officers responsible for 
the 200,000 shares sold on the basis of inside information will want, 
as soon as that information becomes public, to repurchase the same 
number of shares as he sold. Again, we will assume that all such 
information will become public within six months. 
We can extrapolate these figures to a steady state to evaluate 
our rule of inference. On a given day, 700,000 shares would be sold 
by officers. Of these sales, 250,000 would be matched by repur-
chases within the next six months - 200,000 repurchases by of-
ficers who sold on the basis of insider information, and 50,000 by 
officers who did not. A rule of inference that all sales followed by 
purchases within six months were made on the basis of inside infor-
mation would have a 10% (50,000/500,000) Type I error (finding an 
innocent sale guilty) and a 0% Type II error (finding a guilty sale 
innocent). 
c. Conclusion. The foregoing suggests that in a world with only 
negative inside information, the first rule of inference - which fo-
cuses on sales preceded by purchases within six months - is use-
less, and that the second rule of inference - which focuses on sales 
followed by matching purchases within six months - has real pro-
bative value. This result parallels the analysis in the discussion of a 
world with only positive inside information of the rule of inference 
that focuses on purchases followed by sales within six months. The 
rules of inference that tum out to be probative in both worlds focus 
on whether or not the first transaction is based on inside informa-
tion. The fact that the first transaction is followed within six months 
by the second substantially increases the likelihood that the first 
transaction was based on inside information. The fact that the sec-
ond transaction is preceded within six months by the first does not 
add at all to the likelihood· that the second transaction was based on 
inside information. As Part III will indicate, this is an important 
point that is often missed in both judicial and SEC decisions inter-
preting the reach of section 16(b ). 
3. Purchase and Sale Behavior If Section 16(b) Is Applied 
If section 16(b) applies and is enforced, what will happen to 
purchase and sale behavior in this section's scenario, in which all 
inside information is negative so that only sales, not purchases, can 
be based on inside information? 
82. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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a. The first possible rule of enforcement: penalize those sales 
preceded within six months by a purchase. Consider an officer who 
purchases shares of the issuer and then, before six months elapses, 
receives negative inside information. In the absence of the section 
16(b) penalty, he would wish to sell some issuer shares before the 
information became public, or within six months. However, if the 
current share price exceeds the initial price, application of this first 
rule of enforcement will force him to give up the difference to the 
issuer for each share he sells up to the number he purchased in the 
last six months. He will be faced with the choice of selling, which 
means paying the penalty, which may or may not be greater than 
the decline in share price he expects to avoid by selling, or postpon-
ing his sale until the expiration of the six-month period, which 
means taking the chance that the information will have already be-
come public. In at least some cases he will choose to postpone the 
sale and the information will become public before the expiration 
of the period so that the sale would no longer be worthwhile. In 
those cases, the statute prevents a sale that would otherwise occur 
based on inside information. 
Before we can conclude that this first rule of enforcement repre-
sents wise policy, however, we need to examine the costs it imposes 
on the officer who wants to engage in innocent sales and, given the 
costs, consider whether the rule makes sensible distinctions be-
tween the pairs of transactions that section 16(b) should cover and 
the pairs it should not cover. Specifically, we are concerned with an 
officer who purchases shares of the issuer and then, before six 
months elapses, encounters a consumption need or other invest-
ment opportunity that causes him to wish to sell some or all of his 
invested savings. The first rule of enforcement would force him to 
choose between paying the penalty or postponing the sale of issuer 
shares. If he postpones the sale, he must choose either not to con-
sume or to dediversify his portfolio by selling other s~curities to 
meet his needs. Assum,ing that the officer knows, at the time he 
decides whether or not to purchase the issuer shares, that he might 
face this unpleasant choice if a consumption need or opportunity 
arises in the next six months, there is nothing unfair about imposing 
the burden on him. It is just one more risk associated with this 
security that he needs to take into account in determining the com-
position of his portfolio. But imposition of this risk does impose a 
cost, because it will make the purchase of issuer shares less attrac-
tive. From the officer's perspective, his own corporation's shares 
are less liquid than alternative publicly traded shares, so he will 
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want to choose a smaller percentage of those shares for his portfo-
lio. As we saw in Part I, the resulting reduction in officer and direc-
tor holdings of such shares is, ceteris paribus, unfortunate, because 
such holdings reduce the agency costs of management. 
Do the gains the first rule of enforcement offers by deterring 
insider trading exceed the costs the rule imposes by reducing officer 
and director holdings of issuer shares? No absolute answer can be 
given to this question, but we can see that, in terms of such gains 
and losses, the requirement does not discriminate in any rational 
way between the pairs of transactions it covers and the ones it does 
not. This follows from our discussion above of the rules of infer-
ence, in which we concluded that the fact that a sale was preceded 
by a purchase in the prior six months says nothing about the likeli-
hood that the sale was based on inside information relative to a sale 
not preceded by so recent a purchase. To see the lack of rational 
discrimination between pairs of transactions, consider what would 
happen if that rule of enforcement were extended to cover a group 
of sales it does not now cover: those sales preceded by a purchase 
in the period between six months and a year prior to the date of 
sale. The total number of potential sales covered by the rule would 
increase and the number of guilty sales deterred would increase 
proportionally. But the rule's costs - the burden it would impose 
on an officer wishing to sell for some other reason - would also 
increase proportionally. There is no more reason to impose the 
rule on the portion of all sales preceded by purchases within six 
months than on any other portion of sales. Ultimately, in a world in 
which there is only negative inside information, if we are unwilling 
to impose the rule on every sale by an insider preceded by a 
purchase however far back, we should not impose it on the portion 
of such sales preceded by purchases within six months. 
b. The second possible rule: penalize those sales followed within 
six months by a purchase. Consider an officer who purchased issuer 
shares more than six months ago and now receives some negative 
inside information. As we have seen above,83 such information will 
cause him to recalculate his optimal portfolio and, in the absence of 
section 16(b ), he would want to sell a given number of issuer shares. 
As soon as the information becomes public he would want to return 
to his initial portfolio, and as a result he would purchase back the 
same number of shares as he sold. The maneuvers necessary to 
avoid the direct effect of the second rule - postponing for six 
83. See supra section II.A.La.iii. 
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months the repurchase of the shares that he sold - make selling 
issuer shares less attractive and consequently will reduce the 
number he will sell. The second rule will thus prevent sales based 
on inside information to the extent of this reduction. 
The second requirement would also impose a cost on the officer 
who wishes to sell issuer shares not based on inside information if 
he foresees any possibility that within the next six months he would 
want to begin saving again, to increase his investments in risky se-
curities, and perhaps to repurchase issuer shares. But, absent the 
statute, within six months officers of public companies in our exam-
ple would want in the aggregate to repurchase only a portion of the 
shares sold innocently on any given day - in our example 10% -
whereas they would wish to repurchase 100% of the shares sold on 
basis of insider information. It is consequently on average more 
likely, in our example ten times more likely, that a potential share 
sale based on inside information would be burdened by the costs of 
evading section 16(b) than a potential share sale not based on in-
side information. The prospect of this burden on selling issuer 
shares will reduce officer ownership - a cost. But this cost will be 
relatively concentrated on the sales that we have assumed we want 
to deter - that is, sales based on inside information - so that a 
substantial portion of that reduction will simply be from a lessening 
of the prospects of making profits from insider trading. 
C. A World With Both Positive and Negative Inside Information 
What do the models for a world in which there is only positive 
inside information and for a world where there is only negative in-
side information tell us about a world that has both? The discus-
sion below shows that there are situations in which these models 
have direct applicability to a world with both kinds of inside infor-
mation and, when they do not, that they can be combined in a use-
ful fashion. 
1. Direct Applicability of the Preceding Models 
Even in a world in which there is both positive and negative 
inside information, there are some pairs of transactions within six 
months of each other in which the officer involved would only have 
access to inside information at the time of one of the transactions. 
If the transaction made with access to inside information is a sale, 
then only the sale could be motivated by that information and, if it 
is, the information must be negative. The model for a world with 
only negative inside information is directly applicable to this class 
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of paired transactions. The preceding discussion of this world sug-
gests that only the second rule of enforcement for the statute 
should be applied - that is, liability if the sale is followed by a 
purchase within six months. The first rule of enforcement - liabil-
ity if the sale was preceded by a purchase within six months -
should not apply. To impose the first rule would be to add pairs of 
transactions that cannot be logically distinguished from those left 
out in terms of the trade-off between deterrence of insider trading 
and the burden imposed on potential transactions that would not be 
so based. Similarly, if the transaction made with access to inside 
information is a purchase, only the first rule should be imposed -
that is, liability if the purchase is followed by a sale within six 
months - and not the second. Generalizing, in cases in which there 
is access to inside information only at the time of one of the two 
transactions, the statute should only require the officer to give up his 
profits if his access was at the time of the first transaction and not if it 
was at the time of the second. 
2. Combining the Models 
There are many pairs of transactions within six months of each 
other in which the officer has access to inside information at the 
time of both transactions. For these cases, the examination below 
suggests that it is appropriate to apply both the first and second 
requirements of the statute. A rule of inference concluding that in 
the absence of the statute any purchase and sale or sale and 
purchase consummated within a period of six months contains at 
least one transaction based on inside information would have a 
Type II error of zero. This is because we would expect that all 
purchases based on inside information would be followed within six 
months by a sale and that all sales based on inside information 
would be followed within six months by a purchase. This rule of 
inference would have two sources of Type I error. One would come 
from coupling a sale for consumption purposes with a purchase 
within six months that was not based on inside information. The 
other would come from matching a purchase for the investment of 
new savings with a sale within six months that was not based on 
inside information. 
If we combined the examples used to illustrate the two preced-
ing models, we would have some idea of the magnitudes of these 
transactions and of the 1}'pe I error. Again assume a steady state in 
which there are 500,000 purchases daily of issuer shares by officers 
of public corporations based on inside information, 500,000 original 
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purchases not so based, and 200,000 repurchases representing read-
justments to the original portfolios of officers who had sold on the 
basis of inside information in the prior six months. If we look at the 
sales on any given day, there will be 500,000 sales of shares that 
were previously purchased on the basis of inside information. All 
of these shares will have been purchased within the prior six 
months and the sales will represent readjustment back to the of-
ficers' original portfolios. The other 700,000 sales will be of shares 
that were not purchased on the basis of inside information. Of 
these 700,000 sales, 200,000 will have been motivated by inside in-
formation and 500,000 will not. Of the 500,000 sales not motivated 
by inside information, 100,000 will have as their origins purchases 
made within the last six months and will be a source of Type I 
error.84 
The second source of Type I error will come from the officers 
making the 500,000 innocent sales. Some portion of these officers 
will within six months undertake purchases not based on inside in-
formation of 50,000 issuer shares, the second source of Type I error. 
Total Type I error cannot be calculated yet because we do not 
know the denominator for this second source; we do not know how 
many of the 500,000 daily purchases that are not based on inside 
information were made by officers who at some point in the past 
had held issuer shares, sold the111 to consume, and now intend to 
save again. The least it can be is 50,000 - which assumes that any 
such purchases that do occur, occur within six months of the sale -
and the most it can be is 500,000 - which assumes that all 
purchases not based on inside information are purchases by officers 
who sold at least as many shares at some point in the past. Thus the 
range of the Type I error is from (100,000 + 50,000)/(500,000 + 
50,000), which equals 27%, to (100,000 + 50,000)/(500,000 + 
500,000), which equals 15%. Alternatively, if we think about the 
problem from a Bayesian perspective, adding the fact that a 
purchase was followed or preceded within six months by a sale to 
the fact that the purchase was by an insider increases the 
probability that it was based on insid~. information from 42% to 
59%.ss Similarly, adding the fact that a sale was followed or pre-
84. See supra section II.B.2.a. 
85. The probability that a purchase is based on inside information conditional on the 
purchaser being an officer of the issuer is 500,000/(500,000 + 500,000 + 200,000), or 42%, 
because we know that there will be 1,200,000 purchases by officers per day, of which 500,000 
will be motivated by inside information (the others being 500,000 purchases not based on 
inside information and 200,000 repurchases representing readjustments back to the original 
portfolio after an earlier sale motivated by inside information). The probability that a 
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ceded within six months by a purchase to the fact that the sale was 
by an insider increases the probability that it was based on inside 
information from 17% to 24%.86 
This discussion of the application of the rule of inference sug-
gests that when both rules of enforcement for the statute are im-
posed on paired transactions with six months of each other, 
transactions that are based on inside information are always bur-
dened whereas only a portion of innocent transactions are bur-
dened - in our example between one-in-four and one-in-seven. 
III. DETERMINING THE REACH OF THE STATUTE 
The model developed in Part II demonstrates that a legal re-
gime employing the general approach of section 16(b) will deter 
insider trading. It also sets up a theoretical framework that will be 
useful in determining the appropriate reach of the statute. This 
Part will address directly which pairs of transactions section 16(b) 
should cover. It begins by proposing an overall principle of statu-
tory reach derived from the statute's internal logic, other evidence 
of congressional intent, and a concern for economic efficiency. It 
then considers more specifically, through the use of hypothetical 
examples, different kinds of paired transactions. In the process, this 
Part confronts many of the major issues faced by the courts and the 
SEC in applying section 16(b ). 
purchase is based on inside information conditional on the purchaser being an officer and the 
purchase being followed or preceded by a sale within six months is 500,000/(500,000 + 
100,000 + 50,000 + 200,000), or 59%, because we know that among all purchases of issuer 
shares by officers on a given date, 850,000 will be followed by or preceded by a sale within six 
months and 500,000 of those will be based on inside information. The others will be the 
100,000 purchased not on the basis of inside information and sold within six months, the 
50,000 shares purchased by officers who had sold not on the basis of inside information 
within the last six months, and the 200,000 readjusting repurchases. 
86. The probability that a sale is based on inside information conditional on the pur-
chaser being an officer of the issuer is 200,000/(500,000 + 500,000 + 200,000), or 17%, because 
we know that there will be 1,200,000 sales by officers per day of which 200,000 will be moti· 
vated by inside information. The others will be 500,000 sales not based on inside information 
and 500,000 sales representing readjustments back to the original portfolio after earlier 
purchases based on inside information. The probability that a sale is based on inside infor-
mation conditional on the seller being an officer and the sale being followed or preceded by a 
sale within six months is 200,000/(200,000 + 100,000 + 50,000 + 500,000), or 24%, because we 
know that among all sales of issuer shares by officers on a given date, 850,000 will be fol-
lowed by or preceded by a sale within six months and 200,000 of those will be based on inside 
information. The others will be the 100,000 sold not on the basis of inside information that 
had been purchased not on the basis of inside information within the last six months, the 
50,000 shares purchased within the next six months by officers who had sold not on the basis 
of inside information, and the 200,000 readjusting sales. 
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A. An Overall Principle of Decision 
The fundamental purpose of section 16(b) is to deter insiders 
from profiting at the expense of outsiders through the insiders' ac-
cess to nonpublic information and to do so without requiring evi-
dence that such nonpublic information was actually used. This 
purpose is apparent from the statute's language and legislative his-
tory, and it has been repeatedly affirmed by the courts.87 As noted 
in Part I, the simplest and most effective way of accomplishing thi~ 
87. The preamble to§ 16(b) states explicitly that the section was enacted "[f]or the pur-
pose of preventing the unfair use of information which may haye been obtained by such 
[statutory insider]." Exchange Act§ 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). The statute's purpose 
is reflected as well in the congressional testimony of Thomas Corcoran, one of the three 
principal drafters of the 1934 Act: 
Next comes the everlasting problem of protecting the fellow on the outside from the 
insider . . . . That is, the problem of protecting the stockholder - and every fellow who 
buys into the market is a stockholder - who does not know as much about the company 
as the fellow on the inside .... [T]he poor little fellow does not know what he is getting 
. into, and it is just as important as preventing unwarranted and destructive speculation, to 
have the fellow on the outside protected from the fellow on the inside who is an officer 
or director of the corporation or a pool with inside information, as it is not to let the 
little fellow buy too much stock by setting the margins too low. 
Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess: (1934) [hereinafter House Hearings] 
(statement of Thomas G. Corcoran, Counsel, Reconstruction Fin. Corp.), reprinted in 8 LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURffiES Ac:r OF 1933 AND SECURffiES EXCHANGE Ac:r OF 
1934 item 23, at 85 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY). 
This interpretation of the statute's substantive purpose was affirmed by the Second Cir-
cuit in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.) (citing congressional hearings 
that "indicate that § 16(b), specifically, was designed to protect the 'outside' stockholders 
against at least short-swing speculation by insiders with advance information"), cert. denied, 
320 U.S. 751 (1943). Smolowe's reasoning has been affirmed in several subsequent opinions 
of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 
232, 243 (1976); Kem County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 591-92 
(1973); see also Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 428 & n.2 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
1\vo legal scholars, Steve Tuel and Karl Okamoto, each recently have argued that despite 
the language of§ 16(b )'s preamble, deterrence of trading on nonpublic information is not its 
primary substantive purpose. Professor The! proposes that the primary purpose of § 16 is to 
discourage insiders "from manipulating corporate affairs to create corporate opportunities to 
trade corporate stock profitably." The!, supra note 5, at 399. Presumably, at least as far as 
subsection (b) is concerned, the main manipulation that The! is alluding to is the affirmative 
issuance of false or misleading information, rather than business decisions that create share 
price volatility or are otherwise suboptimal. I make this presumption because in an efficient 
market in which insiders refrain from trading on nonpublic information, business decisions 
that make earnings more volatile would not create opportunities for insiders to profit on the 
short-swing. This is because when the insider has no nonpublic information, she is in no 
better position than the outsider to know which way the price will swing, even if she knows 
that sharp swings are likely to occur frequently. Similarly, suboptimal business decisions will 
be reflected in market price before the insiders trade and thus present no profitable trading 
opportunities, either short or long term. Section 16(b) can help deter false or misleading 
information because the truth usually will come out within six months. 
On the other hand, Professor Okamoto contends that the primary purpose of§ 16(b) is to 
deter insiders from trading to affect market prices artificially - that is, by buying and thus 
sending a price-increasing positive signal to the market when there is in fact no undisclosed 
positive information about the issuer and then selling at a profit before the price drops to its 
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purpose would be to penalize all transactions by officers and direc-
tors in their own firm's equity securities because all such transac-
tions are potentially motivated by inside information. Congress did 
not choose this route. Instead, it imposed penalties only on certain 
classes of paired transactions by officers and directors. These 
classes were identified in general terms by a formula related to their 
nature and timing. 
The decision by Congress to carve out a large portion of all 
transactions by officers and directors and not to subject them to the 
penalties of the statute reflects a concern that a broader reach 
would be too damaging to managerial share ownership and its at-
tendant benefits.88 Congress would not have decided upon such a 
complex formula for identifying the classes of transactions that are 
and are not to be penalized unless it expected that the penalized 
classes would contain a larger proportion of transactions motivated 
by inside information than would the classes not penalized. The 
original level after the market realizes that the positive signal has not been subsequently 
confirmed by the announcement of positive news. Okamoto, supra note 5, at 185. 
A significant element in the arguments of both these scholars is that we should ignore 
§ 16(b)'s preamble because§ 16(b)'s design is manifestly ineffective at deterring trading on 
nonpublic information. Id. at 184-85; The!, supra note 5, at 397-98. Congress, therefore, 
could not really have intended the statute to do that and it must have had some other pur-
pose. The model in Part II undermines this argument by showing that § 16(b) is not as inef-
fective at achieving its stated purpose as The! and Okamoto believe. In any event, as 
subsequent discussion will show, neither false or misleading statements made by insiders to 
create trading opportunities nor trades by insiders to reap profits from false signals that the 
trades create call for including within the reach of § 16(b) any class of insider transactions 
that the principle of decision recommended here does not include. 
Congress intended that the substantive purpose of § 16(b) be achieved by a relatively 
mechanical procedure. This procedural goal is again reflected in the congressional testimony 
of Thomas Corcoran. See Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and 
S. Res. 36 and S. Res. 57 (73d Cong.) Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 
73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15 (1934) [hereinafter Senate Hearings], reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra, item 22, at 6557. This goal was also recognized by the Second Circuit in 
Smolowe, in which the court found that there was no need to prove the actual use of inside 
information in order to prevail under § 16(b ). 136 F.2d at 236. 
88. See, e.g., Reliance Electric, 404 U.S. at 422 ("Congress did not reach every transaction 
in which an investor actually relies on inside information."); 404 U.S. at 431 n.7 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (noting that § 16(b) "represents a balance struck between the need to deter short-
swings based on inside information and a desire to avoid unduly inhibiting long-term corpo-
rate investment"). The same concern is articulated in Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 
(9th Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965). According to Max Factor, Congress recognized 
tl!at 
the affirmative value of long-term personal financial commitments by insiders to the 
prosperity of the companies which they controlled was obviously great. Thus, by basing 
forfeiture of profits upon tl!e length of the insider's investment cominitment, Congress 
sought to Ininimize misuse of confidential information, without unduly discouraging 
bona fide long-term investment. 
342 F.2d at 308. Steve Thel's extensive review of the legislative history of § 16 supports the 
conclusion that one of Congress's central concerns was the separation of ownership and con-
trol in the modem public corporation and the need to provide incentives to align the interests 
of management and shareholders. Tuel, supra note 5, at 452-89. 
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model in Part II suggests that Congress was realistic in its expecta-
tion: assuming that six months is an appropriate time frame, a 
scheme working along the lines of section 16(b) can discriminate in 
this fashion. 
The foregoing discussion of congressional intent suggests an 
overall principle of decision for the courts and the SEC in applying 
section 16(b) to pairs of transactions not unambiguously within the 
words of the statute. A given class of paired transactions should be 
included within the coverage of section 16(b) only if, like the ordi-
nary cash-for-security transactions that are clearly within the statute's 
reach, the potential officer-and-director transactions belonging to the 
class contain a significantly larger proportion of transactions moti-
vated by inside information than do potential officer-and-director 
transactions generally. Not only does this principle of decision sepa-
rate out the paired transactions Congress would have wished to 
reach, but it also has the attraction of enhancing economic effi-
ciency, a value whose importance has been increasingly emphasized 
in scholarly work and judicial opinions relating to corporate and 
securities law in the sixty years since the passage of the Securities 
Exchange Act.8? The non-insider-trading rewards of managerial 
share ownership and share-price-based compensation can, as out-
lined in Part I, significantly reduce the agency costs associated with 
large, publicly held corporations. For any given level of deterrence 
of insider trading, the proposed principle puts less of a burden on 
these mechanisms of agency cost reduction than a principle that 
would include within section 16(b )'s coverage any additional classes 
of potential transactions. As the hypotheticals below will show, the 
model developed in Part II and the just-proposed principle of deci-
sion provide a reliable guide for determining the reach of the 
statute. 
B. Must the Term in Office Include the Time of Purchase 
or Sale? 
1. The Time of Purchase 
Consider the following hypothetical: X, who at the time has no 
relationship with ABC Corporation, buys 100 ABC shares at $50 on 
January 1. X becomes an officer of ABC on March 1. While still an 
89. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1988) (utilizing the efficient 
market hypothesis as the basis for making a presumption of reliance in thickly traded securi-
ties markets); FRANK H. EASIERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCIURE 
OF CoRPORATE LAW (1991) (applying economic analysis to a wide variety of corporate and 
securities law issues). 
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officer, X sells his 100 shares at $60 on May 1. Should X's $1,000 
profit be recoverable by ABC under section 16(b )? 
a. Application of the principle of decision. The purchase in the 
hypothetical could not have been based on information obtained by 
reason of X's relationship with ABC, because X was not an officer 
at the time. The s.ale, however, could be based on inside informa-
tion. Because the only kind of inside information that motivates 
sales is negative information, we can analyze the question with the 
model for a world in which there is only negative inside 
information. 
The class of paired transactions at issue here are purchases fol-
lowed within six months by sales by individuals who are officers 
only at the time of sale. Inclusion of this class under section 16(b )'s 
coverage would deter some sales based on inside information, be-
cause it would create an incentive for officers receiving negative 
information less than six months after purchasing a security to post-
pone their sales for six months, by which time the information 
would presumably have become public. But inclusion of this class 
of transactions also burdens potential sales that are not based on 
inside information. As the discussion of the model demonstrates,9° 
the fact that a sale ·is preceded by a purchase within six months 
rather than some longer period adds nothing to the probability that 
the sale is based on inside information. The deterrence or 
nondeterrence of potential sales as a result of the six-month cutoff 
is in no way related to whether or not the sales are based on inside 
information. 
The proposed principle of decision therefore suggests that ABC 
should not be able to recover X's profits. No larger portion of po-
tential officer-and-director sales in the class are motivated by inside 
information than officer-and-director sales generally. By parallel 
reasoning, it can be established that section 16(b) should not reach 
sales followed within six months by purchases when the officer is an 
insider only at the time of the purchase. Thus the above hypotheti-
cal is in fact a member of a larger class of paired transactions that, 
according to the overall rule of decision, should not be included 
within the reach of section 16(b) - those transactions in which the 
officer or director does not have that status at the time of the first 
transaction but does at the time of the second. 
90. See supra section II.B.2.a. 
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b. Court decisions. The Second Circuit, in Adler v. Klawans,91 
confronted a case identical in its relevant details to the hypothetical 
and held that section 16(b) was applicable even though the director 
involved had that status only at the time of the sale and not earlier 
at the time of the purchase.92 At least until the wholesale SEC revi-
sion of the section 16 rules in 1991,93 the Adler holding was gener-
ally considered authoritative,94 so X's profits would be recoverable 
by ABC, an outcome contrary to the recommendation supported by 
the proposed overall principle of decision. 
The reasoning in the Adler decision demonstrates how courts 
have approached questions concerning the scope of section 16(b) 
and illustrates the problems they encounter because of the lack of 
an overall theory of the statute. The specific issue raised in the hy-
pothetical and the case is not by itself of large importance to the 
proper functioning of the economy. It provides, however, a rela-
tively simple context in which to explore some larger issues that are 
highly relevant to the correct treatment under section 16(b) of vari-
ous forms of share-price-based management compensation, which 
in tum is of large importance to the economy. 
The Adler court first acknowledged that applying the conven-
tional rules of construction to the operative language of 16(b) did 
not resolve the issue before it; the defendant director could argue 
that the statute should not be interpreted as reaching his paired 
91. 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959). 
92. 267 F.2d at 847. 
93. See infra section III.C.2.c. 
94. Adler was expressly followed in Marquette Cement Manufacturing Co. v. Andreas, 
239 F. Supp. 962, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The Supreme Court has also cited Adler approvingly. 
Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424 n.4 (1972). See also Arrow Dis-
trib. Corp. v. Baumgartner, 783 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1986) ("(A]n insider's short-swing 
transaction is subject to § 16(b) if the insider has held his corporate position at either the 
time of his purchase or the time of his sale."); Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 12, at 70-72 
(noting that all the major courts that have directly addressed the issue have held that an 
officer or director need only hold the position at the time of either purchase or sale to be 
liable under§ 16(b)). 
The ALi's proposed ALI Federal Securities Code would codify the Adler holding by pro-
viding that liability arises for the short-swing profits of a director or officer "if the defendant 
has that status at the time of either the purchase or the sale or at any time between the two 
transactions." ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CooE § 1714(c) (1978). 
Support for the Adler position is not unanimous, however. Since Reliance Electric, the 
Supreme Court has withheld judgment on the authoritativeness of Adler. Foremost-
McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 243 n.16 (1976) ("Since we rely on the 
exemptive provision, we intimate no view on the proper analysis of a case where a director or 
officer makes an initial transaction before obtaining insider status."). In Allis-Chalmers 
Manufacturing Co. v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 527 F.2d 335, 347-48 & n.13 (7th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078, 424 U.S. 928 (1976), the court rejected the reasoning of 
Adler, saying that "to be charged with a section 16(b) violation, [an insider] must only have 
had insider status prior to the initial purchase or sale." 527 F.2d at 348. 
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transactions.95 The court concluded, however, that the statute was 
remedial, not penal, and hence should be interpreted in the fashion 
most consistent with the legislative purpose.96 The court suggested 
that intent and purpose must be "glean[ ed] from the statute as a 
whole" and not from its "isolated parts. "97 The court then found, 
based on the language of the statute as a whole, that the objective 
was to deter insiders from making improper use of information 
gathered in a representative capacity by taking the profit out of 
such conduct.98 
The court's description of how it should go about applying the 
statute when its language is ambiguous thus closely resembles the 
approach we used to derive the proposed overall principle of deci-
sion. The court's reasoning and our analysis differ, however, con-
cerning the significance of the six-month limitation. The proposed 
principle of decision rests upon a discerned logic behind this six-
month limitation. The Adler court did not rest its analysis on any 
such logic: 
Large areas of "insider" conduct were consciously left untouched 
by Congress for reasons dictated by practicalities rather than ethics or 
pure logic. A line had to be drawn somewhere by the lawmakers, as 
they do in the laws of ... a host of other subjects governed by statute. 
95. 267 F.2d at 844. The court suggested that all that is plain from the first sentence of 
§ 16(b) is that Congress intended to reach purchases and sales within a period of six months 
by "one who was a director, officer or beneficial owner at some time." 267 F.2d at 844. But 
conventional rules of construction alone cannot resolve the question "At what time?" In 
fact, the court said, "If Congress had made such profits the subject of a criminal penalty .•• 
appellant's (the director] argument would carry much weight for we would be obliged to 
construe it strictly." 267 F.2d at 844. 
96. 267 F.2d at 844. See infra note 100 for a discussion suggesting that categorizing the 
statute here as "remedial" is not useful as an aid in its construction. There is, in any event, a 
certain irony in the court's apparent belief that it had to characterize the statute as remedial 
in order to invoke principles of construction that assisted the court in coming to its conclu-
sion. The measure of damages if§ 16(b) were applied to the class of paired transactions at 
issue would be the sale price minus the purchase price - in the hypothetical, ($60 - $50) x 
100 = $1000. If the concern were that the purchase was motivated by inside information, this 
could reasonably be characterized as a remedial payment to the corporation. The true value 
of the security as measured by a fully informed market would be $60, $50 would represent 
the bargain price at which the officer purchased the shares because the market was not aware 
of the information possessed by the officer, and $10 would represent the gain to the insider at 
the expense of the outsiders. Here, however, the concern is that the sale is motivated by 
inside information, that is, by knowledge of information that will push the price down when it 
becomes public. The advantage the officer gains if he possesses inside information is the 
avoidance of a loss. The fact that X purchased the shares at $10 less than he sold them for is 
completely unrelated to the size of that advantage. To make a comparable rough measure of 
X's advantage, the sale price would have to be compared with the market price at some point 
after, not before, the sale. 
97. 267 F.2d at 844. 
98. 267 F.2d at 844. 
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But the consciously limited scope of the statute is no reason for us to 
seek yet further limitations of what is remedial legislation.99 
The Adler court concluded its analysis of the issue by citing 
other cases in which the Second Circuit resolved ambiguities in the 
language of the statute. Though these cases address different issues 
arising under section 16(b ), the Adler court argued that they 
demonstrate that "the purpose of the statute is remedial, rather 
than penal, and that it must be strictly construed in favor of the 
corporation and against any person who makes [a] profit dealing in 
the corporation stock."100 The court's logic, in essence, is that be-
cause section 16(b) is designed to deter trading on inside informa-
tion, it should be applied to every class of paired transactions 
potentially so motivated that the statute's language could possibly 
reach.101 
99. 267 F.2d at 845. 
100. 267 F.2d at 846-47. Thus, at this point the court uses its characterization of the 
statute as "remedial" to justify construing it, not just in accordance with its purpose, but 
"liberally" against insider defendants. This appears to reflect the traditional, but increasingly 
discredited, canon of statutory construction that "a remedial statute should be liberally con-
strued in order to effectuate th~ remedial purpose for which it was enacted." 3 NoRMAN J. 
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATIITORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.01, at 147 (5th ed. 1992). The ca-
non does not seem to have much meaning beyond being the inverse of the proposition that 
because of special due process concerns, a defendant accused of violating a criminal statute 
should not be convicted unless there is clear notice that her behavior was illegal. The stan-
dard treatise in the area has noted that "[w]hen 'remedial' is used to mean all laws other than 
those which are penal, the scope of its reference is broad and indiscriminate. For this reason, 
it is not unusual for a court to give what it calls a strict construction to a statute which it 
nevertheless describes as remedial." 3 id. § 60.01, at 148. Moreover, it is often difficult to 
distinguish between remedial and penal statutes, as a single statutory provision "may be 
either penal or remedial according to the way in which different parties are affected by it." 3 
id. § 60.03, at 160. Other commentators have also found the canon to be useless. See, e.g., 
Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REv. 431, 442 
{1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HAR.v. L. REv. 405, 
459 n.201 (1989). The more sensible route to interpreting a statute is to forgo characterizing 
it as remedial or penal and to construe it to give effect to the statutory purpose, an approach 
that has become increasingly orthodox; See 3 SINGER, supra, § 60.01, at 148, § 60.04, at 163-
64 ("[T]he court should determine what the legislative intent [is] and follow it."). 
101. The court in Adler suggested one other independent argument for its holding. The 
last sentence of the statute provides that § 16(b) "shall not be construed to cover any transac-
tion where such beneficial owner [the beneficial owner of more than 10% of any class of 
equity security] was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and 
purchase, of the security involved." Exchange Act§ 16(b), 78 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988). The 
court argued that because this "exemptive provision" refers only to insiders who acquire that 
status by reason of being a 10% holder, the provision evidences, by application of the canon 
of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a clear legislative intent to treat directors 
and officers differently. 267 F.2d at 845. 
It is not at all obvious that the exemptive provision shows such an intent. The clause's 
function may simply be to make clear that the time for determining whether a beneficial 
shareholder is a greater than 10% holder is the moment immediately prior to entering into a 
short-swing transaction and that the effect of the first transaction in the pair on the percent-
age of shares held should not be counted. Although the presence of the word "both" initially 
makes this construction appear strained, an examination of the sequence of the draft bills 
that culminated in § 16(b) and the surrounding legislative history shows otherwise. See infra 
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The flaw in the court's reasoning102 is its failure to attach any 
significance to Congress's decision to impose the six-month limita-
tion. By blandly asserting that a line must be drawn somewhere 
and refusing to explore the "practicalities" that caused Congress to 
include the limitation, the court missed the fact that Congress was 
evidently trying to balance two concerns: deterring insider trading 
and preserving managerial share ownership.103 Decisions as to the 
reach of the statute should take into account both concerns. The 
note 104. This explanation for the presence of the exemptive provision was adopted in Allis-
Chalmers by the Seventh Circuit, which concluded that an insider, to come within the reach 
of§ 16(b ), must have that status prior to the initial purchase or sale. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. 
v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 527 F.2d 335, 345 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078, 424 
U.S. 928 (1976). 
Even if this explanation of the exemptive provision is incorrect and the provision in fact 
does show an intent to treat officers and directors differently from 10% shareholders, its 
existence is still not a persuasive argument that§ 16(b) should cover the transactions in ques-
tion. Officers and directors would be treated differently than 10% holders if the rule, in the 
case of a purchase followed by a sale, required insider status at the time of the purchase but 
not at the time of the sale. Exactly such a rule for directors and officers is proposed later in 
this article. See infra section IIl.B.2. Under such a rule, the defendant director in the Adler 
case and X in our hypothetical would not need to return their profits. A possible rationale 
for Congress's requiring that 10% shareholders have that status at the time of the sale as well 
as the time of the purchase would be that Jong-term large shareholders have more access to 
inside information than short-term ones. 
102. It is possible to interpret what has been criticized here as the court's "reasoning" 
really to be a formalistic recitation that is regularly invoked when the court for other reasons 
decides against the defendant. If this interpretation of the opinion is adopted, the likely 
"real" reason for the decision is the fact that the defendant director sold a large number of 
shares within ten days after becoming a director. 267 F.2d at 843. This fact leads to the 
inference that the sales were based on negative inside information that the director learned 
at his first directors' meeting. In addition, he moved a resolution that the corporation 
purchase in the market some of its own stock, thereby supporting the price, at a time that 
would coincide with his own undisclosed sales, 267 F.2d at 845-46, an action that strengthens 
the inference of insider trading because it suggests that the director took his fiduciary respon-
sibilities lightly. 
This interpretation does not make the court's decision any more defensible. To start, in 
the opening paragraph of the opinion the court framed the issue as whether§ 16(b) covers 
profits "made on sales of the corporation's stock by the director of a corporation while hold· 
ing such office but who was not a director when he purchased the stock less than six months 
earlier." 267 F.2d at 842. The court held that§ 16(b) does cover such profits. 267 F.2d at 
847. Given how baldly the court stated its holding, the relatively mechanistic structure of 
§ 16(b), the normal deference that district courts give court of appeals holdings, and the 
preeminent position of the Second Circuit in the interpretation and application of§ 16(b), 
this holding is likely to be regarded by insiders as having significant predictive value for cases 
falling into the category described by the holding. This is true regardless of whether they 
include the other "facts" that may have Jed the court in this case to suspect insider trading. 
Thus, the court should have addressed, as it purported to do, the issues raised by the appar-
ent rule laid down by its holding. 
It could be argued that any case falling within the class of paired transactions covered by 
the rule will involve a sale within six months of the insider's becoming a director or officer, 
supporting some inference, though perhaps not as strong as the one raised by the actual facts 
of the Adler case, that the sale was motivated by what he found out when he became a 
director. But this more general inference is not a sound basis for the decision because it is 
unrelated to whether the purchase was made Jess than six months before the sale, the crucial 
factor for determining the applicability of § 16(b ). 
103. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
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models in Part II show that if we take account of both concerns, 
section 16(b) should not apply to paired transactions when the of-
ficer or director does not have that status at the time of the first 
trade.104 
104. The logic of the overall structure of the statute - limiting profit recovery only to 
short swings - is not the only evidence that this rule is consistent with the intent of Con-
gress. As detailed below legislative history and the statutory measure of damages both pro-
vide strong additional support that Congress contemplated that the officer or director would 
have that status at the time of the first transaction. Also, many, but not all, commentators 
who have considered the question also agree that Congress was focusing on the possibility of 
abuse only at the time of the first transaction. 
As first introduced in both the Senate and the House, the draft of the part of the Ex-
change Act bill that was to become § 16(b) read: 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any [statutory insider] 
(1) To purchase any such registered security with the intention o[r] expectation of 
selling the same security within six months; and any profit made by such person on any 
transaction in such a registered security extending over a period of less than six months 
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention or expecta-
tion on his part in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased for a 
period exceeding six months. 
S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(b) (1934) (emphasis added), reprinted in Senate Hearings, 
supra note 87, reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 87, item 22, at 6422, 6430; 
H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., § 15(b} (1934), reprinted in Housing Hearings, supra note 87, 
reprinted in 8 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 87, item 23, at 1, 1. 
The final version of the bill involved two changes of importance here. The first part, 
prohibiting a purchase with a short-swing intention or expectation of sale, was dropped, ap-
parently because it would be so difficult to enforce. Tuel, supra note 5, at 472. The second 
part, providing for the recovery of profits irrespective of intention or expectation, was 
changed so that "any transaction ... extending over a period of less than six months" became 
"any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase ... within any period of less than six 
months." Exchange Act § 16(b}, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b} (1988). The "any purchase and sale" 
part of the second change was obviously necessitated by the deletion of the prohibition of a 
purchase with intention to sell short-swing, because a reference to a transaction extending 
over less than six months would not, standing alone, make any sense. The "sale and 
purchase" part of the second change appears to correct the original draft's oversight of the 
fact that an insider can use short-swing trading to make a profit and return to her original 
position just as easily with negative as positive information. Allis-Chalmers, 527 F.2d at 346-
47. The final version left essentially unchanged the last clause of the early version providing 
recoverability "irrespective of any intention on [the part of such insider] in entering into such 
transaction of holding the security purchased or not repurchasing the security sold for a pe-
riod exceeding six months." Exchange Act§ 16(b}, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b} (1988) (emphasis ad-
ded). This strongly suggests that Congress viewed the paired purchase and sale as a unit and 
that the speculative behavior that concerned Congress was that which occurred at the time of 
the first of the two trades: Congress originally intended both to ban such behavior when 
intent could be proved and to require the return of profits regardless of a showing of intent 
when the insider reversed his position within six months, but Congress eventually settled for 
just the return-of-profits provision. The insider's reversal of position in essence created an 
irrebuttable presumption that the first trade involved the kind of speculative behavior Con-
gress had originally wanted to ban. The testimony of Thomas Corcoran again provides 
confirmation: 
Mr. Corcoran: [Section 16(b}(l}] is to prevent directors from receiving the benefits 
of short-term speculative swings on the securities of their own companies, because of 
inside information .... You hold the director, irrespective of an intention or expectation 
to sell the security within 6 months after, because it will be absolutely impossible to 
prove the existence of such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude 
rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the 
director intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a short swing. 
Senator Gore: You infer the intent from the fact. 
Mr. Corcoran: From the fact. 
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c. SEC rulemaking. Prior to 1991, the SEC's section 16 rules 
never directly addressed the question of the applicability of section 
16(b) to trades by a person who becomes an officer or director. 
However, in 1969, after Adler, the SEC promulgated a rule that 
required reporting of such prior trades under section 16(a).105 The 
SEC explained that it was proposing the rule in order to provide 
disclosure "with respect to all transactions which may be subject to 
section 16(b)" and cited Adler.106 In the SEC's initial 1988 release 
Senate Hearings, supra note ITT, at 6556-57. 
At the time of the first transaction, a person in the position of the corporate insider in 
Adler could not have obtained information as a result of a statutory insider relationship to 
the issuer because the relationship did not yet exist. He therefore cannot engage in the par-
ticular kind of speculative behavior that Congress wished to deter. 
The statute's measure of damages also supports the conclusion that the statute is aimed at 
speculative behavior at the time of the first transaction. As demonstrated in the example in 
supra note 96, if the first trade is motivated by inside information, the difference between the 
purchase and sale price (the "profit realized") represents a rough but reasonable measure of 
the benefit gained from using the information. If it is the second trade that is motivated by 
inside information (the only possibility in Adler), the difference between the purchase and 
sale prices of the paired transactions is totally unrelated to the benefit gained from using the 
information. 
A number of commentators agree that the concern of§ 16(b) is with the misuse of inside 
information at the time of the first trade. See, e.g., DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS L. HAZEN, 
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 439 (4th ed. 1991); Tuel, supra note 5, at 
415-17. Other commentators disagree and believe that even if the only possibility of misuse 
of inside information is at the time of the second trade, short·swing trading is contrary to the 
rationale underlying§ 16(b). 16 ARNOLDS. JACOBS, SECTION 16 OF THE SECURmES Ex. 
CHANGE Acr § 3.03, at 54-55 & n.44 (1993) (listing cases); Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 
12, at 75. The commentators who disagree, however, do not attempt to justify their position 
in terms of the legislative history or the overall mechanics of the statute. They appear to rely 
simply on the facts that the second trade could be based. on inside information and that the 
preamble says that the purpose of § 16(b) is to prevent the use of inside information. 
105. See former rule 16a-l(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(d) (1990) (repealed 1991), which in 
essence required any director or officer who engages in a trade during the first six months of 
service to report any trades during the six months prior to this first trade after assuming 
office. 
106. Exchange A'.ct Release No. 8574, 34 Fed. Reg. 7250, 7250 (Apr. 17, 1969) (hereinaf-
ter Release No. 8574] (proposing former rule 16a-l(d)). Announcement of the final adoption 
of the former rule in slightly modified form was in Exchange Act Release No. 8697, 34 Fed. 
Reg. 15,246 (Sept. 18, 1969). 
It is not entirely clear what this rule implies about the SEC's own position concerning the 
reach of § 16(b) to pre-insider transactions. There could be significance to the fact that the 
SEC uses the word may in its explanation for the rule. The relationship between the transac-
tions that must be reported under§ 16(a) and the ones that give rise to§ 16(b) liability has 
never been fully defined. Rule 16(a)-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 (1993), provides that transac-
tions exempted by SEC rule from the operation of§ 16(a) are exempt from§ 16(b), but no 
rule has ever provided for the converse. On the contrary, the SEC has stated, "The fact that 
ownership of securities and transactions in those securities are reported under Section 16(a) 
... does not necessarily mean that liability will arise therefrom under Section 16(b)." Ex-
change Act Release No. 7824, 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'JI 26,030, at 19,058 (Feb. 14, 1966); 
see also Colan v. Monumental Corp., 713 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing cases). 
On the other hand, the SEC could have thought that a § 16(a) reporting rule was all that 
was necessary, without seeing any reason, perhaps because of the Adler holding's simplicity 
and broad judicial acceptance, to make a formal rule.codifying it. Because§ 16(a) does not 
explicitly provide for SEC rulemaking, the rules under this subsection must be regarded as 
interpretations of statutory language. If the SEC interprets that a transaction is covered by 
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concerning the possible wholesale revision of the section 16 rules, it 
proposed to retain its then-existing approach to pre-insider transac-
tions. As justification for that approach, it observed, "once becom-
ing an officer or director and gaining access to inside information, a 
person would have the opportunity to take advantage of that infor-
mation to offset transactions made shortly before attaining insider 
status."107 The SEC changed its position, however, in a subsequent 
release and in 1991 ultimately adopted rule 16a-2(a), which ex-
empted from both section 16(a) and section 16(b) trades carried out 
before a person becomes an officer or director .108 The reason it 
gave for the change was the concern among commentators that in-
clusion of such trades under section 16(b) is "unnecessarily harsh in 
that it subjects [officers and directors] to liability, even though they 
may not have known at the time of the transactions that they would 
become officers or directors in the future."109 
The SEC came to the right result for the wrong reason. There is 
nothing "harsh" about the Adler rule, once it has been established. 
A person who trades in a corporation's securities and within six 
months thereafter is given the opportunity to become its officer or 
director can avoid forgoing her profits from the transaction in any 
of three ways: she can reverse the trade before taking the job, take 
the job but wait the remainder of six months before reversing it, or' 
decline the job. 
Reasons matter. The SEC's power to exempt transactions from 
section 16(b) extends only to those transactions "not compre-
hended within the purpose of [the] subsection."110 This is a real 
constraint, and the SEC has been found to have exceeded its power 
in seeking to exempt other kinds of transactions from section 
§ 16(a) and that interpretation is respected by the courts, then there should P.robably be a 
presumption - rebuttable with a showing that there is a reason for treating the terms differ-
ently in the two subsections - that the interpretation applies to § 16(b) as well. The transac-
tion would be within the § 16(b)'s reach unless the SEC makes a rule exempting it. Some 
commentators certainly seem to assume that the SEC's requiring of reporting of pre-insider 
transactions is evidence that the SEC interpreted § 16(b) as including them within its reach as 
well. Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 12, at 70-71. 
107. Initial Release, supra note 7, at 89,602. 
108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2(a) (1993). Rule 16a-2(a) contains an exception to its exemp-
tion for cases in which the director or officer becomes subject to § 16 of the Act solely as a 
result of the issuer's registering a class of equity securities pursuant to § 12 of the Act. This is 
appropriate because in this case the insider has access to inside information at the time of the 
first transaction. 
109. Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Stockholders, 
Exchange Act Release No. 27,148 [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I 84,439, 
at 80,384 (Aug. 18, 1989) [hereinafter Reproposing Release]. 
110. 15 u.s.c. § 78p(b) (1988). 
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16(b).111 The court in Adler considered whether the SEC had the 
power to exempt pre-insider transactions to be an open issue. The 
Adler court avoided this issue by concluding, contrary to the de-
fendant's assertions, that the SEC had not sought to create such an 
exemption.112 Now the SEC obviously has. Professor Marc Stein-
berg and Daryl Landsdale, Jr., find that "the SEC has exceeded its 
rulemaking authority by instituting this policy."113 Similarly, Ar-
nold Jacobs, author of the principal treatise dedicated to section 16, 
concludes that "a court could easily invalidate Rule 16a-2(a)."114 
Some commentators have sharply criticized this move, asserting 
that the underlying purpose of section 16(b) is to deter statutory 
insiders from using inside information and that Adler-type matched 
trades present the opportunity for such abuse because of the in-
sider's access to information at the time of the second trade - ex-
actly the concern expressed by the SEC when initially it proposed 
retention of its old approach.11s 
The SEC needs to "take the bull by the horns" and recognize 
that the possibility of abuse of information at the time of the second 
trade is not an appropriate concern under section 16(b ). Although 
this would be an alteration of the SEC's current position, it is, for 
all the reasons set out here, clearly the better reading of the statute 
and hence highly defensible. Given the active section 16(b) plain-
tiffs' bar, rule 16a-2(a) will almost certainly be challenged eventu-
ally.116 The courts are no more likely than the commentators to be 
111. See, e.g., Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1957) (in dicta, expressing doubt 
whether the SEC possessed the power to promulgate former rule 16b-3); Perlman v. Timber-
lake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding that former rule § 16b-3 was in conflict 
with the expressed purpose of the statute, and therefore invalid). These cases are discussed 
further in infra notes 248-53 and accompanying text. Similarly, in Feder v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970), the Second Circuit held 
that rule 16a-10, which purports to exempt from§ 16(b) any transaction that is exempted by 
the SEC from the reporting requirements of§ 16(a), is invalid to the extent that its effect 
would be to exempt paired transactions in which the first trade occurs when the officer or 
director still holds office but the second occurs after he resigns. 406 F.2d at 268. 
112. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 847 (2d Cir. 1959). 
113. Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 12, at 78. 
114. 16 JACOBS, supra note 104, § 3.03, at 55. 
115. See 16 id. § 3.03, at 56 (quoting Initial Release, supra note 7, at 89,602); Steinberg & 
Landsdale, supra note 12, at 75. Steinberg and Landsdale describe the rule as "giving away a 
crown jewel" in the SEC's war on insider trading. Id. at 69. 
116. The rapidity of challenge is slowed by the doctrine, based on § 23(a) of the Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1988), that good faith reliance on SEC rules is a defense 
against being required to pay damages. See Colema Realty Corp. v. Bibow, 555 F. Supp. 
1030, 1040 (D. Conn. 1983); Perlmim v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); 
Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. O'Neill, 168 F. Supp. 804, 805-06 (E.D. Mo. 1958). Thus, to 
challenge the rule, a member of the plaintiffs' bar will need to bring a test case that involves 
little likelihood of remuneration with the hope of establishing a principle that will then open 
up the possibility of a range of remunerative cases in the future. 
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impressed with the extraordinarily weak "harshness" justification 
that the SEC has given for ignoring the possibility of abuse on the 
second trade. Unless the SEC adopts the stronger rationale advo-
cated here, courts may well, as the commentators predict, find rule 
16a-2(a) to exceed the SEC's powers.117 
2. The Time of Sale 
Consider another hypothetical. Y, an officer of ABC Corpora-
tion, buys 100 ABC shares at $65 on June 1. Y resigns his position 
on August 1 and no longer has any relationship with ABC. Y sells 
his 100 shares at $80 on October 1. Should Y's $1,500 profit be 
recoverable by ABC? 
a. Application of the principle of decision. In this hypothetical, 
the sale cannot be based on inside information but the purchase can 
- the reverse of the preceding hypothetical. Because the only kind 
of inside information that motivates a purchase is positive informa-
tion, we can analyze this question with the model of a world in 
which there is only positive information. 
The class of paired transactions at issue here is purchases fol-
lowed within six months by sales by those having insider status only 
at the time of purchase. Including this class of transactions under 
section 16(b )'s coverage would deter both purchases based on in-
side information and purchases not so based. In each case there is 
as at least some possibility that circumstances would arise such that 
the director or officer would, in the absence of the statute, want to 
sell issuer shares within six months. Section 16(b) would make the 
purchase less attractive because he knows that if these circum-
117. Rule 16a-2(a) is a "legislative rule," as it is pursuant to the statutory grant of power 
to the SEC to make exemptions contained in Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) 
(1988). See 2 KENNETII C. DAv1s, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:8, at 36 (2d ed. 
1979). The Supreme Court has said that "legislative regulations are given controlling weight 
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). Despite the high 
barrier to a plaintiff imposed by such a standard of judicial review, a plaintiff challenging the 
rule might well still succeed. If a court is inclined to believe that abuse of information at the 
time of the second trade is an appropriate concern of the statute and the SEC does not 
dissuade the court of that belief, a plaintiff may find it easy to persuade the court that the 
rule's adoption was manifestly contrary to the statute. The paired transactions exempted by 
the rule involve the possibility of the use of inside information, and the statute's purpose is to 
deter such trading whether the results are harsh or not. This argument will be particularly 
effective because the claim of harshness is so dubious and because the SEC has changed its 
position, suggesting that it previously did not interpret the purpose of the statute to include 
avoidance of harshness as part of the statutory purpose. See International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979), in which the Court stated in dictum that 
"an administrative agency's consistent, long-standing interpretation of the statute under 
which it operates is entitled to considerable weight," suggesting that recently changed inter-
pretations are entitled to less weight. 
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stances do arise he will be faced with either paying the penalties of 
the statute for the issuer shares he has purchased or maintaining a 
dediversified portfolio.118 But although these circumstances are 
certain to arise with potential purchases based on inside informa-
tion, because all inside information becomes public in less than six 
months,119 they are less likely to arise with innocent purchases be-
cause the pattern of savings and consumption often involves an in-
vestment period longer than six months. 
The proposed principle of decision therefore suggests that Y's 
profits should be recoverable by ABC. The class of paired transac-
tions in question contains a larger proportion of purchases moti-
vated by inside information than officer-and-director purchases 
generally because, absent coverage by the statute, all such 
purchases would be sold within six months.120 
Again, by parallel reasoning, the model of the world in which 
there is only negative inside information demonstrates that sales 
followed within six months by purchases when the officer has that 
status only at the time of sale should also be included within cover-
age of the statute. Thus this hypothetical is in fact a member of a 
larger class of paired transactions that, according to the overall rule, 
should be included - transactions in which the officer or director 
has that status at the time of the first transaction but not the second. 
b. Decisions. In Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 121 the Second 
Circuit confronted a case in which a de facto director purchased 
shares while it was still a director but resigned a month before sell-
ing them.122 The court held that section 16(b) applied.123 After cit-
ing Adler for the proposition that section 16(b) is a remedial statute 
that should be construed in the way most consistent with the legisla-
ture's purpose, the Feder court stated that the possibility of abuse 
was at least as great in the case before it as in Adler because "in the 
118. See supra section 11.A.3. 
119. See supra section 11.A.2. 
120. More precisely, with potential purchases by an officer or director who subsequently 
resigns within six months, all such purchases based on inside information would, in the ab· 
sence of applying§ 16(b), result in a sale within six months, whereas only a portion of those 
not based on inside information would result in such a sale. 
121. 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970). 
122. 406 F.2d at 263. The purchaser and seller of the shares was the defendant, Martin 
Marietta Corp. Martin Marietta was deemed under§ 16(b) to be a director of Sperry Rand 
Corp., the issuer in question, because George Bunker, Martin Marietta's president and chief 
executive officer, was a director of Sperry Rand and the court held that he had been depu-
tized to represent Martin Marietta on the Sperry Rand board. 406 F.2d at 265-66. 
123. 406 F.2d at 266. All the other courts that have considered the issue raised in Feder 
found the transactions involved to be within the reach of§ 16(b). See 16 JAcoas, supra note 
104, § 3.03, at 48-58 (listing cases). 
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case of a director who resigns his directorship before the sale it is 
possible for both the purchase and sale to have been unfairly moti-
vated by insider knowledge; whereas if the purchase were made 
prior to the directorship only the sale could be motivated by inside 
information."124 In the first hypothetical the SEC came to the right 
answer for the wrong reason. This time it is the court. 
c. SEC rules. As with pre-insider trades, before 1991 SEC rules 
never directly addressed the applicability of section 16(b) to post-
insider trades. However, in 1969, in reaction to the Feder holding, 
the SEC adopted a rule requiring reporting of such trades under 
section 16(a),125 again giving as a justification the desire to provide 
for disclosure of "all transactions which may be subject to section 
16(b )."126 In the SEC's initial 1988 release concerning possible 
wholesale revision of the section 16 rules, it proposed retaining its 
then-existing approach to postinsider transactions. As a reason, the 
SEC stated, "An insider's leaving office does not diminish the abil-
ity to develop a plan to purchase and sell or sell and purchase while 
in possession of inside information."127 Ultimately, the SEC 
adopted the current rule 16a-2(b ), which, without further explana-
tion, explicitly included postinsider transactions within the reach of 
both section 16(b) and section 16(a).128 The reasons quoted 
above129 are somewhat vague, but they encompass the reasons sug-
gested here for why Feder-type transactions should be covered. 
Rule 16a-2(b) will likely stand as settled law, because it is simply an 
SEC interpretation of the statute, an interpretation fully consistent 
with prior judicial opinions concerning postinsider trades. 
C. Market-Acquired Options 
1. The Purchase and Sale of Calls 
Now consider hypothetical Cl. On January 1, W, an officer of 
ABC Corporation, purchases 1000 nine-month call options on ABC 
shares for $4 per option. The exercise price is $50, the current mar-
ket price of ABC shares. On February 1, when the market price of 
124. 406 F.2d at 268. 
125. See former rule 16a-l(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(e) (1990) (current version at 17 
C.F.R. § 240.16a-2(b) (1993)), which in essence required any director or officer who leaves 
office and engages in any trade within six months of his last trade while in office to report 
such postinsider trade. 
126. Release No. 8574, supra note 106, at 7250 (proposing former rule 16a-l(e)). 
127. Initial Release, supra note 7, at 89,602. 
128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2(b) (1993). 
129. See text accompanying supra notes 126-27. 'Ipe S~C presumably intended these 
reasons to justify the rule it finally adopted as well as its initial proposal. 
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ABC shares has risen to $60, W sells the options for $13 each. 
Should X's $9,000 profit be recoverable by ABC? 
a. Application of the principle of decision. W's purchase of op-
tions for his portfolio is economically equivalent to purchasing 1000 
ABC shares on a highly leveraged basis, combined with the acquisi-
tion of 1000 put options as an insurance policy against the risk that 
the market price of these shares will drop below their purchase 
price.130 W's sale of the options is, correspondingly, equivalent to 
selling the 1000 ABC shares, repaying the leveraging loan, and sell-
ing the no-longer-needed insurance policy. 
Putting the insurance aside for a moment, we should draw the 
same inferences concerning the use of inside information from W's 
purchase and sale of the calls as we would from a purchase of 1000 
shares followed within six months by their sale. We should also ex-
pect the same deterrent effect from applying section 16(b) to the 
paired transactions.131 The analysis in Part II demonstrates that, in 
the absence of the statute, purchases followed within six months by 
sales contain a larger proportion of purchases motivated by inside 
information than would officer-and-director transactions generally. 
The application of section 16(b) to such purchases would deter 
trading in a way that burdens a larger proportion of transactions 
that are motivated by inside information than transactions that are 
not so motivated. At this point in the analysis, therefore, the princi-
ple of decision suggests that section 16(b) should be applied to the 
purchase of call options that are sold within six months. 
The insurance aspect of the call options does not change this 
conclusion. The analysis of the ordinary cash-for-security purchase 
and sale in Part II relied on the fact that adding shares to a portfolio 
through purchases based on inside information would dediversify 
the portfolio. Officers holding these additional shares would sell 
130. This equivalence can be seen by considering the following series of transactions that 
W might alternatively have undertaken: (i) take out a discount loan with a face value of 
$5,000 repayable in nine months {the leverage), (ii) use the proceeds {which, because of the 
discount, would be somewhat less than $5,000) to purchase 100 ABC shares {the share 
purchase) and use his own cash to make up the difference, and (iii) purchase 100 nine-month 
put options with an exercise price of $50 {the insurance). See LoRIE ET AL., supra note 26, at 
148. 
131. The leveraging aspect of the transactions does not change the analysis from that of a 
simple purchase and sale, as described in Part II. One element of W's portfolio is the amount 
of his investment in the safe asset, which, if negative, is called "borrowing." Because funds 
are fungible, the nearly $5,000 implicitly borrowed in connection with the purchase of the 
calls either reduces W's net holdings of the safe asset or increases the amount of borrowing 
associated with the portfolio as a whole. If the change does not suit W's taste for overall 
portfolio risk versus expected return, he can make appropriate compensating adjustments. 
See supra note 57. 
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them as the information becomes public because they would not 
want to bear the increased risk associated with dediversification for 
longer than necessary. Although the insurance aspect of the calls 
reduces this increased nsk, it far from eliminates it.132 Thus, if sec-
tion 16(b) did not apply, call options purchased on the basis of in-
side information, like shares purchased on that basis, would be sold 
as soon as the information becomes public. Therefore, application 
of the statute to purchases and sales of call options, like its applica-
tion to simple purchases and sales, would reduce the number of op-
tions that the insider would want to purchase on the basis of inside 
information. The director or officer will know that he will have to 
bear the risk of holding each option so purchased for the remainder 
of the six-month period after the information becomes public. 
b. Court decisions. The legislative history of the Exchaq.ge Act 
reveals that Congress was concerned with the use of options as a 
basis for trading on inside informat~on.133 Starting as early as 1960 
some commentators argued that a purchase of a call option fol-
lowed within six months by its sale should be covered by section 
16(b).134 No courts, however, have reached that conclusion.13s A 
132. In the hypothetical, if W's January 1 call purchases were in fact motivated by receipt 
of inside information that had become public by February l, from there on he runs the risk, if 
he continues to hold the options, that the price will drop below $60. The limit on his losses is 
$10 per share, because the insurance covers losses from any drop in the price of the shares 
below $50. But assuming that ABC's future share price is normally distributed and is not 
exceptionally volatile, a drop that large in a few months is unusual. Thus there is still present 
most of the riskiness that would be associated with continuing to hold without insurance an 
equivalent number of shares. 
There is also an opportunity cost involved in continuing the insurance after the inside 
information becomes public. Part of what a buyer pays for when the call is sold is the insur-
ance. The longer the period covered by the insurance, the more the buyer will pay for it. 
Postponing sale of the option after the information becomes public reduces what will be 
received for the insurance. 
133. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 87, item 18, at 10-11; S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), re-
printed in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 87, item 17, at 9. 
134. Mark R. Beatty, Exchange-Traded Options and Section 16(b): Panacea or Plague for 
Insider's Short-Swing Profits?, 38 Bus. LAW. 515, 525 (1983); George P. Michael, Jr. & Bar-
bara A. Lee, Put and Call Options: Criteria for Applicability of Section 16(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 40 NoTRE DAME LAW. 239, 250 (1965); Natalie Garth, Co=ent, 
Section 16(b): Measuring Profits Realized in Option Transactions, 1983 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 855, 
862; Note, Put and Call Options Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 69 YALE 
u•m~~ · 
135. The closest case to hypothetical Cl is Truncale v. Blumberg, 88 F. Supp. 677 
(S.D.N.Y.), affd. sub nom. Truncale v. Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950). Blumberg in-
volved a defendant who, having sold 3000 of his employer's warrants in the preceding six 
months, received 3000 warrants in December 1945 pursuant to the terms of an employment 
contract entered into in March 1941. The opinion by Judge Rifkind deals solely with the 
issue of damages. Judge Medina, in a prior unreported decision, had already ordered sum-
mary judgment against the defendant except with respect to damages. See 88 F. Supp. at 678. 
One problem with using this case as precedent for a situation like hypothetical Cl is that a 
warrant is issued by the issuer corporation itself. Thus the plaintiff in Blumberg was able to 
2156 Michigan Law-Review (Vol. 92:2088 
court addressing this issue would have to decide whether the 
purchase and sale of the call options constitutes the purchase and 
sale of an "equity security of such issuer"136 (the issuer with which 
the insider is associated). A court could adopt either of two ap-
proaches to find that section 16(b) covered the purchase and sale of 
call options. One approach would be that the purchase and sale of 
the call options should, for section 16(b) purposes, be considered 
the purchase and sale of the underlying shares. The other approach 
would be that the options themselves are "equity securities of [the] 
issuer"137 that have been purchased and sold within six months. 
The argument that the purchase of a call option should be 
treated as the "purchase" of the underlying shares is appealing be-
cause it corresponds to the correct description of the economic ef-
fect of the purchase of an option: a leveraged purchase of shares 
accompanied by the insurance of an equivalent number of puts.138 
Moreover, there is precedent for treating what in reality is one kind 
of security as the equivalent of another kind of security, at least for 
the purposes of section 16(b ). Courts have held that the purchase 
avoid the thorny issue of whether the security purchased and sold was "an equity security of 
such issuer," Exchange Act§ 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). See infra notes 138-41 and 
accompanying text. It should also be noted that Judge Rifkind concluded as a matter of law 
that the price paid for the warrants should be considered the fair market value in December 
1945. Because the sales during the preceding six months were at a lower price, he found 
there to be no profits and hence no damages were recoverable. 88 F. Supp. at 678-79. 
In another case, Seinfeld v. Hospital Corp. of America, 685 F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. Ill. 1988), 
the court made clear in dictum that it would find the short-swing purchase and sale of a call 
option by a statutory insider to be within the reach of§ 16(b ). However, because the defend-
ant was not a 10% holder immediately prior to the acquisition of the option, as required by 
Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., 423 U.S. 232, 250 (1976), the court 
granted defendant's motion to dismiss. 685 F. Supp. at 1069. Also, the precedential value of 
this case, like Blumberg, is limited by the fact that the entity granting the option was the 
issuer itself. 
136. Exchange Act§ 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). 
137. Exchange Act§ 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). 
138. The technical legal problem here is how to characterize the purchase of the call as a 
"purchase," as the term is used in § 16(b ), of the underlying share. See Note, supra note 134, 
at 884-85. One approach is to argue that the purchase of the call is a "contract to buy" the 
share and hence is a "purchase" of the share under Exchange Act§ 3(a)(13), which defines 
purchase to include "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." Exchange Act 
§ 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1988). A call is certainly a contract and it entitles the 
holder to buy. It can be argued in response, however, that Congress's intention in including 
the "contract to buy" language in the definition was to recognize that when two parties are 
each legally obligated to transfer a security at some point in the future, the portfolio effect for 
both is essentially the same as if the transfer had already taken place. The call, on the other 
hand is really a unilateral contract of its writer to make an offer to sell a security at a particu-
lar price. 
A second, ultimately more straightforward, approach is to point to the prefatory phrase of 
§ 3(a), "unless the context otherwise requires," Exchange Act § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) 
(1988), and argue that here the context requires that the purchase of a call be treated as a 
purchase of a share because the two transactions are economic equivalents for purposes of 
§ 16(b). 
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of a convertible security and the sale of the underlying security af-
ter conversion could constitute a paired transaction within the 
meaning of section 16(b ).139 The courts in these cases focus on 
whether the sale of the underlying security was within six months of 
the purchase of the convertible security, and they treat the conver-
sion as a nonevent.140 Despite its attractiveness, this approach is 
untenable unless the courts reverse the doctrine, developed rela-
tively early in the history of section 16(b ), that a "purchase" occurs 
under 16(b) when the purchaser incurs "an irrevocable liability to 
take and pay for the stock,"141 something that manifestly does not 
occur at the time a call option is acquired. 
The development of this doctrine illustrates the way in which 
courts have floundered without a central policy-based theory to 
guide the application of section 16(b ). The doctrine's origin is the 
sensibly decided case of Blau v. Ogsbury.142 Ogsbury, the defend-
ant officer and director, gave notice in December 1945 of his elec-
tion to purchase 10,000 shares pursuant to an option that was part 
of his employment contract. In accordance with his rights under the 
option, the defendant postponed paying for the shares until Decem-
b~r 1948. The contract made clear that although title and stock-
holder rights remained in the company pending payment, the 
defendant was obligated to pay for the shares. The section 16(b) 
issue arose because in July 1948 the defendant had sold 500 other 
issuer shares. The critical question for deciding liability was 
whether the purchase occurred on the date of payment, December 
1948, or on the date of the election of purchase, December 1945. 
The court decided that the purchase occurred on the ·date of 
Ogsbury's election to exercise his right to purchase the shares. The 
139. For a discussion of some of these cases, see infra note 190. 
140. See infra notes 188-92 and accompanying text. The underlying logic of this rule is 
that the two classes of securities are economic equivalents for § 16(b) purposes. The change 
from one to another in an insider's portfolio is of no significance. If the conversion from in-
the-money convertible preferred stock to common stock does not trigger § 16(b ), logically 
the purchase and sale of in-the-money convertible preferred should be considered equivalent 
for§ 16(b) purposes to the purchase and sale of common stock. This logic is not nee\fed to 
get the purchase and sale of preferred within the reach of § 16(b) because convertible pre-
ferred shares are themselves clearly "equity securit[ies] of such issuer," Exchange Act 
§ 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988), and hence are covered. But the logic applies equally well 
to the purchase and sale of a call, which arguably is not an "equity security of such issuer." 
Exchange Act § 16{b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). Any call, as in hypothetical Cl, that is 
exercisable at the share price at the time of purchase and that is sold when the share price is 
higher is "in the money," that is, its sale price will at least equal the share price at the day of 
sale less the exercise price. 
141. Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954); see also Stella v. Graham-Paige 
Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956). 
142. 210 F.2d 426 {2d Cir. 1954). 
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rationale was that after December 1945 "for all speculative pur-
poses he owned the stock."143 Although the court spoke in terms of 
the "purchase" occurring in December 1945, its decision that sec-
tion 16(b) does not apply only required the rejection of December 
1948 as the purchase date. The court did not explore, because it did 
not need to, whether the defendant "for all speculative purposes" 
owned the stock before December 1945. Ogsbury would have 
served as a more valuable guide for future cases if it instead had 
concluded that the date of purchase of a share is a date no later than 
the date on which the insider incurs the irrevocable obligation to 
take and pay for it. 
The effect of the language in Ogsbury was to strengthen the 
force of language in earlier cases suggesting that the exercise of a 
stock option constitutes the purchase of the underlying shares.144 
Because it would be hard to say that the same shares were 
purchased twice,145 these holdings are inconsistent with the idea 
143. 210 F.2d at 427. 
144. The case that is usually cited as the origin of this doctrine is Park & Tiiford, Inc. v. 
Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.}, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947). Park & Tilford in fact 
involved the conversion of convertible preferred stock, which the defendants had apparently 
held for some time, followed within six months by a sale of the common shares that were 
received. The court found the conversion and sale to be "a 'purchase and sale' within the 
statutory language of§ 16(b}." 160 F.2d at 987. It noted that "(d)efendants did not own the 
common stock in question before they exercised their option to convert; they did afterward." 
160 F.2d at 987. The court in Ogsbury, however, erroneously stated that in Park & Tilford 
"we held that the exercise of an option to acquire securities was a 'purchase' within ••• 
§ 16(b}." Ogsbury, 210 F.2d at 427 (emphasis added}. The irony of applying the Park & 
Tilford principle to call options is that the principle was not followed in conversion cases 
subsequent to Park & Tilford in other circuits and that ultimately the Second Circuit itself 
reversed its position. See infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), involved a defendant who exercised 
an option he had received from the issuer pursuant to an employment contract. The defend-
ant held the option for over two years. There were a number of sales of shares within six 
months prior to or after the exercise. Judge Medina apparently took it as self-evident that 
the exercise was a purchase that could be matched against these sales, stating, "There are no 
disputed issues of fact and the sole question is whether defendant Reuscher enjoyed any 
profit as a result of the purchase and sale within six months of securities issued by the corpo-
ration of which he is an officer." 95 F. Supp. at 32. 
There are other pre-Ogsbury decisions that also show the same judicial failure to under-
stand that the point at which speculation begins is the point at which an insider obtains the 
right to acquire the stock at a predetermined price. In an earlier opinion growing out of the 
case of 'Ihmcale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387, 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), Judge Medina, citing 
Park & Tilford, rejected in dictum the defendant's claim that the time at which an employ-
ment contract providing for a future grant of warrants is the "time of purchase" of such 
warrants. Medina therefore concluded that the time of acquisition of the warrants is the time 
of§ 16(b} purchase. 80 F. Supp. at 390, 392. Judge Rifkind applied this principle without 
further comment in the later Blumberg opinion discussed in supra note 135. lhmcale v. 
Blumberg, 88 F. Supp. 677, 679 (S.D.N.Y.), affd. sub nom Truncale v. Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 
(2d Cir. 1950). That opinion involved other defendants who had sold warrants less than six 
months prior to their receipt. 88 F. Supp. at 678. 
145. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d at 427. 
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that the purchase of the option should be considered the purchase 
of the underlying securities. The rejection of this idea, we will see, 
makes it difficult to apply section 16(b ), in a fashion consistent with 
its purposes, to the acquisition of an option paired with a variety of 
other kinds of transactions. The rejection ignores the fact that the 
way one takes advantage of inside information is to profit from 
changes in market price. It is the right to acquire stock at a prede-
termined price that permits a profit from a change in market price, 
not the obligation to take the stock.146 
The alternative approach to interpreting section 16(b) to cover 
the purchase and sale of call options is to argue that the options 
themselves are equity securities of the issuer. Although amend-
ments to the definition sections of the Exchange Act147 and the Ex-
change Act rules148 provide that an option is an "equity security," 
the question remains, whether it is a security "of" the issuer. The 
legislative history, not surprisingly, is bereft of any direct evidence 
of what Congress intended by the phrase "of such issuer." To a 
securities lawyer, the most natural reading of the phrase is that it 
refers to equity securities issued by the issuer. This is clearly what 
is meant by the phrase in most places where it is used throughout 
the federal securities laws.149 Most market-traded options, other 
than warrants, would not qualify under this reading because they 
are written by third parties. 
It is possible, however, to read the phrase in section 16(b) more 
broadly as referring to all securities "connected with" or "relating 
to" an issuer - which reading would include exchange-traded op-
tions - and to argue quite sensibly that this alternative reading of 
the phrase is more consistent with the congressional purpose of 
preventing the unfair use of inside information. In modem securi-
ties markets, an officer or director with positive inside information 
can just as easily purchase 100 calls, anticipating that in a few 
months when the information becomes public he will sell the calls 
and lock in his profits, as he can 100 shares, with a similar anticipa-
146. JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 12, at 1393. 
147. Section 3(a)(10) now defines security to include "any put call, straddle, option or 
privilege on any security." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988). 
148. Rule 3all-1 includes within the definition of "equity security" any "put, call, strad-
dle, or other option or privilege of buying such a security from or selling such a security to 
another without being bound to do so." 17 C.F.R. § 240.3all-1 (1993). 
149. This is the reading advocated by the American Bar Association Task Force on In-
sider nading, a group of distinguished securities lawyers. Committee on Fed. Reg. of Sec., 
supra note 9, at 1110. Because the Task Force concluded that short-swing purchases and sales 
of options should be subject to a§ 16(b)-type return of profit requirement, it called for an 
amendment to the language of the statute to cover them. Id. 
2160 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:2088 
tion of sale. As we have seen,150 the profits from the purchase and 
sale of calls will be almost as great as the profit from a similar trans-
action in shares, and the added portfolio risk will actually be some-
what less. The two kinds of transactions therefore equally implicate 
the concerns animating section 16(b ). 
For our hypothetical Cl both readings accomplish the same re-
sult - the return to ABC by W of his profits from the purchase and 
sale of the calls. But the second reading is only necessary if one 
must evade the Ogsbury doctrine that a "purchase" occurs when 
the insider is irrevocably liable to take and pay for the shares. A 
frontal attack on the application of that doctrine to the purchase of 
options would be preferable because, as mentioned above, the doc-
trine creates a variety of other problems in deciding the reach of 
section 16(b ). 
2. The Purchase of a Call Followed by Its Exercise and the Sale 
of the Share 
Now consider hypothetical C2. On January 1, V, an officer of 
ABC, purchases 200 six-month call options on ABC shares for $3 
per option. The exercise price is $50, which is the current market 
price of ABC shares. On June 30, when the market price is $60, he 
exercises the options and purchases 200 shares at $50. On Septem-
ber 15, when the price is $65, he sells the shares. Thus the sale of 
shares is more than six months after the purchase of the option but 
less than six months after the exercise of the option. Are there 
"profits" in this series of transactions that should be recoverable 
from V by ABC? 
a. Application of the rule of decision. The purchase of the 200 
calls is, we have seen, 151 the economic equivalent to the purchase, 
largely funded by a loan, of 200 shares coupled with the acquisition 
of 200 puts as insurance against the risk that the market price will 
drop. The exercise of the call is equivalent to the repayment of the 
loan and cancellation of the insurance. 
The first question raised by the hypothetical is whether the 
purchase of the calls on January 1 could be motivated by the receipt 
of positive inside information. Clearly the answer is yes. As we 
saw in Part II, when V receives inside information he will want to 
add ABC shares to his portfolio.152 Purchasing a call is, in terms of 
150. See supra section 111.C.1.a. 
151. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra section 11.A.1.a.iii. 
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its effect on V's portfolio, a method of acquiring an additional 
share.153 
Having established that the purchase of shares could be moti-
vated by inside information, the next question is whether the timing 
of either the sale of the shares or the exercise of the option tells us 
anything about the probability that the purchase of the option was 
motivated by the receipt of inside information. The answer here is 
no. For purposes of our discussion, the timing of the sale of shares 
- more than six months after the purchase of the calls - does not 
tell us anything about this probability because the rules of inference 
we have been exploring are tied to the statutory six-month period. 
The timing of the exercise of the calls has no probative value for us 
either, even though it followed the purchas.e by less than six 
months. In terms of economic equivalents, the exercise of the calls 
in fact increases the range of prices over which V is speculating on 
the 200 shares because it involves the cancellation of the implicit 
puts.154 This moves V's portfolio in the opposite direction from 
what someone who purchased calls on positive inside information 
would wish once the information became public. Such a person 
would now wish to reverse the dediversification of his portfolio that 
had occurred at the time he originally received the information. 
The last question is whether the exercise of the option itself 
could be motivated by positive inside information, because, if it 
could, the sale of the 200 shares less than six months later might 
suggest a higher probability that the exercise was motivated by in-
side information. The answer, however, is that the receipt of inside 
information could not have been the motivating factor in the exer-
cise. In the hypothetical, V, having waited until the last moment, is 
bound to exercise the calls whether or not he has received inside 
information. Otherwise the call will expire and he will lose his op-
portunity to purchase at $50 shares currently valued by the market 
at $60. 
153. If V can borrow infinitely at the safe rate of interest, r*, purchasing calls is, com-
pared to the straight purchase of shares, an inferior way of acquiring additional shares. With 
the purchase of a call, the put that accompanies the share acquisition is, in V's eyes, over-
priced. The market, which does not have V's positive inside information, views the 
probability of ABC shares falling in price below $50 as greater than V views that probability. 
However, legal and economic restrictions on borrowing to purchase stocks in the real world 
may make the purchase of calls an attractive alternative to the straight purchase of shares. 
154. The exercise of a call, in terms of its economic equivalents, also represents the repay-
ment of the implicit loan that largely funded the acquisition of the share when the call was 
purchased. This fact, however, plays no role in our analysis. Funds are fungible, and V, in 
reaction to both the loan and its repayment, can be expected to make adjustments to suit his 
taste for risk in his aggregate level of borrowing or net investment in the safe asset. See supra 
note 131. 
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The answer to the last question may appear to be a clever ma-
nipulation of the facts of the hypothetical and not to be generaliz-
able to the situation in which the exercise of the calls occurs at 
some point prior to their date of expiration. But that is not the 
case. Assuming that Vis a rational investor, he would only exercise 
the calls prior to their expiration date if he wanted to sell the shares 
immediately.155 To exercise prior to the point at which one wants 
to sell them is to forgo, with no gain, the insurance that the call 
provides against the possibility that the share price will drop below 
the exercise price. Any exercise prior to the expiration of the calls 
is simply the satisfaction of a necessary precondition for the sale of 
shares that will inevitably follow immediately thereafter. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that when there is a sequence 
of the purchase of a call, the exercise of the call, and the sale of a 
share, the focus should be on the dates of the call purchase and the 
share sale. The timing of the exercise is the earlier of the date of 
sale or the date of the call's expiration and therefore has no in-
dependent significance. One component of a call purchase, in 
terms of its economic equivalents, is a share acquisition. The other 
components, the loan and the put, disappear as a result of the exer-
cise. The purchase of the call should therefore be treated as the 
purchase of a share. If it is followed within six months by a sale, the 
pair of trades should be covered by section 16(b ). If the share sale 
is more t_han six months after the call purchase, as in hypothetical 
C2, the pair of trades should not be covered. 
b. Court decisions. Commentators have suggested three possi-
ble ways of characterizing the scenario in hypothetical C2 in terms 
of the meaning of the terms purchase and sale under section 16(b ). 
The first characterization, which consistently obtains the results rec-
ommended above, is to consider (i) the purchase of the call to be a 
"purchase" of the underlying shares, (ii) the exercise not to be the 
"purchase" or "sale" of anything, and (iii) the sale of the shares to 
be a "sale" of shares.156 The second characterization is to consider 
155. The SEC confirmed this fact empirically in a report on puts and calls that concluded 
that "when an option holder exercises a call he usually resells the stock he has acquired 
immediately. DIVISION OF TRADING ExcHs., SECURITIES & ExcH. CoMMN., REPORT ON 
PUT AND CALL OPTIONS 77 (1961). If the insider can sell the calls in a competitive market, it 
is in fact always more advantageous for him to do so, rather than to exercise the calls prior to 
expiration and then to sell the shares. The exercise prematurely cancels the insurance aspect 
of the calls - insurance for which someone else would be willing to pay. KENNETH GAR· 
BADE, SECURITIES MARKETS 381-82 (1982) (concluding that in-the-money calls will not be 
exercised prior to the expiration date because the price of the options exceeds their intrinsic 
value). 
156. This characterization corresponds to the first approach for bringing the short-swing 
purchase and sale of a call option, hypothetical Cl, within the reach of § 16(b ). It has been 
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(i) the call purchase not to be the "purchase" of anything for which, 
in this scenario, there is a matching "sale," (ii) the exercise to be a 
"purchase" of shares, and (iii) the share sale to be a "sale" of 
shares.157 The third characterization is to consider (i) the calls 
themselves to be "equity securities of such issuer"158 and their 
purchase to be a "purchase" of such securities, (ii) the exercise to 
be both a "sale" of the calls and a "purchase" of the shares, and (iii) 
the share sale to be a "sale" of the shares.159 Viewed as a whole, 
the cases dealing directly with stock options tend to support the 
second and third characterizations. These cases, however, lack a 
single clear set of reasons, and there exists among them some im-
portant authoritative support for the first characterization - the 
one favored here. At least as important, cases dealing with the 
closely analogous problem of convertible securities unambiguously 
support the first approach. All these cases will be discussed 
below.160 
One line of cases relevant to the proper choice of characteriza-
tion deals with the exercise of employee stock options (ESOs). 
These cases, which will be discussed in more detail later,161 uni-
formly hold that the exercise of an ESQ is a "purchase" of the ac-
quired share and hence support the second and third approach. 
These cases, however, are not exactly on point. The courts deciding 
them were not faced as conspicuously with the question of whether 
the acquisition of an option should be treated as a section 16(b) 
"purchase" because the options at issue were granted to the insid-
ers, not purchased by them. 
Another line of cases relevant to the choice of characterization 
deals with the sale, rather than exercise, of call options acquired 
more than six months previously. The plaintiffs in these cases argue 
that the sale of the option should be treated as a simultaneous exer-
cise of the option and sale of the shares.162 The rationale is that the 
the characterization advocated by Jennings and Marsh in their venerable securities regulation 
casebook for a number of editions. See, e.g., RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, J:R., 
SECURmES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1436-38 (6th ed. 1987). 
157. See Beatty, supra note 134, at 525-27. 
158. Exchange Act§ 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). 
159. See Note, supra note 134, at 876-77. 
160. See infra notes 188-92 and accompanying text. 
161. See infra section III.D. 
162. So far, no court presented with this argument has been willing to apply it to the facts 
of the case before it. See, e.g., Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) (finding that the sale of warrants by insiders to underwriters who converted them and 
sold the underlying shares is not a 16(b) purchase and sale because the facts suggested no 
possibility of speculative abuse); Rosen v. Drisler, 421 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (hold-
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results of the actual and putative transactions are economically 
equivalent, because the sale price of the option should approxi-
mately equal the difference between the exercise price and the mar-
ket price of the shares. An insider would go into each transaction 
with the call and come out without the call but with approximately 
the same amount of additional cash. Although research reveals no 
reported case that has adopted this argument, the plaintiffs' ration-
ale in these option sale cases suggests the third characterization of 
hypothetical C2, in which the exercise of a call is considered a si-
multaneous "sale" of the call and "purchase" of the underlying 
shares. An insider would go into each of the actual and putative 
transactions with the call and come out with the share but with less 
cash approximately equal to the exercise price. 
The third relevant line of cases - the few that actually deal with 
calls that were purchased by the insider rather than acquired as em-
ployee compensation - presents a more mixed picture. The clos-
est case factually to hypothetical C2 is Morales v. Mapco, Jnc. 163 
The defendant, a vice-president of Mapco, purchased warrants for 
company stock more than six months prior to exercising them. The 
warrant automatically would have converted into a half share of 
Mapco on its expiration date. Alternatively, at any point prior to 
expiration, the holder could exercise the warrant for the exercise 
price of nine dollars and receive a full share of Mapco. In essence, 
the warrant was equivalent to a half share of Mapco plus an option, 
with an exercise price of nine dollars, to purchase another half 
share. In the month prior to the expiration date, the defendant ex-
ercised all of his 3616 warrants and simultaneously sold nine hun-
dred of the shares so acquired. 
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. The court classified this transaction as "unorthodox" 
rather than "traditional cash-for-stock."164 The court concluded as 
ing that the sale of options is not a 16{b) purchase and sale when the sale is back to the issuer, 
the issuer took the initiative to offer to purchase the options, and plaintiffs could not show 
how the disputed transactions gave rise to the possibility of speculative abuse). The case with 
a holding most closely analogous to the plaintiff's argument being considered here is Matas 
v. Siess, 467 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), in which the exercise of an SAR was held to be a 
§ 16{b) purchase and sale because it was economically equivalent to the exercise of a stock 
option and tpe sale of the underlying shares. However, in Seinfeld v. Hospital Corp. of 
America, 685 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), discussed infra text accompanying notes 183-87, 
the court rejected the whole approach implicit both in Matas and in the plaintiffs' argument 
being discussed here because the court did not as a general matter view the exercise as a 
§ 16{b) purchase of the u~derlying shares. 685 F. Supp. at 1064-65. 
163. Morales v. Mapco, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
'll 95,094, at 97,875 (N.D. Okla. 1975), revel, 541 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1976). 
164. [1974-19751i"ansfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,878. 
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a consequence that the applicability of section 16(b) should be de-
termined by a "pragmatic" test165 that turns on whether the circum-
stances provide an opportunity for speculative abuse of inside 
information.166 The court found, for three reasons, that no such op-
portunity existed and hence that section 16(b) did not apply. The 
first reason was that the simultaneity of the exercise and sale left no 
time between the two in which to speculate over inside informa-
tion.167 This reason implicitly treats the exercise as a purchase and, 
taken alone, tends to support the second and third characterizations 
of the scenario in hypothetical C2.168 The second reason was that 
for at least a year the market price of the warrants was based on the 
market price of the Mapco shares;169 making the two economic 
equivalents.170 Because this reason does not treat the exercise as a 
purchase, it tends to support the first characterization, favored here. 
Because the purchase of the warrants occurred more than six 
months before the sale of the shares, there was no b~sis for impos-
ing section 16(b) liability. The third reason was that because the 
exercise occurred within a month of the expiration date of the war-
rants and a failure to exercise would have entailed a major eco-
nomic loss to the defendant, the exercise was essentially 
involuntary.171 This reason also tends to support the first character-
ization, but the grounds are narrower because the reasoning applies 
165. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,878. 
166. In Kem County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), the 
Supreme Court embraced the distinction between "traditional cash-for-stock transactions 
that result in a purchase and sale ... within the six-month, statutory period" and "unortho-
dox" transactions, ones that are "not ordinarily deemed a sale or purchase" but which argua-
bly fit within broad definitions of these terms under § 16(b). 411 U.S. at 593-94. The 
"traditional" transactions are "clearly within the purview of§ 16(b)." 411 U.S. at 593. The 
Court said, however, that in deciding whether an "unorthodox" transaction is "within the 
reach of the statute, the courts have come to inquire whether the transaction may serve as a 
vehicle for the evil which Congress sought to prevent - the realization of short-swing profits 
based upon access to inside information." 411 U.S. at 594. This way of dealing with unortho-
dox transactions is known as the "pragmatic" approach. 411 U.S. at 594 n.26. The court gave 
conversions and dealings in options and warrants as examples of unorthodox transactions. 
411 U.S. at 593 n.24. 
167. Mapco, [1974-75 'Il'ansfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,879. 
168. The court said that "[h]ad Ross held the stock for any period of time after the ex-
change, a strong presumption of speculative abuse would immediately exist." Mapco, [1974-
1975 'Il'ansfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,879. This adds to the suggestion that 
they regarded the exercise as a purchase. If, however, the court really wanted to treat the 
exercise as a purchase, the more logical way of dealing with the lack of opportunity for specu-
lative abuse here is to conclude that the purchase and sale are covered by § 16(b) but that 
there are no profits because the value of the cash received is no greater than the value of 
what was given up - one warrant plus nine dollars. 
169. [1974-1975 'Il'ansfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,878. 
·170. [1974-1975 'Il'ansfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,878-79. 
171. [1974-1975 'Il'ansfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,879. The court cites as 
evidence of the economic necessity of conversion the fact that by the expiration date of the 
2166 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:2088 
only to calls exercised just prior to expiration, not to all "in the 
money" calls as would the court's second reason. 
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court decision in an opin-
ion that deals remarkably ineffectively with the district court's three 
reasons. The court of appeals emphasized that the defendant had 
to pay cash for the shares, not just surrender the warrant.172 The 
court did not indicate why the payment of cash was important other 
than to differentiate the case factually from some of the convertible 
security cases, discussed below,173 in which the conversions were 
not found to be purchases. The court of appeals stated that the 
transactions had the possibility of speculative abuse, but it did not 
explain how except by saying that "the warrant holder could exer-
cise a warrant and pay $9.00 with full awareness of the current mar-
ket quotations on Mapco stock."174 The court stated that "[t]he 
warrants were not the economic equivalent of the stock because the 
warrants carried no equity ownership,"175 but it did not explain why 
equity ownership should be a factor in deciding whether two securi-
ties are economically equivalent for section 16(b) purposes. The 
court of appeals ignored the involuntariness question. 
Miller v. General Outdoor Advertising Co. 116 deals directly with 
the question of whether the acquisition of a call is a "purchase" that 
can be matched against the sale of shares. In October 1962 the de-
fendant was granted a call on approximately fifteen to twenty per-
cent of the outstanding shares of the Alleghany Corporation by a 
major shareholder in Alleghany. The grant was part of a contract in 
which the defendant purchased outright a similar number of shares. 
The call was to expire on May 31, 1963; but, pursuant to amend-
ments on May 29, June 28, and July 29, the expiration date was 
extended, ultimately to October 15, 1963. On July l, 1963, the de-
fendant contracted to sell a substantial number of Alleghany shares 
subject to certain approvals by the shareholders of the purchasing 
corporation. Alleghany sued under section 16(b ), claiming that the 
June 28 extension of the call was a "purchase" and the July 1 con-
tract to sell was a "sale" of Alleghany shares.177 The district court 
warrants, over 98% had been converted. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) at 97,879. 
172. Morales v. Mapco, Inc., 541 F.2d 233, 235 {10th Cir. 1976). 
173. See infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text. 
174. 541 F.2d at 236. 
175. 541 F.2d at 236. 
176. 223 F. Supp. 790 {S.D.N.Y. 1963), revd., 337 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964). 
177. 223 F. Supp. at 792. 
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granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because it 
did not believe either that the acquisition of the call was a 
"purchase" of Alleghany shares178 or that the call was itself an eq-
uity security of such issuer.179 
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's order, stating 
that the complexity of the factual pattern made a trial more pru-
dent.180 The Second Circuit observed that 
since this is the first case to raise the difficult and far-reaching ques-
tion of whether the acquisition of a call may be a "purchase" of an 
"equity security" under Section 16(b ), it falls within that twilight zone 
where full development of the facts is necessary to decide whether the 
transactions involved were susceptible to the type of speculation the 
section seeks to eliminate.181 
Thus General Outdoor Advertising explicitly leaves the door open 
in the crucial Second Circuit for the adoption of the first characteri-
zation - that is, that the purchase of the call, not the exercise, con-
stitutes the purchase of the underlying shares.182 
The final case is Seinfeld v. Hospital Corp. of America.183 The 
facts of this case do not closely resemble hypothetical C2, but the 
court in dictum wholeheartedly endorsed the concept that it is the 
acquisition of the option, not its exercise, that constitutes the sec-
tion 16(b) "purchase." In Seinfeld, the defendant was a corporation 
attempting to acquire the issuer. It obtained from the issuer, pursu-
ant to a merger agreement, a "lock-up" option for more than ten 
percent of the issuer's shares. Within six months, the defendant re-
178. 223 F. Supp. at 793. 
179. 223 F. Supp. at 795. The court left open the possibility that it would have ruled 
differently if the call had been transferable. 223 F. Supp. at 795. The distinction between 
characterizing an acquisition of a call as a "purchase" of shares and characterizing the call 
itself as "an equity security of the issuer," Exchange Act§ 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988), is 
merely semantic if, using the second characterization, a court is willing to match the purchase 
of a call against the sale of a share. 
180. Miller v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 337 F.2d 944, 947 (2d Cir. 1964). 
181. 337 F.2d at 948. 
182. Jennings and Marsh suggest that the Second Circuit reversed after realizing that the 
courts had been wrong for 30 years in finding an exercise to be a purchase in the employee 
stock option cases. JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 156, at 1438. They note wryly that "[the 
court] did not suggest what further 'facts' it thought were going to throw any more light on 
this problem." Id. The extent to which the Second Circuit's opinion can be used as support 
for the first characterization of hypothetical C2 is somewhat weakened, however, by the fact 
, that the contract granting the defendant the call also granted the other party a put on an 
equal number of shares at an equal price. 337 F.2d at 946. If it were not for the fact that the 
transaction involved a large control block of shares and the fact that the put expired after the 
call did, this pairing of a call and put would virtually guarantee the acquisition of the shares 
by the defendant: a market share price above the exercise price would guarantee an exercise 
of the call and a market share price below the exercise price would guarantee an exercise of 
the put. 
183. 685 F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
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linquished its right to the option in return for $200 million in cash, 
the merger having not been consummated because of the appear-
ance of a higher-paying suitor. The court held that this was an or-
thodox transaction - the option was an equity security that was 
acquired for value and relinquished for value - that should be 
treated under the "objective approach" applied to traditional "cash-
for-stock" transactions.184 However, because the defendant was 
not a ten-percent holder when it acquired the option, as required by 
Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., 185 the court 
granted defendant's motion to dismiss.186 
The plaintiff tried to avoid this outcome by arguing that the sale 
of an option is an "unorthodox" transaction that should be treated 
under the "pragmatic" approach. The plaintiff argued that under 
this approach the transaction should be treated as a simultaneous 
exercise of the option and sale of the underlying shares because the 
economic effects of this putative pair of transactions and the actual 
one are the same. Obviously underlying this argument was the 
premise that the exercise of an option is a section 16(b) "purchase." 
In response to this argument, the court stated that even if it used 
the pragmatic approach and accepted the idea that the option sale 
constituted a simultaneous exercise of the option and sale of the 
underlying shares, it would disagree with that premise and there-
fore would not have found liability: 
Vrrtually all courts to consider the issue have held that "an exer-
cise of a[ ] [call] option is a purchase of the underlying stock for pur-
poses of§ 16(b )." Thus, according to these cases, if a person exercises 
an option for stock and then, within six months, sells the stock, he is 
liable under § 16(b) .... 
This judicial rule cannot withstand careful analysis. A person who 
acquires a call option acquires the right to purchase the underlying 
stock at a given price. If the price of the stock subsequently rises and 
the person exercises the option and then sells the stock, the "profit" 
he earns represents the "swing" in the price, not between the date of 
exercise of the option and later sale of the stock, but rather between 
the time he originally purchases the option and the time he sells the 
stock.187 
The final line of reported cases relevant to the characterization 
of hypothetical C2 deals with the conversion of a convertible secur-
ity. Call options and convertible debentures share much in com-
184. 685 F. Supp at 1062-63, 1069. 
185. 423 U.S. 232, 250 (1976). 
186. 685 F. Supp. at 1069. 
187. 685 F. Supp. at 1065-66 (citations omitted) (quoting Beatty, supra note 134, at 518). 
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mon. A senior security - a debenture or .preferred share - that 
can be converted into one share of comnion stock is economically 
equivalent to the same senior security without the conversion privi-
lege combined with a call option on one share of common stock 
with an exercise price equal to the value of the senior security.188 
Assuming they are both "in the money," the market price of a se-
nior security convertible into one share and the market price of a 
regular call option will each move up or down approximately one 
dollar for every dollar change up or down in the market price of the 
underlying shares with which they are associated.189 Tue conver-
sion of the convertible senior security and the exercise of the call 
each involve giving up something of value - the rights associated 
with being a holder of the simple senior security in one case and 
cash in the other - that has very different risk and return charac-
teristics from the share of common stock that is received. Thus, if 
we cut through form to economic substance, we ·should treat con-
vertible securities and call options the same in our section 16(b) 
analysis. Tue scenario in which an insider purchases a convertible 
security, converts it, and sells the underlying shares is essentially 
identical to the scenario in which the insider purchases a call, exer-
cises it, and sells the underlying shares, at least in terms of the fac-
tors that should count for a section 16(b) analysis: there is no 
difference in the speculative nature of the item initially purchased 
or in the nature of the act that results in the acquisition of the un-
derlying shares. 
Cases dealing with the conversion of convertible securities pres-
ent a much clearer picture than the cases dealing directly with call 
options. In the scenario most analogous to hypothetical C2 - the 
insider purchases a convertible security, converts it when it is "in 
the money," and sells the underlying shares - the cases do not 
consider the conversion a "purchase" and hence do not apply sec-
tion 16(b) if the convertible security purchase and share sale are 
separated by more than six months.190 In Blau v. Lamb, the key 
188. To exercise this call, the owner must pay a price; he must give up the senior security. 
NANCY L. JACOB & R RICHARDSON PETTIT, INVESTMENTS 608-09 & fig. 19-15 {2d ed. 1988). 
189. GARBADE, supra note 155, at 378 (noting that a call that is "in the money" will have 
an intrinsic value equal to the excess of the stock price over the option's exercise price). 
190. The line of cases addressing this question starts, unpromisingly, with the early case 
of Park & Tiiford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 {2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947), 
discussed supra note 144, in which the Second Circuit held the conversion of convertible 
preferred shares to common to be a§ 16{b) "purchase." 160 F.2d at 987. As other circuits 
began to confront the issue, however, they came to the opposite conclusion and found that 
the conversion was not a purchase, although each case was arguably distinguishable from 
Park & Tilford. See, e.g., Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 537-38 {8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 
385 U.S. 1006 (1967) (involving a case in which the convertible preferred was being called for 
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case reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit, reaching the very 
heart of the matter, reasoned that because the appreciation in the 
value of the original investment in the preferred continued to be at 
risk after the conversion, the conversion could not afford the de-
fendants "opportunities to realize a trading gain based on specula-
tive judgment exercised when they purchased [the preferred]."191 
The court therefore concluded that "in cases like the present in-
volving the purchase of a convertible security and its subsequent 
conversion, the issue should be whether the underlying security has 
been sold within six months from the acquisition of the convertible 
security."192 Although the courts have not seen it, this reasoning is 
equally compelling in the case of the exercise of a stock option. 
c. SEC rulemaking. As discussed in connection with the hypo-
thetical Cl, before the 1991 rule revisions the SEC largely avoided 
the issues of how to treat the acquisition of an option and its exer-
cise under section 16(b) and explicitly left the resolution of these 
issues to the courts.193 The SEC apparently did not like the results, 
which it described in 1988 as "inconsistent. "194 In 1988, therefore, 
the SEC proposed a comprehensive framework for dealing with op-
tions and other "derivative securities,"195 the ownership of which 
would be treated as "indirect ownership of the underlying equity 
securities."196 As adopted, new rule 16a-4(a) provides that "both 
redemption at the time of conversion); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308-09 (9th 
Cir.) (involving a conversion between stocks of similar investment risk), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 
892 (1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345-46 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 
927 (1959) (addressing a case in which the convertible preferred was called for redemption at 
the time of conversion). The Second Circuit essentially reversed itself in 1966 in Blau v. 
Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967), holding that the conver-
sion of convertible preferred shares into common shares less than six months after the acqui-
sition of the convertible preferred did not constitute a sale under§ 16(b). 363 F.2d at 526. 
In Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965), the Third Circuit held that a 
conversion involved both a sale of the convertible debentures given up, which had been 
purchased less than six months before, and a purchase of the common shares received. 352 
F.2d at 161. The impact of this contrary holding is significantly lessened by the court's find· 
ing that the sale resulted in no profit because the value of what was given up - the deben· 
ture plus the conversion right - just equaled what was received in return. 352 F.2d at 167· 
68. . ' 
Blau v. Lamb was essentially codified with the 1966 amendment to former rule 16b-9(a), 
eliminating the issue as a subject of contention in the courts. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9(a) 
(1990) (current version at 17 C.F.R. § 16b-6(b) (1993)). 
191. 363 F.2d at 522. 
192. 363 F.2d at 525. 
193. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text. 
194. Initial Release, supra note 7, at 89,609. 
195. Rule 16a-l(c) defines derivative securities to mean, subject to certain exceptions, 
"any option, warrant, convertible security, stock appreciation right, or similar right with an 
exercise or conversion privilege at a price related to an equity security, or similar securities 
with a value derived from the value of an equity security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a·l(c) (1993). 
196. Initial Release, supra note 7, at 89,609. 
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derivative securities and the underlying securities to which they re-
late shall be deemed to be the same class of equity securities."197 
With this bold and clearly correct move, the SEC embraced the first 
characterization of the scenario in hypothetical C2: V's purchase in 
January of the 200 call options is equivalent to a "purchase" of the 
underlying ABC shares. The exercise in June is a nonevent for pur-
poses of section 16(b) because it leaves unchanged the total number 
of ABC equity securities held by the insider. The sale of the shares 
in September, then, is a "sale" of securities. Because the sale fol-
lowed the purchase by more than· six months, there would be no 
liability.198 
In comparison to the existing judicial interpretations of the stat-
ute, which were largely developed without the benefit of SEC input, 
the new rules concerning call options expand the reach of section 
16(b) to cover some transactions that at least arguably were not 
covered before and contract its reach to exempt some that at least 
arguably were covered before. Correct as these changes may be, 
we can expect the new rules to be challenged in the courts on both 
fronts. 
The challenge by defendants caught by the expansion in section 
16(b )'s reach will probably fail. An example of this· broadened 
scope would be a variation of hypothetical C2: everything is the 
same except that on December 1, a month prior to V's purchase of 
the calls, V sold 200 ABC shares for sixty dollars. Under the ap-
proach suggested by existing judicial interpretations, there would 
be no purchase within six months of the December 1 sale· because V 
was not irrevocably committed to take the ABC shares until June 
30.199 Under the new rules, the January 1 purchase of the calls 
would be matched with the December sale of shares. We have seen 
that section 16(b) has been liberally interpreted in other con-
197. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-4(a) (1993). 
198. As discussed in the text, this result appears to follow directly from rules 16a-4(a), 
16a-l(c) (discussed supra note 195), and 16a-l(d), which define an option to be a "derivative 
security" and which define a derivative security relating to an issuer to be, in the language of 
the statute, "an equity security of such issuer." 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(c) to (d) (1993). 
A more complex set of definitions and exemptions, needed to cover other scenarios in-
volving derivative securities, makes the steps more explicit, however. Rule 16(a)-l(b) defines 
a call equivalent position to be a derivative security position, including a call option, that 
"increases in value as the value of the underlying equity increases." 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(b) 
(1993). Rule 16b-6(a) provides that ,the establishment or increase in a call equivalent posi-
tion "shall be deemed a purchase of the underlying security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6(a) 
(1993). Rule 16b-6(b) exempts from § 16(b) the closing of a derivative security position as a 
result of an exercise. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6(b) (1993). 
199. See Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954). 
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texts.200 The statutory language is malleable enough that it could 
be interpreted to cover a third-party call option as "an equity secur-
ity of such issuer"201 and to permit a "match" when there is a sale of 
one type of such security - the shares - and the purchase of a 
closely related type - the calls.202 It would be relatively easy for a 
court to see a close parallel between, on the one hand, a sale of 
shares at $60 and their repurchase a month later for $50 and, on the 
other hand, a share sale for $60 followed by a purchase of the calls 
at a $50 exercise price: in each case the insider has avoided the $10 
loss and from a speculative point of view largely or completely re-
turned to her original position. Courts pay less deference to agency 
rules constituting statutory interpretation than they pay to rules 
based on the statutorily delegated power of exemption, but courts 
do show enough deference to agency interpretations that they are 
likely to uphold these expansions.203 
The challenge by plaintiffs that the new rules improperly con-
tract section 16(b )'s reach has a better chance of success, even 
though the provisions involved are based on statutorily delegated 
powers of exemption. The problem is not with the overall scheme 
itself, which is clearly justifiable. The problem is with the SEC's 
justifications. The justifications provided by the SEC in its rule re-
vision releases relating to call options have two basic thrusts. One 
thrust is that a determination of the reach of the statute should be 
based on the opportunity to use inside information to profit from 
changes in share price,204 which opportunity begins at the time that 
the insider acquires the right to purchase a security at a fixed 
price.205 The other thrust is that a failure to permit the matching of 
transactions in derivative securities against transactions in the un-
derlying shares will permit evasions of section 16(b ).206 These pro-
positions by themselves, while absolutely correct, do not lead 
200. See supra section 111.B.1.c. 
201. Exchange Act § 16(b ), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). 
202. There is precedent for matching two related types of equity securities. See Gund v. 
First Fla. Banks, Inc., 726 F.2d 682 (11th Cir. 1984) (matching the sale of convertible deben· 
tures with the purchase of common stock). Ironically, the correct principle that two related 
types of equity security should be matched was misapplied in this case because the converti-
ble securities were not "in the money" and so their trading price was not primarily deter-
mined by the trading price of the underlying shares. See Daniel B. Bogart, Note, 
Mismatching Convertible Debentures and Common Stock Under Section 16(b), 1985 DUKE 
LJ. 1057, 1073. 
203. See supra note 117. 
204. Initial Release, supra note 7, at 89,611. 
205. Exchange Act Release No. 28,869, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 'I 84,709, at 81,258 (Feb. 8, 1991) [hereinafter Implementing Release]. 
206. Initial Release, supra note 7, at 89,612. 
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inevitably to the conclusion that a call purchase is the acquisition of 
indirect beneficial ownership in the underlying shares and that its 
exercise is consequently a nonevent that deserves an exemption.207 
A scenario like hypothetical C2 raises the traditional suspicion 
that the insider has cleverly evaded section 16(b) by using a call 
option to stretch out the time between purchase and sale. The 
SEC's justifications do nothing to eliminate this suspicion. Thus, a 
court facing the new rules might feel constrained by the statutory 
scheme to adopt the third rather than the first characterization of 
the hypothetical. Under this characterization, the call purchase in 
January is the purchase of an equity secunty, the exercise in June is 
its sale and the purchase of another equity security (the share), and 
the sale of the share in September is another such sale.20s Each of 
the paired security purchases and sales would constitute prohibited 
short-swing transactions under section 16(b ), and they would argua-
bly generate recoverable profits: ten dollars for the first pair of 
transactions and five dollars more for the second. 
Another traditional suspicion raised by a scenario like hypothet-
ical C2 - a suspicion the SEC's justifications do not eliminate - is 
that there could be insider mischief at the time the insider exercises 
the option. Marc Steinberg and Daryl Landsdale, for example, 
have raised this suspicion: 
The increased potential for abuse under the new regulatory scheme 
comes from the ability of insiders to exercise options and sell the un-
derlying securities immediately, as long as the option has been held 
for at least six months .... For example, upon learning bad news, an 
insider holding the derivative security for six months can immediately 
exercise the option and sell the underlying securities before such in-
formation is made public, thereby taking advantage of nonpublic in-
formation for his or her personal gain. Section 16 was enacted to 
prevent this type of transaction.209 
207. The SEC suggested that exercise is in part a nonevent because the insider "realizes 
no profit at the time of exercise," and the profit occurs "at the time the underlying security is 
sold." Reproposing Release, supra note 109, at 80,390 & n.87. This is true but irrelevant 
The new rules also provide that § 16(b) does cover a share purchase followed within six 
months by the purchase of a put option and the sale of the shares more than six months after 
their purchase. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6(a) (1993); see infra notes 222-26 and accompanying 
text. Yet, there is no realization of profit within six months in that scenario. 
The SEC also stated that "the exercise does not change the opportunity to realize a 
profit." Implementing Release, supra note 205, at 81,259. That is also true but it is not by 
itself a persuasive reason to provide an exemption that would permit an insider like V to 
keep his profits if he otherwise would not be able to do so. 
208. This approach would also permit a court to avoid the discomfort of breaking with 
the well-established Ogsbury doctrine. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text. 
209. Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 12, at 65 (emphasis added). 
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A court sharing these suspicions would again be inclined to em-
brace the idea that the exercise of a call option is a sale of the call 
and a purchase of the underlying security. The argument would be 
that the exercise is a transacti.on "within the purpose of [section 
l6(b)]"210 and therefore its exemption is outside the powers dele-
gated to the SEC under section 16(b ). 
These suspicions linger because the SEC, while demonstrating 
conclusively how transactions involving derivative securities present 
opportunities for insider profits akin to those available from trans-
actions in the underlying securities, has not successfully articulated 
how the statutory six-month cutoff should fit into its new larger vi-
sion of section 16(b ). In order to overcome these suspicions, the 
SEC needs to acknowledge three points derived from the model in 
Part II. First, section 16(b) is aimed only at the abuse of inside 
information at the time of the first of the paired transactions. Sec-
ond, section 16(b) deters transactions based on inside information 
by forcing the insider who does engage in such a transaction to suf-
fer the risk of portfolio dediversification for six months. A longer 
period of time would discourage an increasing number of legitimate 
transactions without burdening any more transactions based on in-
side information. Third, purchase and sale should be defined in 
terms of when this change in portfolio risk is assumed and when it is 
relinquished. The exercise of a call option does not significantly 
change portfolio risk and so it should not be considered either a 
purchase or a sale. 
If the courts were to adopt the third characterization of the C2 
hypothetical by overturning the exemption for exercises but other-
wise approving the proposed scheme for market-purchased call op-
tions, one might conclude that their approach, while not 
representing an entirely consistent vision of section 16(b) in eco-
nomic terms, does no real serious harm. We would not significantly 
undermine our system of managerial incentives or work any real 
unfairness if we were to burden insider acquisitions of call options 
and not burden their near equivalents - leveraged purchases of 
the underlying securities. But we cannot avoid this issue so easily. 
The same issue arises with employer-granted employee stock op-
tions, discussed later,211 and the effect of these burdens on manage-
rial incentives is much greater in that context. 
210. Exchange Act§ 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). 
211. See infra section III.D.1.a. 
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3. The Purchase of a Share Followed by the Purchase 
of a Put 
2175 
Now consider hypothetical C3. On January 1, U, an officer of 
ABC, purchases 500 ABC shares for $50 per share. On March 1, 
when the market price of ABC shares has risen to $60, U purchases, 
for $4 each, 500 nine-month put options with an exercise price of 
$60. On December 1, when the market price is also $60, U's put 
options expire unexercised and he sells the 500 shares. Are there 
"profits" in this series of transactions that should be recoverable 
from U by ABC? 
a. Application of the principle of decision. The share purchase 
on January 1 adds 500 ABC shares to U's portfolio. The put 
purchase on March 1 is economically equivalent to a sale of 500 
shares that are to be delivered and paid for on December 1212 cou-
pled with a call option for 500 shares exercisable at $60 expiring 
December 1.213 The analysis in Part II suggests that purchases fol-
lowed within six months by sales would, in the absence of the stat-
ute, include a larger proportion of share purchases motivated by 
inside information than officer-and-director transactions generally. 
Consequently, putting aside the call option aspect for a moment, 
the same should be true of purchases of shares followed within six 
months by purchases of puts. Therefore, as with the application of 
section 16(b) to purchases followed within six months by sales, the 
application of section 16(b) to share purchases followed within six 
months by puts purchases will burden a larger proportion of share 
purchases based on inside information than potential purchases not 
so based. Thus, at least before considering the call option aspect of 
212. The delayed delivery date is irrelevant for our analysis because the sale price is the 
market price on March 1 and becomes fixed on that date. Ignoring dividends and the time 
value of money, adjustments included in the market price of the put, the economic effect on 
U's portfolio of delivery on December 1 is the same as if U delivered the shares on March 1. 
If U wants cash on March 1, he can borrow money on March 1 and repay the Joan on Decem-
ber 1 with the proceeds from the sale of shares. 
213. If U had no ABC shares, the purchase of 500 puts would be equivalent to a short 
sale of 500 shares and the call option aspect would serve as insurance against the risk that the 
price of ABC shares would exceed $60 on September 1. Here, however, U owns at least 500 
ABC shares. Actual short sales by directors, officers, and 10% holders are prohibited by 
§ 16(c) of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1988). New rule 16c-4 provides an exemp-
tion from § 16(c) for establishing or increasing a put equivalent position so long as the 
number of puts does not exceed the number of underlying shares owned by the insider. 17 
C.F.R. § 240.16c-4 (1993). This exemption implies that an insider does violate§ 16(c) when 
she purchases more put options than she owns underlying shares, but nothing in the statute, 
which by its terms makes unlawful a statutory insider selling an equity security "if the person 
selling .•. does not own the security sold," 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1988), or in the § 16 rules, 
directly provides that such a put purchase is a violation. Rule 16b-6(a) provides that "the 
establishment or increase in a put equivalent position shall be deemed a sale of the underly-
ing securities," but it is limited by its terms to § 16(b). 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6(a) (1993). 
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the put, the principle of decision would suggest that section 16(b) 
should be applied to purchases of shares followed within six months 
by purchases of puts.214 · 
This conclusion is ultimately not altered if we take into account 
the call option aspect of the put purchase. Because in the scenario 
that is economically equivalent to hypothetical C3 U will own at 
least 500 ABC shares immediately prior to performing the required 
delivery on December 1, he will not need to go into the market and 
purchase shares in order to perform, and therefore he will not face 
the risk of losing money if the market price of ABC shares on that 
date exceeds $60.215 Rather than serving as insurance against a risk 
of loss, the implicit call here constitutes continued speculation in 
the price of ABC shares. Compared to continued ownership of the 
500 shares, however, the range of share prices over which specula-
tion occurs is significantly narrowed. By purchasing the puts, U is 
only speculating over the range of prices above $60 and not over 
the full range of possible share prices. 
In order to analyze whether section 16(b) should apply to share 
purchases followed by put purchases, we first need to understand 
how the question is dependent on whether section 16(b) applies to 
share purchases followed by share sales. If we were operating in a 
world in which section 16(b) applied to neither class of paired trans-
actions, U would never rationally choose on March 1 to purchase 
500 puts over the alternative of a straight sale of 500 shares - as-
suming, as in most financial models, that he believes share prices 
are normally distributed. This is evident if we consider the three 
possible motives for either buying puts or selling shares: raising 
cash, profiting from the receipt of negative inside information, or 
reversing a dediversification caused by an earlier share purchase 
based on receipt of positive inside information.216 In each case, U's 
interests are, in the absence of section 16(b ), better served by a 
straight sale of ABC shares. 
If raising cash is U's sole motivation, he will not have altered his 
evaluations of the expected returns, variances, and covariances of 
214. The discussion assumes that the exercise price of the puts is the market price of the 
shares on the date that the puts were purchased. 
215. If the market price of ABC shares on December 1 is, for example, $70, delivery of 
each share involves an opportunity cost of $70 for which he was only compensated $60. But 
· the $10 "loss" is no more a loss than if delivery were on March 1. It simply represents the 
risk inherent in any sale that the price may go up in the future. 
216. The assumption here, as in Part II, is that U will not be motivated to change his 
portfolio on March 1 as the result of the receipt of new information also available to other 
investors because the price will adjust so quickly to reflect the information that U will want 
the same portfolio as he did before. See supra text accompanying note 54. 
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the available risky securities. Therefore, as a rational investor, he 
would not wish to change the proportions of his holdings in the 
available risky securities.217 He would be able to raise cash without 
making such a change by engaging in a proportionate straight sale 
of his holdings in each of the available risky securities, including 
ABC shares. The purchase of 500 puts would be an alternative, but 
less satisfactory, way of raising cash. With the puts, U can borrow 
$3,000 secure in the knowledge that on September 1 the proceeds 
from a sale of the shares would be at least sufficient to repay the 
principal of the loan. Part of what U is paying for in a purchase of 
puts, as compared to a straight sale of shares, is the continued spec-
ulation for six months in 500 ABC shares over the range of prices 
exceeding $60. This, in tum, changes his proportionate holdings of 
the available risky securities, something he does not wish to do 
since, based on his evaluations, his original proportions were 
optimal. 
If U receives negative inside information concerning ABC and 
hopes to profit from it - the second possible motivation - U 
could again choose either to purchase puts or to engage in a straight 
sale of a certain number of shares. But again the call-option aspect 
of the puts - the difference, in ,terms of economic equivalents, be-
tween a put purchase and a share sale - raises problems. A call 
exercisable at $60 has some value to U because, in assessing the 
probable future price of ABC shares, U will predict that the price 
might exceed $60. But if U possesses negative information not pos-
sessed by the market, the market will view the probability that the 
price will exceed $60 as greater than U views th!lt probability. Im-
plicitly, then, what U would pay for the call when he purchases the 
puts at the market price would exceed his estimation of the call's 
value.218 
U's third possible motivation is the desire, once the positive in-
side information that he received earlier becomes public, to reverse 
a dediversification caused by the purchase of shares on the basis of 
that information. The way to fully rediversify is simply to sell the 
same number of shares as were purchased at the time the inside 
information was received. A purchase of puts only lessens the im-
pact of, rather than fully reverses, the dediversification; this is again 
217. See supra section II.A.3.a. 
218. In an efficient market the price of a call is dependent upon the market's determina-
tion, based on all available information, of the price, the dividend, and volatility of the under-
lying security. ROBERT A. STRONG, SPECULATIVE MARKETS 100-02 (1989). Hence, U's 
knowledge of negative inside information allows him to form a more accurate assessment of 
the value of a call than the market's. 
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because, in terms of the puts' economic equivalents, the sale of 
shares is coupled with an implied call on ABC shares. If, for exam-
ple, the purchase of the 500 shares on January 1 were based on 
inside information, a purchase of 500 puts on March 1 after the in-
formation becomes public would still leave U speculating over part 
of the possible price range for 500 ABC shares. According to the 
analysis in Part II, U would rather not bear the risk of that specula-
tion in his portfolio. 
If, however, we were operating in a second world in which sec-
tion 16(b) applies to share purchases followed by share sales (as it 
clearly d9es ), but not to share purchases followed by put purchases 
(the issue before us), the purchase of the puts by U would be per-
fectly rational. For each of the three possible motivations, the 
purchase of puts allows U partially to accomplish the same thing as 
a straight sale would while avoiding the penalty that section 16(b) 
would impose on a straight sale. The puts purchase alters the port-
folio in the same direction as a straight sale, but it only lessens 
rather than eliminates speculation with respect to the 500 shares. 
The same officers who in a first world without section 16(b) would 
be motivated to engage in straight sales would, in a second world in 
which section 16(b) applies to share purchases followed by straight 
share sales but not to share purchases followed by put purchases, be 
motivated instead to purchase puts. The three possible motivations, 
which arise from factors not. related to the existence or reach of 
section 16(b ), should have the same relative frequency in both 
worlds. Therefore, in both worlds we should be able to draw from 
the length of time between the first and second transactions the 
same inferences as to which motivation was at work. We estab-
lished in Part II that i~ a world without section 16(b ), sales to raise 
cash or in response to negative inside information might occur at 
any point after a purchase, but sales to reverse a dediversification 
caused by a purchase based on inside information will almost cer-
tainly occur within six months of the purchase. We therefore con-
cluded that share purchases followed within six months by share 
sales contain a larger proportion of purchases motivated by receipt 
of inside information than officer-and-director transactions gener-
ally.219 In the second world, the saine will be true of share 
purchases followed within six months by put purchases. Thus, ac-
cording to the principle of decision, applying section 16(b) to share 
purchases followed within six months by put purchases is desirable 
219. See supra section II.C.2. 
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because it would burden a larger proportion of potential share 
purchases motivated by inside information than purchases not so 
motivated. Failing to apply section 16(b) to this class of transac-
tions would provide officers and directors considering purchasing 
shares on the basis of inside information a way of partially avoiding 
the sting of section 16(b) and hence would lessen the statute's 
effectiveness. 
b. Court decisions. No reported case has ruled on the question 
whether a share purchase followed within six months by a put 
purchase is covered by section 16(b ). The issue, obviously, is 
whether the purchase of the puts can be considered a "sale" of the 
underlying shares to be matched against the share purchase.220 The 
argument that it should be considered a sale exactly parallels the 
argument above that the purchase of a call should be treated as the 
purchase of share. Acceptance of that argument, however, again 
depends on the reversal of the Ogsbury doctrine that a share 
purchase requires an irrevocable liability to take and pay for the 
share. Otherwise, logical consistency would dictate that a share sale 
requires an irrevocable liability to sell the share. The purchase of a 
put clearly does not meet this implicit Ogsbury standard of what 
constitutes a "sale." Thus the Ogsbury doctrine permits a "profit-
freezing" transaction that is a clear evasion of section 16(b ).221 
c. SEC rulemaking. In its new comprehensive framework for 
derivative securities, the SEC ended its silence on put options and 
adopted a set of rules that would clearly include hypothetical C3 
220. In commenting on a scenario essentially identical to hypothetical C3, the SEC stated 
that prior to the new rules "it is questionable whether the courts would have found liability." 
Implementing Release, supra note 205, at 81,261 n.114. The reason for its skepticism was 
that with certain exceptions "the courts have been reluctant to match transactions in two 
different types of securities." Id. 
221. A number of commentators writing prior to the 1991 rule revisions suggested that it 
would be desirable for § 16(b) to cover such transactions, but, because of an unwillingness to 
confront the Ogsbury doctrine, either concluded that it does not or suggested confusing rea-
'sons why it does. One commentator argued, all within the same article, that (i) a purchase 
and sale of a call or put is covered by § 16(b) because the call or put itself is an "equity 
security of such issuer," Exchange Act § 16(b ), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988); (ii) a purchase of a 
put is instead a sale of the underlying share when it is preceded within six months by the 
purchase of a share; and (iii) the exercise of a put rather than its purchase is the sale of the 
underlying security when the exercise is followed by the purchase of a share within six 
months. Note, supra note 134, at 872-74, 883-85, 876-77. Another concluded that § 16(b) 
does not apply to a share purchase followed less than six months later by a put purchase that 
is exercised more than six months after the put purchase, but § 16(b) does cover a share 
purchase followed more than six months later by a put purchase that is exercised less than six 
months after its purchase. Beatty, supra note 134, at 528 & n.59. This conclusion appears to 
be based on the idea that the put purchase cannot be matched against the share purchase 
because under the Ogsbury doctrine the put purchase is not a share sale, but that the share 
sale at exercise can be matched against the put purchase because one transaction is a 
purchase of some sort and the other a sale of some sort. Id. 
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within the reach of section 16(b ). The SEC defines a "put 
equivalent position" to be "a derivative security position that in-
creases in value as the value of the underlying equity decreases," 
and it includes in this definition the holding of a put option.222 An-
other rule deems "the establishment of or increase in a put 
equivalent position" to be a statutory "sale" of the underlying se-
curity.223 Thus, U's purchase of 500 puts in March can be matched 
as a "sale" against his purchase of 500 shares two months earlier. 
The SEC's new rules clearly reach the correct result, but again 
this apparent expansion of the reach of section 16(b) through defi-
nitional rulemaking would be more likely to survive court challenge 
if the reasons for the rules were better articulated. The main justifi-
cation provided by the SEC for including the purchase and exclud-
ing the exercise of call options - that they represent indirect 
ownership of the underlying securities224 - does not really work 
for put options. Nor is it correct to say, as it is in justifying the 
inclusion of call options, that U's February puts purchase should be 
. matched with the January share purchase because the puts 
purchase, as a transaction that "provide[s] an opportunity to obtain 
or dispose of the stock at a fixed price," occurs when "the opportu-
nity to profit commences."225 In our example, that opportunity 
would arise in January. 
For the rationale treating a put purchase as a sale in this context 
to be persuasive, it must address the function of the six-month cut-
off; it is the fact that the put purchase follows so soon after the 
share purchase that raises the issue of whether section 16(b) should 
apply in the first place. The closest the SEC comes to providing 
such a rationale is in its discussion of an example closely resembling 
hypothetical C3. The SEC says that with a put purchase that fol-
lows a share purchase within six months, "the insider lock[s] in the 
ability to earn a profit."226 For this point to be persuasive it needs 
to be fleshed out in the manner set out above. Because of its effect 
222. Rule 16a-l(h), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(h) (1993). 
223. Rule 16b-6(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6(a) (1993). The rule also provides that "a de-
crease in a put equivalent position shall be deemed a purchase." Id. Thus, under the new 
rules, § 16(b) would cover a situation in which Z on January 1purchases1000 nine-month 
ABC puts for $4 each with an exercise price equal to the current market price of $50 and on 
February 1, when the market price has fallen to $40, sells the puts for $13 each; this would be 
the mirror image of hypothetical C2, in a declining instead of increasing market. The put 
'purchase, which would be a "sale," is followed within six months by the put sale, which would 
be a "purchase." 
224. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
225. Implementing Release, supra note 205, at 81,258. 
226. Id. at 81,260. 
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on the risk characteristics of portfolio cash flows, a put purchase is 
the near equivalent of a share sale. A put is almost as effective as a 
sale in reversing the extra risk of portfolio dediversification that re-
sults from the purchase of shares based on positive inside informa-
tion. Treating put purchases as sales would deter insiders from such 
share purchases by telling them that if they do make such purchases 
they must live with the resulting dediversification for at least six 
months in order to avoid giving up their profits. 
D. Stock-Price-Based Officer and Director Compensation Plans 
- Employee Stock Options and Stock 
Appreciation Rights 
Consider hypotheticals Dl and D2. In Dl, Z has been an officer 
of ABC for several years. Z is still an officer on January 1, 1987, 
when ABC grants him nontransferable employee stock options for 
100 ABC shares exercisable at the current market price of $20. The 
options are exercisable starting one year after the date of grant and 
expire five years after the date of grant. Z exercises his ESOs on 
March 1, 1990, when the shares are trading at $60. He sells the 100 
shares acquired with the options on the same day. Should some or 
all of Z's $4,000 profit be recoverable by ABC, given that the exer-
cise was followed within six months by a sale? The class of paired 
transactions at issue here are director and officer exercises of non-
transferable ESOs that were granted more than six months earlier, 
followed within six months of exercise by a sale of the shares so 
purchased. 
In hypothetical D2, ABC grants Z 100 stock appreciation rights 
(SARs) on January 1, 1987. The SARs entitle Z to receive in cash 
the difference between the exercise price, in this case again the cur-
rent market share price of $20, and the market share price on the 
date of exercise. Just like the options in Dl, these SARs are exer-
cisable starting one year after the date of grant and expire five years 
after the date of grant. Z exercises his SARs on March 1, 1990, 
when the shares are trading at $60, and receives $4,000 in cash from 
ABC. Should some or all of Z's $4,000 profit be recoverable by 
ABC under a theory that the exercise of the SARs is, in economic 
terms, identical to hypothetical Dl (an exercise of a stock option 
followed by the immediate sale of the shares)? In other words, 
should section 16(b) apply? 
2182 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:2088 
1. Application of the Rule of Decisi<,m 
a. Employee stock options. The exercise of the ESQs in hypo-
thetical D1 cannot in and of itself be a purchase of shares motivated 
by inside information. A purchase is only motivated by inside in-
formation if the purchaser relies on positive, nonpublic information 
to acquire shares at a price that is lower than it will be when the 
information is made public. Here, the purchase price is fi~ed under 
the ESQ and it will remain the same regardless of whether the in-
formation that X knows becomes public. The exercise is, however, 
a precondition to the sale of the underlying shares and the sale can 
be motivated by inside information. Because the only kind of infor-
mation that motivates sales is negative information, we can analyze 
the problem with the model of a world in which there is only nega-
tive information. 
The fact that a director or officer would, in the absence of the 
statute, sell shares less than six months after he acquires them 
through the exercise of an ESQ tells us nothing about whether or 
not the sale is motivated by inside information. Regardless of the 
motivation for the sale, the officer has no reason to exercise the 
option until he intends to sell the underlying shares. If an officer 
postpones the exercise of the ESQ until the moment of sale instead 
of exercising the ESQ and holding the shares, he can enjoy any in-
crease in share price that occurs without tying up capital or taking a 
risk that the market price will drop below the exercise price. 
Because the fact that shares are held for less than six months 
after the exercise of the ESQ is useless as the basis of a rule of 
inference, the principle of decision suggests that this class of paired 
transactions should not be included under section 16(b ). Among 
the potential universe of transactions involving the sale of shares 
acquired pursuant to ESQs, inclusion of this particular class of 
transactions under section 16(b) would burden as high a proportion 
- 100% - of potential sales not based on inside information as 
potential sales based on inside information. Moreover, there is no 
reason to think that a larger proportion of potential sales of ESQ-
acquired shares would be based on inside information than of po-
tential sales of shares acquired by officers and directors through or-
dinary market purchases.221 
227. Although the class of potential sales of shares acquired within the prior six months 
pursuant to employee stock options does not contain a larger proportion of sales based on 
inside information than director and officer sales generally, it might be argued that this class 
of transactions should nevertheless be included under§ 16(b) because its inclusion would be 
particularly effective at deterring insider sales. Assume for a moment that directors and 
officers, in order to retain for as long as possible the advantages of being option holders 
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It is important to note that this discussion addresses only the 
pairing of the share sale with the exercise of the ESO. The share 
sale, however, has the same portfolio effect as any ordinary share 
sale and should be matched with any ordinary share purchase oc-
curring within six months. 
b. Stock appreciation rights. Z's exercise of the SARs in hypo-
thetical D2 is, in economic terms, identical to his exercise of the 
ESOs and immediate sale of underlying shares in Dl. The rule of 
decision would again suggest, "therefore, that the SAR exercise, 
standing by itself, should not give rise to section 16(b) liability. The 
SAR exercise has the same portfolio effect as an ordinary sale of 
shares and as such it should be matched against any ordinary 
purchase occurring within six months.22s 
2. Court Decisions and Pre-1991 SEC Rulemaking 
a. Employee stock options. Before 1991, the law concerning the 
treatment of ESOs was the unsatisfactory culmination of a complex 
course of development. The courts and the SEC addressing the 
treatment of ESOs confronted the same basic questions that we en-
rather than shareholders, do not exercise their options until the desire to sell arises. The 
effect of imposing § 16(b) is to delay the sale for six months after his desire arises because, to 
avoid the penalty of the statute, he must exercise the option and wait the period. For poten-
tial sales based on inside information, the information will almost certainly become public 
during the six months waiting period and the officer and director will have lost his advantage. 
Thus, inclusion of this class of transactions under § 16(b) should almost completely eliminate 
such sales. 
The effectiveness of the inclusion of this class of paired transactions is the result of sin-
gling out sales of shares acquired p~rsuant to employee stock options for particularly onerous 
treatment If we were to treat sales of shares acquired by ordinary market purchases in an 
equivalent fashion, we would have to require directors and officers to commit to the sales six 
months in advance. Such a rule would almost completely eliminate sales of such shares based 
on inside information. Congress did not choose to impose such a requirement on the sales of 
shares acquired by ordinary market purchases, presumably because it would impose too great 
a burden on managerial shareownership. There is no good justification, therefore, for impos-
ing a similar requirement on the sales of shares acquired pursuant to employee stock options. 
Both the argument and the response are premised on the assumption that the option 
holder will not exercise his option prior to the moment that his desire to sell arises. If § 16(b) 
were imposed on this class of transactions, however, directors and officers may exercise their 
options prior to that moment in order to create more flexibility in the timing of their sales. 
This would be true both of officers and directors whose sales are ultimately based on inside 
information and of those whose sales are not so based. If directors and officers do behave 
this way, the argument for imposing § 16(b) is no stronger. The direct )>urden imposed by the 
statute on potential sales not based on inside information is less, but so is the effectiveness of 
the statute in deterring potential sales based on inside information. Moreover, in the process 
the statute would cause directors and officers to behave in a way that undermines the special 
agency-cost-reducing features of compensation through employee stock options by making 
such compensation relatively less attractive than paying a straight salary. 
228. The economic equivalence of the SAR exercise to the ESO exercise and immediate 
share sale indicates that the appropriate sale price for calculating the amount of profits, if 
any, derived from such a matched purchase and sale would be the market price on the date of 
the exercise. 
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countered with market-purchased options: Is the acquisition of an 
ESQ a "purchase" of an "equity security of the issuer?"229 Is the 
exercise of the ESQ, because it disposes of the option, a "sale" of 
an equity security? Finally, regardless of the answer to this second 
question, is the exercise of the option, because it results in the ac-
quisition of a share, a "purchase" of an equity security? 
i. Acquisition of the ESO. As with market-acquired options, 
there are two potential approaches for establishing that an officer's 
or director's receipt of an ESQ pursuant to a grant by his employer 
should be considered a "purchase" of "an equity security of such 
issuer"230 under section 16(b ). The first approach holds that the 
acquisition of an ESQ should be considered a purchase of the un-
derlying shares. This approach has met with uniform judicial resist-
ance. All the ESQ cases follow the Ogsbury approach and hold 
that the underlying shares are not purchased until the employee in-
curs "an irrevocable liability to take and pay for the stock."231 For 
ESQs, the irrevocable liability arises not at the time of the option's 
acquisition but later at the time of its exercise.232 The second ap-
proach holds that the ESQ itself is an "equity security of [the] is-
suer."233 This approach avoids the Ogsbury doctrine and seems to 
be unassailable. An ESQ is clearly an equity security because it is 
an option and because Congress has amended the definition of "eq-
uity security" to include stock options.234 Moreover, because it is 
written and granted by the issuer, an ESQ should fit within even the 
narrowest reading of the phrase "of such issuer."235 Because ESQs 
are generally nontransferable, however, there will never be any 
"sale" to match against the "purchase" under this second approach 
unless exercise of the ESQ is deemed to be a sale. 
The courts have apparently been mesmerized by the Ogsbury 
doctrine, and so they have missed a third, better approach to deal-
229. Exchange Act§ 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). 
230. Exchange Act§ 16(b}, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). 
231. Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954); see also supra notes 142-43 and 
accompanying text. 
232. See, e.g., Arrow Distrib. Corp. v. Baumgartner, 783 F.2d 1274, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 
1986) {holding the purchase date to be the date the ESO was exercised}; Riseman v. Orion 
Research, Inc. 749 F.2d 915, 920 (1st Cir.1984} (same); Matas v. Siess, 467 F. Supp. 217, 224 
(S.D.N.Y 1979) (same); see also JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 12, at 1392, 1401. 
233. Exchange Act§ 16(b}, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). 
234. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
235. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. Long before the 1991 rules, the SEC 
accepted ESOs as satisfying the Exchange Act's definition of an "equity security of such 
issuer." Interpretive Release on Rules Applicable to Insider Reporting and 1i'ading, Ex-
change Act Release No. 18,114, 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I 26,062, at 19,063-29 to -31 
(Sept. 23, 1981). 
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ing with the acquisitions of most ESQs. This approach, which flows 
naturally from the model in Part II, would greatly simplify the treat-
ment of ESQs under section 16(b ). The acquisition of an ESQ 
should, like any other option, be considered an acquisition of the 
underlying shares. Unlike a market-acquired option, however, an 
ESQ acquisition should not generally be considered a section 16(b) 
"purchase." An ESQ acquisition is an "unorthodox," not a tradi-
tional "cash for stock," transaction, and thus it should be analyzed 
by the Kern County "pragmatic" test.236 The pragmatic test asks 
"whether the transaction may serve as a vehicle for ... the realiza-
tion of short-swing profits based upon access to inside informa-
tion."237 The typical acquisition of a~ ESQ does not serve as such a 
vehicle. The grant occurs either because of the actions of others or 
pursuant to the automatic operation of smp.e formula established by 
the corporation, probably not in the preceding six months. The in-
sider takes no action at the time that she receives the ESQ. The 
acquisition therefore cannot be the result of the insider's knowl-
edge of any nonpublic information. Nor could it reflect an insider's 
decision to engage in a dediversifying reversal of an earlier sale 
based on negative inside information. 
ii. Disposition of the option at exercise. As with call options ac-
quired by purchase or contract, there are no reported cases holding 
that the exercise of an ESQ is a simultaneous "sale" of the option 
and "purchase" of the underlying shares.238 
iii. Acquisition of the share at exercise. All the cases that have 
considered the issue have treated a share acquisition resulting from 
the exercise of an ESQ as a section 16(b) "purchase." There is, 
however, a long and somewhat convoluted' history of SEC rulemak-
ing exempting at least some such exercises from·section 16(b). In 
1935, the SEC adopted former rule 16b-3,239 which in its original 
version exempted from section 16(b) coverage the exercise of 
ESQs, provided that the plan satisfied certain provisions.240 At that 
236. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593-95 (1973). 
The Court gives "dealings in options" as an example of an "unorthodox" transaction. 411 
U.S. at 593 n.24. See supra note 166. 
237. Kem County, 411 U.S. at 594. 
238. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
239. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1949). 
240. The exercise of ESOs was exempt from § 16(b) coverage, provided that (i) the 
purchase was pursuant to a nontransferable option granted prior to or on June 6, 1934, in 
connection with an employment contract; (ii) the sale was made subsequent to October 9, 
1935; (iii) the plan was approved at a shareholders' meeting; and (iv) the price of the stock 
under the option was higher than the market price of the s~ock at the time the option was 
granted. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1949). 
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time, the SEC simply stated that it found that these transactions 
were "not within the purpose of section 16(b)" without giving any 
reason.241 Because one of the provisions governing the application 
of the original rule 16b-3 required that the grant had to have been 
made prior to June 6, 1934, the 1935 rule became increasingly obso-
lete and in 1949 the SEC amended it.242 The 1949 version of rule 
16b-3 had a very different thrust than the 1935 rule. The 1949 rule 
provided an exemption for the acquisition of actual stock received 
through bonus plans that conformed with the rule, but it specifically 
did not provide an exemption for transactions involving options, 
warrants, or other rights to purchase securities.243 The SEC gave 
no reasons for this switch.244 The SEC again amended rule 16b-3 in 
1952 to exempt the acquisition of ESOs and, it would appear as 
well, the acquisition of stock pursuant to the exercise of ESOs.245 
In 1956, the SEC further amended rule 16b-3246 to "make[ ] it clear 
that the exemption applies to the acquisition of stock [the exercise] 
pursuant to non-transferable options."247 
This exemption for stock acquired pursuant to the exercise of 
ESOs did not fair well in the courts. In Greene v. Dietz,248 the Sec-
ond Circuit stated "we express doubt as to the power of the Com-
mission to promulgate Rule X-16B-3 inasmuch as the Rule's broad 
language may permit acts by insiders sought to be prevented by 
the Securities Exchange Act."249 Soon after, in Perlman v. 
241. Exchange Act Release No. 392 {Oct. 9, 1935). 
242. Exchange Act Release No. 4253, 14 Fed. Reg. 2522 (May S, 1949). 
243. Id. The rule stated, in pertinent part, "Any purchase of an equity security (other 
than a convertible security or a warrant or right to purchase a security) by a director or officer 
of the issuer of such security shall be exempt from the operation of section 16{b)." Id. at 
2522-23 (emphasis added). 
244. See id. 
245. Exchange Act Release No. 4754, 17 Fed. Reg. 8900 (Sept. 24, 1952). The rule stated, 
in pertinent part, "Any acquisition of shares of stock or nontransferable options (other than 
convertible stock or stock acquired pursuant to a transferable option, warrant or right) by a 
director or officer of the issuer of such stock shall be exempt from the operation of section 
16{b)." Id. (emphasis added). 
Rule 16b-3 was amended once between May 6, 1949, and September 24, 1952, but this 
amendment did not affect ESOs. Exchange Act Release No. 4584, 16 Fed. Reg. 2679 (Mar. 
19, 1951). 
246. Exchange Act Release No. 5312, 21 Fed. Reg. 3646 (May 18, 1956). The rule stated, 
in pertinent part, "Any acquisition of non-transferable options or of shares of stock including 
stock acquired pursuant to such options by a director or officer of the issuer of such stock 
shall be exempt from the operation of section 16{b)." 21 Fed. Reg. at3647 (emphasis added). 
247. Id. at 3646. 
248. 247 F.2d 689 {2d Cir. 1957). 
249. 247 F.2d at 692. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint after trial. The 
trial court expressly held that the 1952 promulgation of rule 16b-3 was within the power of 
the Commission. The Second Circuit found it unnecessary to adopt this portion of the trial 
court's opinion in order to affirm its dismissal of the complaint because the defendants had 
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Timberlake, 250 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York held rule 16b-3 to be invalid.251 Explicitly reacting to 
these two decisions, the SEC amended rule 16b-3 in 1960 to elimi-
nate the exemption for exercising ESOs.252 Thus, rule 16b-3 was 
reduced to providing exemptions only for the grant, as opposed to 
the exercise, of ESOs and bonus plan shares, subject in each case to 
relied in good faith on the rule and thus were entitled to the protection from liability pro-
vided by § 23(a) of the Exchange Act. 247 F.2d at 690-94; see supra note 116. 
The SEC filed a petition, as amicus curiae, for a rehearing, asking for a clarification con-
cerning the court's beliefs as to the validity of the rule. The court in a per curiam opinion 
responded as follows: I 
The petition and brief demonstrate that the Securities Exchange Commission under-
stands, without further clarification, the content of our opinion. We learn therefrom that 
it is re-evaluating its Rule X-16B-3. In the meantime, pending any [such] modification 
••. it would seem that any reliance upon it by persons entitled to exercise stock purchase 
options under employee stock option plans ... would be ill-advised. 
Id. at 697 (emphasis added}. 
250. 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
251. The court stated, "We hold that Rule X-16b-3 is in conflict with the express purpose 
of the statute and therefore invalid." 172 F. Supp. at 258. Despite its finding of invalidity, 
the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, on the grounds, as in 
Greene, that their good faith reliance on the rule protected them from liability pursuant to 
§ 23(a) of the Exchange Act. 172 F. Supp. at 258. 
The court in Timberlake observed that the structure of the Second Circuit's opinion in 
Greene "logically and rhetorically presupposes a prior determination of invalidity" and that 
"the logical effect of [its] expression of doubt ... is that of a holding." 172 F. Supp. at 253. It 
suggested that the reason the Second Circuit "refrained from an unequivocal declaration of 
invalidity" was "to give the Commission an opportunity to bring the rule in line with Con-
gressional intent - as disclosed by the per curiam opinion on the rehearing." 172 F. Supp. at 
253; see supra note 249. But see Continental Oil Co. v. Perlitz, 176 F. Supp. 219, 226-27 (S.D. 
Tex. 1959) (holding that the SEC does possess the power to promulgate rule 16b-3 because 
the SEC provided adequate and reasonable reasons for the rule). 
252. Exchange Act Release No. 6275, 25 Fed. Reg. 4901 (May 26, 1960). The newly re-
vised rule stated, in pertinent part, "Any acquisition of shares of stock (other than stock 
acquired upon the exercise of an option, warrant or right) .•. shall be exempt from the opera-
tion of section 16(b)." Id. at 4902 (emphasis added}. 
In the release announcing the proposed rule change, the Commission took note of Greene 
and Timberlake and cited a report by its staff recommending deletion of the ESQ exercise 
exemption. It said that this recommendation was based on a review of these court decisions 
and "the possibilities of abuse arising out of the rule." Exchange Act Release No. 6111, 24 
Fed. Reg. 9272 (Nov. 5, 1959). The closest that the staff report came to identifying any 
abuses that came from the ESQ exercise exemption was the following statement: 
In recommending the [ESQ exemption deletion] be deleted, we have concluded that 
Rule 16b-6 provides a means for separating profits which may be attributed to long term 
increments in value arising from the very nature of the restricted stock option device, 
and which the statute is not designed to discourage, from the profits fairly attributable to 
the short term aspects of the transaction which the Act intended to denude of profit. 
Id. at 9273. Former rule 16b-6 measured the profit inuring to the issuer from a sale within six 
months after exercise of an option to be the difference between the sale price and the lowest 
market price in the period extending from six months before the date of sale to six months 
after the date of sale. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6(b) (1990} (amended ~991). The rule appeared to 
express the concerns that the insider either postponed the sale knowing that good news 
would come out soon or accelerated the sale knowing that bad news would come out soon -
both inappropriate concerns for § 16(b) because they are equally applicable to sales of shares 
that have been held a long time. 
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an increasingly complex set of qualifications relating to shareholder 
approval and administration of the plan.253 
b. Stock appreciation rights. Exercising an SAR, as we have 
seen, is the economic equivalent of exercising an ESQ and immedi-
ately selling the underlying shares. Both transactions, therefore, 
present the identical range of opportunities for abuse of inside in-
formation. Contrary to the approach advocated here, the courts 
have uniformly held that the share acquisition resulting from the 
exercise of an ESQ is a section 16(b) "purchase" that can be 
matched with a sale of the shares obtained.254 Judicial consistency 
would require courts to treat an SAR exercise as a section 16(b) 
purchase and sale as well. Indeed, the one court that has faced the 
issue reached just that conclusion and thus in hypothetical D2 
would have permitted ABC to recover profits from Z.25s There are, 
however, cases concerning the exercise of SARs in which the courts 
focused on other aspects of the particular complex transactions in-
volved and in the end did not find section 16(b) applicable.256 
In 1976 the SEC recognized that if section 16(b) were applied to 
all SAR exercises, SARs would "essentially be worthless as a means 
of executive compensation."257 As a result, the SEC ultimately 
adopted former rule 16b-3( e ),258 which exempted the exercise of 
most cash-settlement SARs held for more than six months from 
section 16(b) liability. This exemption only applied, however, if the 
exercise of the SAR occured within a ten-day window following the 
issuer's announcement of quarterly sales and earnings.259 Under 
this rule, Z's profits in D2 would not be subject to disgorgement 
under section 16(b) if the date of exercise, March 1, were within 
253. Rule 16b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1961). 
254. See supra note 232. 
255. Matas v. Siess, 467 F. Supp. 217, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
256. Freedman v. Barrow, 427 F. Supp. 1129, 1151-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that the 
exercise of an SAR accompanied by the surrender of a stock option did not constitute a 
purchase and sale of the underlying security as long as the transaction constituted "an elec-
tion between two methods of previously granted executive compensation" in a regime that 
gave the executive a choice of an SAR or an option); Rosen v. Drisler, 421 F. Supp. 1282, 
1287-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that repurchases of options granted to executives for the 
difference between the option exercise price and the market price were not equivalent to 
SARs because the transactions "presented no opportunity for speculation"). 
Professors Loss and Seligman criticize these cases as "elevat[ing] form over substance" 
given the cases holding that an exercise of an option and sale of the shares is subject to 
§ 16(b) liability. 5 Loms Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2362 (3d ed. 
1990). 
257. Exchange Act Release No. 13,097, [1976-1977 Thansfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) <JI 80,835, at 87,202 (Dec. 27, 1976). 
258. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(e) (1977) (amended 1991). 
259. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(e)(3)(ii) (1977). 
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that window. Otherwise, the profit could be recovered by ABC 
under section 16(b ). Providing an exemption for the imputed 
purchase portion of the SAR exercise, while inconsistent with the 
SEC's earlier decision not to exempt the exercise of ESOs, is obvi-
ously consonant with the approach advocated here. Restricting the 
exemption to a quarterly ten-day window is not consistent with the 
approach we advocate, but this feature unfortunately has been re-
tained under the 1991 wholesale SEC revisions discussed in more 
detail below.260 
The SEC, in originally proposing former rule 16b-3( e ), stated 
that it could delineate situations in which the exercise of SARs 
would not present an opportunity for the unfair use of inside infor-
mation,261 and in its release adopting the final version of the rule, 
the SEC stated that providing the window period was the most ef-
fective means of identifying those situations.262 The SEC presuma-
bly reasoned that this period is the one in which it is least likely that 
the person exercising the SAR possesses information not reflected 
in the market price. But, as we saw in the discussion applying the 
rule of decision to hypotheticals Dl and D2, the fact that an insider 
possesses inside information at the time of exercise is irrelevant to a 
consideration of the ways in which a short-swing rule can deter 
those transactions that are particularly likely to be based on inside 
information. Regardless of the length of time the SAR has been 
held or the role the insider has played in obtaining it, the only non-
public information that would prompt an insider to exercise an 
SAR is negative information, and that information only promotes 
the "sale" that is imputed in the exercise of an SAR. There is no 
more reason to impose liability on SAR exercises standing by them-
selves just because they are made outside the window period than 
to impose liability on sales, made outside this window period, of 
shares that have been held for many years. Conversely, there is no 
more reason to exempt the sale aspect of a window-period exercise 
of an SAR that has been held more than six months from being 
matched against any ordinary purchase occurring within six months 
before or after than there is reason to exempt an ordinary share 
sale made within that window period from such a matching.263 
260. See infra section III.D.3. 
261. Exchange Act Release No. 12,374, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. 
(CCH) 'I 80,462, at 86,205 (Apr. 23, 1976). 
262. Exchange Act Release No. 13,659, 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'll 26,085, at 19,091 
(June 22, 1977). 
263. Stating the proposition in this way reveals the futility of trying to isolate periods in 
which insiders are unlikely to possess material nonpublic information. It is doubtful that the 
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3. The 1991 Rule Revisions 
In 1991, the SEC undertook wholesale revisions of the section 
16 rules and changed the treatment of ESOs and SARs. Under the 
1991 revisions, the treatment of ESOs and SARs is largely built 
around the concept that ESQ and SAR ownership constitutes indi-
rect ownership of the underlying equity securities, the same concept 
already discussed in connection with market-acquired options. 
The new scheme is a large step forward, but again the SEC has 
left several problems by failing to articulate a fully coherent theory 
for the application of section 16(b ). To start, the new ESO and 
SAR regime still contains a highly complex set of restrictions -
mostly historical relics from the prior regime - that a better-
articulated theory of section 16(b) would reveal to be needless and 
thus wasteful of both private legal resources and SEC staff time. 
Former rule 16b-3, the heart of the earlier regime and the source of 
these historical relics, prompted more interpretative requests than 
any single other SEC rule.264 New rule 16b-3 appears to continue 
in this tradition. Because of these interpretative problems, the SEC 
is considering further rulemaking. The effective date of new rule 
16b-3 has been postponed twice, and the rule now is not scheduled 
to become effective until September 1, 1994, which is more than 
three years after its adoption.265 Also, the unnecessary restrictions 
SEC thinks that it has been so successful at identifying such periods with its window periods 
that it would want to extend the exemption to ordinary sales. Many events that move share 
prices significantly are announced at times other than quarterly earnings announcements; for 
example, new inventions, new contracts, changes of chief executive, merger talks, and divi-
dend chan~es. 
264. Peter J. Romeo & Alan L. Dye, Reforming Section 16, 22 REv. SEC. & CoMMODI· 
TIES REG. 23, 27 (1989). 
265. Implementing Release, supra note 205, at 84,709 (providing a 16-month phase-in 
period, until Sept. 1, 1992); Exchange Act Release No. 30,850, (1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. {CCH) 'l! 85,004, at 82,888 (June 23, 1992) (extending the phase-in period until 
Sept. 1, 1993, and stating that "the Commission intends to engage in further rulemaking in 
order to streamline the reporting requirements and exemptions applicable to employee bene-
fit plan transactions"); Exchange Act Release No. 32,574, (1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) <JI 85,206, at 84,235 (July 2, 1993) (stating that "further Section 16 rulemaking 
remains under consideration" and extending the phase-in period until Sept. 1, 1994, or an 
earlier date as set in such rulemaking). 
The interpretative questions raised by the new rules appear to be posing a significant 
burden for the SEC staff. The Division of Corporation Finance announced in response to 
two "no-action" letter requests concerning new rule 16b-3 that it would no longer repeat 
answers to questions relating to § 16(b) if it regarded the issue as having been raised before 
and answered in previous publicly available no-action letters or SEC releases. Dial Corp., 
SEC No-Action Letter, (1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. {CCH) 'I 76,143, at 
79,837 {Apr. 14, 1992); Pinnacle West Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'll 76,138, at 79,355 {Mar. 25, 1992). This decision 
runs contrary to the traditional SEC policy that companies should not rely on no-action let-
ters addressed to others. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 5073, (1969-1970 'Ii'ansfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. {CCH) 'I 77,838, at 83,980 (July 14, 1970) ("(N)o-action and inter-
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on ESOs and SARs reduce, for no good reason, the attractiveness 
of these agency-cost-reducing forms of executive compensation. At 
the same time, hidden behind the new regime's complexity are 
some surprising gaps that permit insider trading where application 
of short-swing based liability would help prevent it. A better-
articulated theory would have revealed these gaps. Finally, the lack 
of a coherent theory exposes the progress that has been achieved to 
the unnecessary risk of judicial invalidation. 
a. Employee stock options. New rule 16b-6 clearly indicates 
that the exercise of any "in the money" option, whether or not it is 
an ESO, is not a "purchase." The special issue for ESOs, therefore, 
is the status of the original grant of the option. New rule 16b-3266 
also exempts this grant from being a "purchase" if certain condi-
tions are met. First, the grant must be made pursuant to a written 
plan that specifies the terms of the ESO and the eligibility require-
ments for parti~ipation. Additionally, the determination of the re-
cipient, quantity, and date of the award of ESOs must be made 
either by a formula or by a committee of disinterested directors. 
Moreover, the plan and any material amendments thereto must be 
approved by the shareholders. Furthermore, there is a minimum 
six-month holding period between the date of the grant and the 
date of disposition of the ESO or its underlying security. Finally, 
the ESOs must be nontransferable.267 The provisions requiring a 
written plan and the use of certain methods for determining the 
recipient, amount, and timing of ESO grants are necessary and ap-
propriate requirements for exempting such grants. These require-
ments go to what should be the essential question in determining 
the availability of the exemption: whether the receipt of the ESO 
and its timing are within the control of the recipient. When an in-
sider has some degree of control over the receipt, the receipt in-
volves an element of volition that, paired with a share sale within 
six months before or after, suggests a heightened probability that 
nonpublic information motivated one of the traD;sactions. Without 
insider control, the receipt of the ESO suggests nothing about the 
possibility that inside information has been abused: the receipt can 
neither itself be triggered by the insider's possession of positive 
pretative responses by the staff are subject to reconsideration and should not be regarded as 
precedents binding on the commission."). 
266. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b·3 (1993). 
267. Exceptions are allowed for death, retirement, disability, end of employment, and 
qualified domestic relations orders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(d)(2)(i)(B) (1993). 
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nonpublic information nor represent a postdisclosure reversal of an 
earlier sale based on nonpublic negative information. 
None of the other requirements for an ESQ grant exemption, 
however, fits appropriately into a short-swing-based scheme for de-
terring insider trading. At best, they appear to be misconceived 
"suspenders" in a "belt and suspenders" approach to preventing 
ESQ grants from being vehicles for the abuse of inside information. 
First, consider shareholder approval. If in fact a plan's recipients 
have no control over the grant of ESQs, shareholder approval is 
irrelevant. If a plan does permit some control, the chances are slim 
that an abusive grant of an ESQ could slip by the SEC provisions 
expertly designed to screen out plans permitting control but still be 
caught by the shareholders.268 The approval requirement not only 
is ineffective but it also has significant costs. The cumbersome pro-
cess of seeking shareholder approval of any "material" change 
chills plan innovation and limits plan adaptability as circumstances 
268. Individual shareholders in public companies normally vote the way management 
recommends. They suffer from the usual collective action problem of having little incentive 
to inform themselves extensively because of the small chance that their vote will make the 
difference. See Black, supra note 22, at 560 {deeming collective action problems an "impor· 
tant" cause of shareholder passivity). It might be argued that the real way that the share· 
holder requirement could stop plans permitting some control would be the same way that 
many disclosure requirements promote good corporate governance: managers would not 
want to make the disclosures that seeking shareholder approval of such plans would entail. 
This argument is not persuasive. Even if public issuers were not required to seek shareholder 
approval for ESO plans and their amendments to qualify for the § 16{b) grant exemption, 
they would still have to provide, annually, detailed disclosure concerning such compensation 
arrangements. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1993) (providing the requirements for disclosure of exec· 
utive compensation). · 
In the period leading up to the 1991 wholesale revision of the rules, the SEC initially 
proposed to eliminate the shareholder approval requirement that had been part of old rule 
16b-3. The SEC stated that the requirement "has been viewed as a measure that deters 
insiders from implementing compensation plans that allow for abuse of inside information" 
but that it "has been criticized as unclear, burdensome, and ineffective as a deterrent." It 
proposed instead "greater reliance on the disinterested administration requirement to assure 
that opportunities for abuse are minimized." Initial Release, supra note 7, at 89,618. 
The SEC justified its decision to reverse this initial proposal and to retain the requirement 
by noting that "concerned shareholders, commenting on the proposals, urged that sharehold· 
ers have an interest in not only the level of compensation, but that compensation be designed 
to enhance the longer term horizon of management." Implementing Release, supra note 205, 
at 81,268. Thus the ESO grant exemption is being provided subject to a condition that, ac-
cording to this justification, is totally unrelated to § 16{b )'s statutory purpose of deterring the 
unfair use of inside information. 
Restricting an exemption for purposes unrelated to the purpose of the statute that gave 
the agency the power to make the exemption, while not an uncommon SEC practice, raises 
questions about abuse of discretion. This is particularly true when the restriction is to an 
exemption for which, as here, the need for'the transaction in question to meet other condi-
tions already assures that the transaction does no damage to the statutory scheme. This is to 
be contrasted with a restriction to an exemption for which the agency judges that the transac-
tions permitted by the exemption will do damage to the statutory scheme but that, if the 
exemption is properly restricted, this damage is outweighed by the benefits the transactions 
will create in terms of other areas of concern to the securities laws. 
June 1994] A Unified Theory of Section 16(b) 2193 
change over time.269 Furthermore, because of the inevitably vague 
standards governing what constitutes a "material" change, the need 
for frequent determinations of this sort needlessly consumes consid-
erable legal resources and SEC staff time.270 
The six-month holding period has similar problems. Again, if 
the recipient has no control with respect to the acquisition of an 
ESQ, the timing of a sale relative to the acquisition date says noth-
ing about the likelihood that inside information has been abused. If 
a plan that permits some control over acquisition slips through the 
SEC restrictions, the six-month holding period is of only very lim-
ited value in preventing abuse. For an insider with control who pos-
sesses positive nonpublic information, the holding period will 
provide little, if any, deterrence against his using this control to ac-
quire an ESQ. Although he must hold on to the ESQ or its particu-
lar underlying security for six months to qualify for the exemption, 
he can reverse the portfolio effect of the ESQ acquisition at any 
time before that point simply by selling other shares of the issuer or 
by purchasing puts. For an insider with control who possesses nega-
tive nonpublic information, the holding period will not deter the 
insider from selling shares based on the information and then, as 
soon as the information becomes public, using this control and ac-
quiring ESQs to reverse the dediversifying portfolio effect of the 
sale.271 
269. To make a material amendment, the issuer faces the choice between engaging in an 
expensive proxy solicitation of all the·company's shareholders just for this matter and waiting 
until the solicitation connected with the next annual shareholders meeting, a period of as 
long as 12 months. 
270. Initial Release, supra note 7, at 89,618. The shareholder approval requirement con-
tinued to create confusion after the announcement of adoption of the wholesale rule revi-
sions in February 1991. Within three months, the SEC had to issue a detailed new release 
concerning what does and does not constitute a "material" change. Exchange Act Release 
No. 29,131, 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'l! 26,086A (Apr. 26, 1991). In a generally circulated 
memorandum to its clients, one major law firm stated that the release "substantially modifies 
prior interpretations 9f the Section 16 rules by the Commission and its Staff, and generally 
broadens the instances under which shareholder approval will be required" and that it "cre-
ates considerable uncertainty." Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Cli-
ents: SEC Expands Shareholder Approval Requirement for Amendments to Employee 
Benefit Plans (May 10, 1991) (on file with author). 
271. This analysis at a minimum shows that the six-month holding period is an unneces-
sary complication of the law. One might conclude, however, that it does not create a prob-
lem in terms of the other concern expressed here - making less attractive agency-cost-
reducing executive compensation schemes. An ESO that is exercised and has its underlying 
shares sold all within six months has not created much incentive for the executive to increase 
share value. This conclusion is not completely correct. One of the things that gives an ESO 
value to an executive is the possibility of a merger or acquisition - something that in an era 
with much such activity is not a totally remote possibility within six months of a grant. The 
holding period would eliminate this value by creating § 16(b) liability for the exercise and 
sale or exercise and exchange at merger. 
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The restriction on transferability will enhance an ESO's agency-
cost incentive structure by requiring recipients to hold ESOs for 
longer,272 but it is unrelated to a short-swing-based scheme to deter 
insider trading. Even though the ESO is not transferable, the recip-
ient can always exercise the ESO, and there is no restriction on the 
transferability of the underlying shares, with the exception of the 
irrelevant six-month holding period. 
b. Stock appreciation rights. The exercise of an SAR, it will 
again be remembered, is economically equivalent to the exercise of 
an ESO and the immediate sale of the underlying shares. Eco-
nomic equivalence does not translate to equivalent legal treatment 
under the new rules, however. In fact they even make distinctions 
among SARs, setting out two separate regimes - one for SARs 
that pay only cash at the time of exercise and another for SARs in 
which there is the possibility of receiving shares equal in value to 
the amount of appreciation instead of cash of that value. For each 
kind of SAR, the exemption provided fails to cover some transac-
tions that it should cover and covers some transactions that it 
should not. Also, the diff~rential treatment between kinds of SARs 
is an unjustified complication. 
i. Cash-only SARs. Cash-only SARs are explicitly excluded 
from the new rules' definition of "derivative securities" as long as 
they meet certain requirements.273 These requirements are the 
same as the ones inducted in rule 16b-3 relating to the determina-
tion of recipients and timing, shareholder approval, six-month hold-
ing period, and nontransferability.274 In making this exclusion, the 
SEC intended to exempt from section 16(b) liability both the grant 
272. Absent a transferability exemption, it is irrational to exercise an option prior to its 
expiration date because it would sacrifice the continuing value of the option from the exer-
cise date until the expiration date. If the holder wishes to cash in on her equity position prior 
to that date, she should sell the option instead. The buyer would then pay for that value. See 
supra note 155 and accompanying text. If an ESO is nontransferable, a recipient who wishes 
to cash in will have to sacrifice this value. The longer the recipient holds onto the ESO, the 
less of this value he must sacrifice. Thus nontransferability creates an incentive to hold on at 
least'somewhat longer than would otherwise be the case. 
273. Rule 16a-l(c)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(c)(3) (1993). 
274. Rule 16a-l(c)(3) also excludes from the definition of derivative securities cash-only 
SARs that do not meet these requirements but that "may be redeemed or exercised only 
upon a fixed date or dates at least six months after award." 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(c)(3)(ii). 
The resulting exemption of the exercise of such an SAR seems correct because of the absence 
of volition in the exercise's timing. The exemption for the grant, however, is unfortunate. If 
the SAR's plan does not meet the rule 16b-3 requirements relating to the determination of 
recipients and timing, the recipients may have control over whether and when they receive an 
SAR. Use of this control to acquire an SAR presents the same opportunities as an ordinary 
share purchase for abuse of positive inside information and for reversal after public disclo-
sure of an earlier sale based on negative inside information. Such an acquisition should 
therefore be matched against any sale within six months before or after. 
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and the exercise of such cash-only SARs.275 The grant exemption is 
clearly correct as far as it goes, but it should go farther. It should 
extend to SARs granted under any plan meeting rule 16b-3's re-
quirements concerning the determination of the recipients and tim-
ing. It should not matter whether or not the plan meets any of the 
other rule 16b-3 requirements, which for the reasons just dis-
cussed276 do not appropriately fit into a short-swing based scheme 
for deterring insider trading. 
On the other hand, the exercise exemption for cash-only SARs 
goes much too far. The exercise of a cash-only SAR, as long as it is 
volitional, is economically equivalent to a share sale. It offers the 
same potential for abuse of negative inside information and for the 
reversal, after public disclosure, of a prior purchase based on posi-
tive inside information. Thus, although an SAR exercise should not 
be treated as a simultaneous purchase and sale or, assuming no con-
trol at the time of grant, as a sale to be matched against the SAR's 
grant, the exercise should be matched against any other share 
purchase that occurs within six months before or after.277 
ii. Other SARs. The definition of derivative securities does not 
exclude SARs for which the recipient may at the time of exercise 
receive either cash or shares equal in value to the cash.278 New rule 
16b-3(c) exempts the grant of such an SAR, subject to the same 
requirements as are imposed for exempting a grant of an ESQ and 
for the exclusion of a cash-only SAR. Again, for the same reasons, 
275. During the proposal process, the SEC stated: 
Under the proposed rules, many SARs that can be settled in cash only would be 
excluded from the definition of "derivative security" and would not be viewed as equity 
securities. Thus they would be exempt from Section 16 .... 
SARs would have favored treatment over options because both the "purchase" at 
the time of exercise of the SAR and the "sale" upon receipt of cash would be exempt, 
whereas a sale of stock received from an option exercise would not be exempt. 
Reproposing Release, supra note 109, at 80,395 (footnotes omitted). 
A court that is unsympathetic to the SEC approach could of course simply regard the 
excluded cash-only SARs as outside the scheme of the new rules, but, because of their eco-
nomic equivalence to options, could declare them to be "equity securities" for purposes of 
§ 16(b). It could then fashion its own rules to cover them subject to whatever extent it felt 
bound by the prior judicial precedent in the area. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying 
text. 
276. See supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text. 
277. The only rationale that the SEC gives for exempting all transactions involving cash-
only SARs from§ 16(b) is the statement that "[c]ash-only derivative securities that are not 
standardized and are awarded as part of an employee benefit plan are similar to cash bo-
nuses, rather than equity securities." Initial Release, supra note 7, at 89,609. This statement 
simply makes no sense. An SAR position, just as much as an ESO or any other call option 
position, increases in value as the underlying security increases in value. This correspon-
dence in change in value between derivatives and their underlying securities is, quite prop-
erly, the whole reason behind the new rules' reformed treatment of derivative securities. 
278. Rule 16a-l(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(c)(3) (1993). 
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the requirements concerning the determination of recipients and 
timing are necessary and appropriate and the other requirements 
clearly are not. 
New rule 16b-3( e) exempts the exercise of such an SAR as well 
if it meets a complex variety of conditions carried over from the 
former regime, the most important of which is the quarterly ten-day 
window period discussed above.279 Recall that this whole apparatus 
was constructed to save SARs in the face of court rulings that an 
option exercise is a section 16(b) purchase and that an SAR exer-
cise is a simultaneous option exercise and sale of the underlying 
shares.280 The apparatus should now be abandoned. The imputed 
option exercise would today be exempt under the new rule 16b-6(b) 
and hence not be considered a "purchase." The only purpose 
served by the new rule 16b-3( e ), therefore, is to exempt the im-
puted simultaneous sale of the underlying shares.281 It is just as 
much a mistake to exempt this imputed sale as it is to exempt the 
sale imputed through the exercise of a cash-only SAR. In each 
case, the portfolio effect of the imputed sale is identical to the port-
folio effect of an ordinary share sale. The imputed sale should be 
matched against any ordinary share purchase within six months 
before or after the exercise of the SAR.282 
c. Viability of the new ESO and SAR rules in the face of judicial 
scrutiny. The new regime governing ESQs and SARs, while appro-
priately subject to numerous criticisms, is still a large step forward. 
The critical change is the recognition that ownership of an ESQ or 
SAR is the economic equivalent to ownership of the underlying 
shares. This change derives from exempting, as not a "purchase," 
the actual or imputed acquisition of the underlying security that re-
sults from the exercise of an ESQ or SAR. Remember that in 
279. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.166-3{e)(3) (1993); supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text. 
In addition, for the exercise to be exempt, all the same requirements necessary for the grant 
to be exempt must be met and a disinterested administrator either must be the party deter-
mining that the consideration will be cash instead of stock or, if the recipient makes the initial 
choice, must approve that choice. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3{e){2) {1993). 
280. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text. 
281. Initial Release, supra note 7, at 89,619; Implementing Release, supra note 205, at 
81,272 & n.212. 
282. In the case in which the consideration for the SAR exercise is stock, the SEC incor-
rectly interprets new rule 16b-6 as exempting both the disposition of the SAR and acquisition 
of the shares. Implementing Release, supra note 205, at 81,272 n.209. Such an exercise is, in 
terms of portfolio effect, equivalent to a partial sale of shares and it should be treated as such 
for § 16(b) purposes. Consider a modification of hypothetical D2 in which Z, when he exer-
. cises his 100 SARs in March 1990, receives 66.66 ABC shares, at a share price of $60, rather 
than $4,000 in cash. This reduction in equity stake from 100 to 66 2/3 is equivalent to a sale of 
33 1/3 shares. 
June 1994] A Unified Theory of Section 16(b) 2197 
Greene v. Dietz283 the plaintiffs challenged a previously promul-
gated version of just such an exemption and that the Second Circuit 
expressed doubt as to whether the SEC had the power to promul-
gate the exemption. Greene was followed by Perlman v. 
Timberlake, 284 in which the court actually found the exemption to 
be invalid. The SEC then eliminated the exemption, acknowledg-
ing these decisions and expressing its own concern about the ex-
emption's potential for abuse.285 
Stock-price-based compensation schemes have traditionally 
been the frequent target of suits by members of the plaintiffs' sec-
tion 16(b) bar. The new approach would eliminate many such po-
tential suits.286 In view of Greene and the events following it, the 
plaintiffs' bar is almost certain to challenge the new approach in the 
courts.287 There are not yet any reported cases considering a direct 
challenge to the validity of the new rules,288 but some commenta-
tors have doubts that it can survive such a review.289 In the recent 
case of Frankel v. Slotkin, 290 the Second Circuit refused, in light of 
the prior judicial precedent, to apply the new approach to events 
that occurred prior to proinulgation of the new rules.291 This sug-
283. 247 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1957). 
284. 172 F. Supp. 246, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
285. See supra notes 248-53 and accompanying text for a more extensive discussion of 
these cases and of the history of the earlier exemption. 
286. One commentator stated concerning the old law, "The most usual situation leading 
to Section 16(b) liability, involves exercise of an employee stock option ... and the sale of 
those shares, at a higher price, within six months." Robert A. Barron, Control and Restricted 
Securities: Some Comments on Current Questions Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 18 SEC. REG. LJ. 194, 195 (1990). 
287. At least two commentators have expressed the possibility that the new SEC treat-
ment of derivative securities under § 16(b) may be subjected to a court challenge by the 
"Section 16 plaintiffs' bar." Robert A. Barron, Control and Restricted Securities: SEC Rule 
16b-6(b) - The "Relief Provision" - Permitting Section 16 Insiders To Exercise an Em-
ployee Stock Option and Sell the Stock Immediately Without Incurring Section 16(b) Liability, 
19 SEC. REG. LJ. 419, 420 (1992); Peter J. Romeo & Alan L. Dye, The New Section 16 
Regulatory Scheme, 24 REv. SEc. & CoMMODITIES REG. 105, 112 (1991). 
288. As discussed earlier, the rapidity of challenge is likely to be slowed by the§ 23(a) 
defense of good faith reliance on SEC rules and thus must await a test case that, while not 
itself producing a contingency fee, will be brought to clear the way for future suits. See supra 
note 116. 
289. Steinberg and Landsdale, noting that the new framework "directly contradicts ex-
isting judicial precedent," state that "[c]onvincing the judiciary to adopt the view that the 
exercise of a derivative security is an exempt transaction under section 16(b) may prove 
problematic." Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 12, at 64-65; see also Romeo & Dye, supra 
note 287, at 112. 
290. 984 F.2d 1328 (2d Cir. 1993). 
291. 984 F.2d at 1338. In Frankel, the defendants were statutory insiders who had 
purchased on the market 1.1 million of the issuer's shares in May 1985 for $15.31 per share 
(and 2500 shares for $13.71 per share) and in July 1985 acquired puts for 3.8 million shares 
with an exercise price of $18. The puts were not exercisable for at least a year. The plaintiff 
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gests a possible continuing judicial sympathy to the old approach 
despite the new understanding that the SEC presumably hopes has 
come out of the process of promulgating the new rules.292 
The SEC acknowledged the problems raised by the Greene and 
Timberlake decisions in its release promulgating the new rule. The 
SEC's best argument as to why its new exemption for the exercise 
of derivative securities should survive judicial review despite the in-
validation of the old rule is its statement that "[n]ow, after 30 years 
of study and experience with trading in derivative securities, the 
Commission's rules today recognize what they did not then, that 
derivative securities are functionally equivalent to underlying eq-
uity securities for purposes of Section 16."293 This statement is fine 
as far as it goes, but it does not provide a fully articulated theory of 
section 16(b ). It will not constitute an adequate response to the 
continuing concern that an exercise of an ESO, a call option, or an 
SAR followed within six months by a sale of the resulting shares 
claimed that the acquisition of the puts should be deemed a sale under§ 16{b) and so the 
defendants should be compelled to disgorge their profits from the short-swing purchase and 
sale. In support of this claim, the plaintiff pointed to the new rule 16b-6, which deems the 
acquisition of a put to be a § 16{b) sale, see 11 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (1993), and argued that 
"the rationale behind the new rules ... mandates the application of section 16(b} to the 
transactions in this case" even though the new rules "were not effective until May 1991 and 
therefore not directly applicable." 984 F.2d at 1337-38. The Second Circuit rejected this 
argument: 
"[T]he new regulatory framework not only reverses the Commission's own regulatory 
approach but also differs from a line of cases that, in the absence of rules to the contrary, 
have held that the exercise of the option (rather than its acquisition) is the section 16(b} 
purchase of an equity security. " ... Given that the new rule is a reversal, and that the 
law of this circuit has been to consider only the exercise of an option a purchase or sale 
within section 16(b), the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's claim, and we 
affirm. 
984 F.2d at 1338 (quoting Implementing Release, supra note 205, at 81,261). 
292. The court obviously did not invalidate the new rule - it did not need to confront 
that issue - and it was careful to note that the prior precedent was " 'in the absence of rules 
to the contrary.'" 984 F.2d at 1338 (quoting Implementing Release, supra note 205, at 
81,261). On the other hand, it certainly could have taken the plaintiff's invitation to reexam-
ine that precedent in light the new learning offered by the SEC in the process of promulgat-
ing the new rules. That it declined to do so has some significance, particularly given that it 
could have used Exchange Act§ 23(a), see supra note 116, to protect the defendants from 
any unfairness the court felt they would suffer from having the reasoning of the new rule 
applied ex post facto. 
293. Implementing Release, supra note 205, at 81,263 (footnote omitted). The SEC made 
two other points as well, neither of which is very persuasive: (i) the old exemption was not 
part of a larger scheme that permitted the § 16(b) matching of derivative security transac-
tions with each other and with transactions in the underlying securities, and (ii) the old ex-
emption did not require a six-month holding period. Id. at 81,263 & n.126. As to the first, 
the SEC was leaving development of rules as to these kinds of matchings to the courts and 
nothing was stopping the courts from doing so. See supra sections III.C.1.b, III.C.2.b. As to 
the second, a six-month holding period is not in fact a necessary or appropriate part of the 
scheme in any case. See supra note 271 and accompanying text. Furthermore, as the discus-
sion in the text immediately below suggests, neither of these factors is related to the central 
concerns expressed by the court in Greene. 
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could be an occasion for the abuse of negative nonpublic informa-
tion at the time of the exercise and that an exemption for such exer-
cises prevents section 16(b) from deterring such behavior.294 In the 
earlier consideration of hypothetical C2, involving a market-
purchased call option, we suggested that a court having this concern 
might well find the exercise of such an option to be a transaction 
"within the purpose of [section 16(b)]" and the SEC's attempted 
exemption of the exercise to be outside the SEC's statutorily dele-
gated powers.295 This would be all the more true with an ESQ be-
cause, as we have seen, the cases dealing with ESQs have uniformly 
held an exercise to be a "purchase" and the earlier SEC exemption 
for ESQ exercises was judicially invalidated.296 
The only effective response to this concern is to derive a better 
understanding of how a statute imposing liability on the short-swing 
can really work to especially deter trades based on inside informa-
tion, as opposed to deterring equally all trades - ones based on 
inside information and ones that are not. The theory in Part II pro-
vides such an understanding. The crux of this theory is that the 
statute can only be concerned with the possibility of abuse at the 
time of the first transaction; the statute deters such transactfons by 
forcing those who would engage in them to be dediversified for at 
least six months; and purchase and sale should be defined in terms 
of when insiders assume an increase in their portfolio risk and when 
the increased risk ends. The class of paired transactions represent-
ing SAR exercises and ESQ exercises followed by quick sales may 
contain some situations in which one or both of the transactions are 
motivated by negative inside information, but it does not fit within 
this scheme. The sale is the second transaction, and the first trans-
action - the exercise of an SAR or an ESQ - should not be con-
sidered a "purchase" because it involves no change in portfolio risk. 
In economic terms there has not really been a short swing: there is 
no more reason to require the return of profits arising from these 
pairs of transactions than from the ordinary sales by insiders of 
shares they have held for a long time. 
The value of this better-articulated theory for defending the 
SEC's 1991 reforms is well illustrated by the reasoning of the court 
294. Steinberg and Landsdale, for example, have expressed this concern in commenting 
upon the new regime. Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 12, at 65. Their remarks are 
quoted earlier in this article. See supra text accompanying note 209. 
295. See supra text accompanying note 209. 
296. See supra text accompanying notes 248-53. 
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in Greene v. Dietz. 29? The court asked rhetorically whether exemp-
tion for ESO exercises under old rule 16b-3 "was consistent with 
the express purpose of the statute."298 Suggesting that it was not, 
the court answered this question by stating: "we can still envision 
insider trading abuses made possible by the broad exemptions of 
employee stock purchase options."299 The court gave as its single 
illustration a scenario involving a director who learns nonpublic 
negative information shortly after exercising an ESO, and then sells 
his shares in advance of the price decline.3oo The rationale devel-
oped here shows the error in the court's reasoning. Imposing liabil-
ity on ESO exercises followed by quick sales .out of the fear that 
this scenario will arise is not consistent with the way a short-swing 
·statute can deter insider trading because the transaction motivated 
by inside information - the sale - is the second transaction. Our 
theory illustrates that the relevant transaction for a short-swing 
statute is the first transaction. The court's example cannot be made 
more compelling by changing the facts so that the officer instead 
discovers the nonpublic negative information prior to first the 
transaction - the exercise - because that simply makes it the 
more general case of the concern discussed just above. As we have 
seen, the exercise does not involve a change in portfolio risk, and 
therefore the pair of the exercise and the sale does not really consti-
tute a short-swing transaction. The exercise is simply a necessary 
preliminary to the sale of an interest that has been held for a longer 
time.301 
297. 247 F.2d 689, 693 (2d Cir. 1957). 
298. 247 F.2d at 693. 
299. 247 F.2d at 693. 
300. Specifically, the illustration involved a Director Y of Company X who has the right 
to exercise stock purchase options granted by rule 16b-3. Tue court said: 
Let us assume that Company X announces to the public an impending merger or the 
negotiation of a large government contract, the news of which stimulates a significant 
increase in the market price of X's stock. Director Y, with no intention of defrauding 
the public or the corporation, immediately thereafter exercises his options and acquires 
a substantial amount of stock in X. Within a short time thereafter Director Y, through 
access to inside information, learns that the anticipated merger or contract has fallen 
through. Before this information is communicated to the public, Y sells his recently 
acquired stock at the market peak. The public is informed and the market price of X 
stock declines accordingly. It would seem to us that such an opportunity for profit-
taking by insiders in a temporary and artificially stimulated market would be minimized, 
in accord with the purpose of section 16(b), by a requirement that insiders [who acquire 
stock by exercise of ESOs] ... must retain their stock for at least six months •••. 
247 F.2d at 693. There is in fact no artificial stimulation in this example. The higher price 
was not inevitably temporary. It fell because of the occurrence of a negative event subse-
quent to the exercise about which the insider learned before the public did. Thus the abuse is 
simply a sale motivated by nonpublic negative information. 
301. Imposing § 16(b) in this modified situation admittedly would discourage insiders 
from exercising options and quickly selling upon learning of nonpublic negative information. 
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CONCLUSION 
Debate over section 16(b) has generated more heat than light. 
Critics assert that it is totally ineffective in combatting insider trad-
ing because all that an insider needs to do to avoid its bite is to wait 
six months before reversing the trade. Supporters of section 16(b) 
ignore this criticism and assert that anything but the broadest appli-
cation of the statute will impede the war against insider trading. 
The theory developed here refines and focuses this debate. It 
shows that a penalty on short-swing t,rading, by prolonging the pe-
riod of dediversification, does reduce· trades based on inside infor-
mation. It also shows that the penalty has costs: it reduces the 
attractiveness of management ·share ownership and share-price-
based compensation and detracts from thyir effectiveness as meth-
ods of reducing agency costs. 
The theory does not definitely answer the question whether sec-
tion 16(b) should be retained. It does, however, point to the critical 
factors for making that determination: one's assessments of the 
harm, if any, that results from insider trading and of the extent to 
which lower levels of share ownership and share-price-based com-
pensation increase agency costs.302 It also identifies the minimum 
characteristics necessary to justify inclusion of a class of paired 
transactions within section 16(b )'s reach if the statute is retained: 
the class must contain a larger portion of potential transactions mo-
tivated by inside information than officer-and-director transactions 
generally. 
But this is an inappropriate reason to include within § 16(b) SAR exercises and ESQ exer-
cises followed by quick sales since, compared to shares acquired by ordinary purchase and 
held long-term, it for no good reason singles out for onerous treatment sales of shares ac-
quired pursuant to ESOs. It will also lead to adaptive behavior - exercising early to provide 
flexibility - that burdens equally both guilty and innocent sales by officers and directors. 
The requirement advocated by the court and a requirement that insiders commit six months 
in advance to sell regularly purchased stock would prevent exactly the same kinds of abuses, 
but they are not abuses that § 16(b) was designed to remedy because they are unrelated to 
the short swing. For a more detailed discussion of these points, see supra section m.D.l.a. 
302. There might also be differences among people as to their assessment of the amount 
by which the prospect of prolonged dediversification will reduce trades on inside informa-
tion. A person who assesses this reduction as less, however, will also assess as less§ 16(b}'s 
reduction in the attractiveness of managerial share ownership and share-price-based compen-
sation. Thus an assessment that suggests reduced benefits is balanced by an assessment that 
suggests reduced costs. One might also argue that the beneficial effect could be easily 
evaded by a failure to report or by trades made in the name of someone else. This point 
underestimates, however, the way the whole § 16 apparatus of reports and short-swing penal-
ties will steer basically law-abiding people away from the temptation of engaging in trades 
based on inside information. It also ignores the fact that these methods of evasion have a 
significant cost that will tend to deter their use: they enhance the likelihood that the insider 
will be found to have violated rule lOb-5 because such methods of evasion make scienter 
easier to prove. 
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This rule of statutory reach is important. Whatever one's indi-
vidual assessments of the factors cited above, section 16(b) is un-
likely to be repealed in the foreseeable future. Public sentiment 
against insider trading is sufficiently strong that a proposal to elimi-
nate the only provision in the Federal securities law that explicitly 
deals with such trading would meet overwhelming political opposi-
tion. Thus we must be sure that this rule of thumb is no cruder than 
it needs to be. A review of judicial and SEC decisionmaking shows 
there is significant room for improvement. 
APPENDIX 
Demonstration That an Increase in a Security's Expected Return 
Leads to an Increase in Its Proportion of a Portfolio of 
Risky Securities 
Consider an officer of the issuer of security 1. Security 2 is the 
other available risky security. Let ft and f2 and O't and cr2 be respec-
tively the expected rates of return and standard deviations of secur-
ities 1 and 2; let r* be the rate of return provided by the safe asset; 
let Ptz be the correlation coefficient of the two returns of the risky 
securities, and let Xt =ft - r* and x2 = f2 - r*. Let k* be the optimal 
proportion of the dollar amount invested in security 1 to that in-
vested in security 2, i.e., the one that will result in the portfolio of 
risky securities with the highest extra return/risk ratio. 
(A-3) 
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303. For the derivation of this expression, see CHARLES W. HALEY & LAWRENCE D. 
SCHALL, THE THEORY OF FINANCIAL DECISIONS 140-42 (2d ed. 1979). 
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The first expression in (A-3) equals 0. The second expression is 
positive if x2 > 0304 and -1 < p12 < 1 (i.e., the rather likely scenario in 
which returns on the two risky securities are not perfectly corre-
lated or perfectly inverse correlated).305 Thus, under these 
circumstances, 
dk* 
dX > 0, 
I . 
i.e., an increase in the expected rate of return of security 1 leads to 
an increase in the proportion of the amount invested in that secur-
ity relative to the total amount invested in risky securities generally. 
304. If the officer possesses no nonpublic information concerning the issuer of security 2 
(which seems likely since he is not aJ:! insider of that issuer) and the securities are generally 
perceived to be positively correlated, x2 should be greater than 0 in an efficient market. In 
other words, security 2 would be priced to provide some premium over r*, what could be 
earned by investors in the safe asset. 
305. If p12 = 1, the investor would invest all of his risky portfolio in the security with the 
higher extra return/risk ratio, i.e., the higher X/cr. 
